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Дата публикации: 13 декабря 2004
Публикатор: Александр Павлович Шиманский
Рубрика: ЭКОНОМИКА - Зарубежные экономисты →
Номер публикации: №1102951721 / Жалобы? Ошибка? Выделите проблемный текст и нажмите CTRL+ENTER!
Murphy, John W.
REASON, BOUNDED RATIONALITY, AND THE LEBENSWELT:
Socially Sensitive Decision Making
Abstract. Herbert Simon introduced the concept of bounded rationality to provide a socially sensitive perspective on decision making But he was not entirely successful in this endeavor. Specifically, he has not abandoned the assumption of perfect rationality. All he has done is to recognize that persons have limited cognitive abilities, and thus are incapable of acting in a perfectly rational manner. In this paper, the attempt is made to illustrate how Simon's position can be deepened, due to the work of a host of modern writers. Decision making, in other words, can be made socially sensitive by understanding facts and reason to originate from the Lebenswelt.
Throughout the Western Tradition, the forces of reason and unreason have been at war. In short, rational judgments are believed to be constantly threatened by irrational impulses. And as graphically described by Hobbes, the "war of all against all" can erupt at any moment. But through the proper socialization, education, and professional training, for example, irrationality is thought to be brought under control. With irrationality repressed, both personal actions and social policies can be guided by reason.
Yet for such a change to occur, a unique and somewhat troublesome demarche has to be made. Specifically, the realm of quotidian concerns must be overcome. In other words, doxa or opinion must be abandoned, so that real knowledge (episteme) can be obtained. As a result of avoiding interpretation, reason can be exposed and utilized.
Clearly this kind of dualism is problematic. After all, reason can be exercised only in the absence of interpretation. But surely self-denial is an odd principle for directing the acquisition of knowledge. Nonetheless, according to traditional wisdom, persons cannot become truly rational so long as they are distracted by daily affairs.
Plato, for example, required that persons gain entree to the realm of ideas, before their minds can be considered cleansed. In the Medieval Period, various mendicant practices were adopted to liberate persons from their bodies, in order that divine inspiration might be obtained. And in the modern world, methodological practices are used to neutralize the search for truth. By creating the appearance that scientists are value-free, their findings and recommendations are touted to be unquestionably rational.
The aim herein is not to be exhaustive, but to suggest that a high cost has been paid for pursuing reason. It seems particularly important that the elements of humanness have been portrayed as impeding the discovery of valid information. The attempt made by positivists to separate fact from value epitomizes this tendency. According to these philosophers, only knowledge that can be divorced from judgments should be considered noteworthy. And essential to gaining this sort of untainted insight is the correct implementation of scientific ortechnical methods.
Obviously this view of accurate knowledge is not foreign to economists. The quantification of exchange has been given a high priority, especially during the period from the onset of the marginalists up to the present. In fact, modern econometrics is thought to represent the state of the art to many social scientists.
The belief is that if personal biases and other idiosyncracies could be removed from economic models related to the operation of markets, trading could be optimized. Very rational decisions would be made, and thus the economy would flourish. Homo economicus could finally be discovered and unleashed. What should be immediately evident, however, is that this rendition of human action is abstract. But this modern trader is no different from the person who managed to escape from the darkness of Plato's cave. Pure reason, in short, is thought to be operative in each case.
What Plato never imagined is that his ideas would eventually be replicated through the use of computer technology. As a result of simulations, expert systems, and other technological advances, decision making has been formalized and made extremely reliable. If particular signals are witnessed at the marketplace, an appropriate and thus rational response to these indicators is automatically initiated. In this way, profits are maximized.
The way this mechanistic reasoning works is quite simple. Information that is presumed to be self-evident to rational traders serves as the knowledge base of a trading program. This information is then formulated into a variety of "scripts" or trading scenarios, based on a series of "if/then" statements. Given certain input, particular trading gambits are made. Assumed is that in every instance there is a correct way to decipher the conditions at the marketplace. And anyone who is unemotional can recognize any changes in this environment and trade rationally.
Reason is thus idealized. This occurs regardless of the amount of data available for making a decision. Even in the absence of complete information, a particular mode of assessing input is accepted a priori as rational. Reason is enacted as a simple relationship between a market stimulus and a response by traders.
But the question should be asked, is reason this pristine? Do traders evaluate facts dispassionately and exploit market opportunities fully? This somewhat naive viewpoint is derived from research on artificial intelligence, particularly the decision making strategies used in games such as chess. Undoubtedly anyone who asks another person to play chess is expected to know the rules of this game. Yet compared to other aspects of social life, a chess match is a very restricted activity, for the parameters of play are fairly clear. How can such a limited framework be instilled in the general population? Indeed, persons often act on very different assumptions about how society should operate?
The point is that everyday life is not as simple as a game. Therefore, why should economic decisions be imagined to occur in such a simplified way? Clearly persons do not reside in an identical environment, have similar values, or pursue the same goals. Considering these differences, adopting a single model to describe trading makes little sense. Simply put, reason is not uniform enough to justify such an approach to conceptualizing buying and selling.
At this juncture, a statement about the relationship between reason and interpretation is in order. Interpretation does not refer to the selection, organization, or portrayal of facts, as if this activity is prior to the exercise of reason (i.e., making inferences or drawing conclusions). Instead, interpretation pervades reason. What this means is that the characteristics of reason are specified with regard to how social reality is created through interpretation. Hence interpretation serves to justify every version of rationality.
In other words, reason is not pure and ahistorical. Making economic decisions is a part of daily existence, rather than a rarefied endeavor. Moreover, social conditions are instrumental in determining the outcome of decisions. How can persons ignore their values, beliefs, and commitments when deciding what to buy and sell? Expecting that persons will trade in an idealized manner is quite fatuous. Reason, instead, should be viewed as replete with contingencies.
As a variety of modern writers have noted, reason does not exist sui generis. In this regard, they claim that reason is socially constructed. Like every other facet of social life, reason is invented, corroborated through dialogue, and expressed in a very qualified way. Instead of universal, reason is thematic and useful only in very specific circumstances. This means that the market should not be envisioned as the source of rationality and discipline, because numerous modes of interpretation are operative long before trading begins.
Persons do not arrive at the marketplace with identical assumptions about reality, profit maximization, and productive trading strategies. From the outset, different resources, means, and goals inform trading. Trading is thus multivalent, rather than guided by uniform principles. To be realistic, the marketplace is where realities begin to clash. Because of their different expectations, traders do not respond similarly to market signals.
Clearly this critique of reason is not new. Writers as different as Marx and the members of the Austrian School questioned the universality of reason. But the work of Herbert Simon is usually associated with the modern challenge to Homo economicus. With his notion of "bounded-rationality," he tried to change the way in which traditional economists have thought about trading.
As Simon indicates, classical theory was concerned with decisions made according to given alternatives. At that time, the givenness of events and the parameters of reason were taken for granted. Every reasonable person was simply presumed to adjust to fluctuations of the market. And those who never acquired this aptitude would be unsuccessful at trading. That traders may not try to maximize their opportunities was not given serious consideration.
Subsequent to Simon's discussion of bounded rationality, however, trading came to be viewed more in social terms. Economists began to entertain the idea that perhaps traders are not perfectly rational. Maybe reason has parameters that are not universal, and trading reflects the parochial nature of the assumptions that are made about reality. If this is the case, assessing whether or not a particular decision is rational requires far more than knowledge about syllogisms, rules of deduction or induction, or other technical facets of logic.
Contrary to what Muth maintains, for example, persons do not trade in accordance with the theory of a particular model. Rather than merely acting rationally, traders interpret conditions based on how they construe their past, present, and future. Using a phrase popularized by Max Weber, persons trade in terms of what they view to be their "life chances." In this respect, rationality is certainly bounded or regionalized.
This point is affirmed by the distinction Simon makes between optimizers and satisficers. Optimizers act according to the thesis of profit maximization and make the most economically sound decision in any situation. Nothing, in other words, interferes with the optimal utilization of resources. Satisficers, on the other hand, halt their pursuit of gain when they believe that every option has been explored. For them, possibilities are not dictated by the economic system, but rather by so-called intangibles such as ambition, perceived need, and future plans. In a sense, satisficers place reason in the service of these ostensibly non-economic and non-rational considerations.
Satisficers act reasonably instead of rationally. This does not mean that their decisions are haphazard or lack justification. Instead, their trading behavior does not reflect solely economic motives and logic. But the question remains to be asked, has Simon gone far enough in abandoning the standard rendition of decision making? The contention of this paper is that he has not, but instead merely acknowledges that traders are not perfectly rational. This proposition is altogether different from understanding reason as being thoroughly localized.
Simon rejects the idea that reason exists a priori, and that only specific ways of searching for information, classifying input, analyzing data, and responding to market conditions are indicative of rationality. Nonetheless, his critique is insufficient. He asserts that reason is not uniform because of logistical considerations. The argument presented here goes further and recognizes that reason is a modality of interpretation; reason reflects particular assumptions that are accepted as real.
Realism in Decision Making
What is the primary shortcoming of Simon s notion of bounded rationality? Although he has proffered a more accurate depiction of trading than was previously available, his theory is dualistic. Because human action does not extend to the core of reason, the criteria for judging the appropriateness of a transaction remain a part of the market environment. And with the source of reason externalized, the rules of trading appear to be objective. Economic exchange can thus proceed smoothly.
Given recent developments in epistemology, however, providing reason with such an indubitable foundation has become increasingly difficult to justify. Dualism is under attack by a variety of writers, who contend that knowledge cannot be divorced from interpretation. For example, this is what Jacques Derrida has in mind when he declares that "nothing exists outside of the text." Social reality and human action are thus inextricably united. Accordingly, the element of realism retained by Simon may become a liability, for this remnant of the past may obscure the interpretive thrust of decision making. Compared to objective market indicators, the actual logic employed by traders may seem unimportant.
How is realism expressed by Simon? In his contribution to A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, Simon defines reason in a dualistic fashion. He writes that reason is exhibited when a person recognizes market constraints, which are objective and possibly fixed. Acting rationally, in other words, requires that accurate knowledge of market conditions be obtained. Prudent traders, notes Simon, react to the "objective conditions of the environment."
The problem appears to be that humans have limited cognitive capacity. According to Simon there are two renditions of reason--God's and Man's. As a result, humans are condemned to be irrational, because they are always acting on the basis of one perspective or another. Without extensive information, the best choice may never be known.
Bounded rationality becomes relevant at this point. Because of inadequate conceptual power, humans are incapable of anticipating every contingency. Due to trading irregularities, incomplete information, and the ever increasing complexity of the business environment, human reason can never be more than bounded. Therefore, truly rational behavior should not be expected from traders, because reason is "bounded by the situation and by human computational powers." All persons should simply be viewed as making the best possible decision with the input that is available. After all, those who cannot comprehend what Simon refers to as the "real world" cannot take full advantage of their opportunities. Traders, in short, are not gods. And if they were gods, they would not be human.
Although Simon wants to elevate in importance subjective or bounded rationality, he has failed to accomplish this goal. He seems to believe that true rationality could be achieved by traders, if only humans could increase their cognitive abilities. If persons could begin to think like computers, for example, perhaps they would make more sound investments. Anyway, he does not jettison the "assumption of perfect rationality," but merely admits that humans are feeble. However, recognizing that traders are not strictly rational apparently does not provide much insight into the process of trading. As is true for most realists, Simon suggests that subjectivity impedes the search for objectivity and stifles rational behavior.
Clearly, Simon addresses the issue of rationality at a purely technical level. Insufficient data processing and storage capacity are his focus of attention. With more sophisticated methodologies and better quality data, accordingly, trading could become increasingly predictable and rational. Apparently, Simon thinks that technical skills are the key to making the market perform in an optimal way.
What he fails to mention is that enhancing reason is not simply a technical undertaking. Even the most powerful computer and an infinite amount of data cannot guarantee that decision making will adhere to strict economic principles. The rationale for this conclusion is quite straightforward: reasoning is fundamentally an epistemological activity. That is, persons do not simply make deductions based on objective evidence and a priori rules of logic. Likewise, they do not simply collect facts, as part of the process of induction. Throughout the deliberation process interpretation is operative, and thus basic premises, facts, and cognitive processes are all provisional. For example, identifying facts is difficult because of cultural differences and shifts in how persons define their existence.
Someone might claim at this time that because traders are not ultimately rational, why not study what they actually do? Why worry about their lack of rationality? But the problem is that such research may be meaningless, unless the world-view of traders is understood. A high degree of technical competence does not necessarily lead to more insightful trading, because the existential commitments that sustain reason may be obscured. Reason is interpretive and not simply an empirical or technical issue.
Although Simon addresses the role of values in decision making, he is also dualistic when dealing with this issue. Reason and values are differentiated. He states that reason is instrumental, whereas values represent the emotional side of making a decision.
Accordingly, reason is pure and objects of choice are empirical. Furthermore, values have to be clarified and reduced in number before reason can function effectively. Through the proper socialization of expectations, values can promote rationality.
But difficulties result from treating reason as pure and striving to restrict values. Most important, reductionism is encouraged. In this regard, Simon goes so far as to suggest that maybe a uniform value base can be discovered, thus increasing the efficiency of decision making models. Truncating reason and values may reduce complexity and improve efficiency, but decision making is misrepresented.
Before subjective rationality can be viewed as more than a liability, dualism must be subverted. For as long as objectivity is pursued, the knowledge related to interpretation will be considered a surrogate for information that is derived from reality. And why should anyone settle for opinion, when more profound knowledge is available? Clearly, the bounded character of human rationality will remain a liability, until interpretation is recognized to be a legitimate source of knowledge.
If economists and other social scientists are serious about interjecting interpretation into decision making, a non-dualistic epistemology should be adopted. As a result, subjectivity will not be treated automatically as ancillary to objectivity. Values, and a host of so-called non-logical factors, can be placed at the core of decision making, without the fear of sacrificing reason. Therefore, satisficing does not have to be merely a reasonable alternative, until more encompassing heuristic devices are invented.
Knowledge and the Lebenswelt
A Plethora of modern writers argue that dualism is unjustified. According to them, transcending the influence of interpretation is impossible. To paraphrase Walter Benjamin, perception is simultaneously interpretation, and thus knowledge is revealed only indirectly in terms of the nuances of experience. Simon recognizes the validity of anti-dualism, but he believes the relevance of this philosophy does not extend beyond the field of micro-physics.
In view of the recent writing of Barthes, Derrida, Kristeva, Lacan, and Lyotard, for example, Simon's assessment of anti-dualism is uninformed. What they demonstrate is that dualism is passe on both the micro and macro levels of reality. Their key point is that persons never simply respond to objects, but react to the meaning of these phenomena. Barthes summarizes this position nicely when he says that "everything has meaning, even non-sense." Accordingly, the idea that reality is obtrusive and readily visible to any rational observer has lost a significant amount of credence.
Rationality should never be equated with reason, according to these newer authors. Responsible for this shift in thinking is the change that has occurred in understanding language. Speech acts are no longer envisioned to be indexical and "point to," "indicate," or "stand for" objective events. This portrayal is dualistic and suggests that reality is not interpretive. As opposed to this version of speech, Barthes writes that "everything is language, nothing escapes language, all of society is permeated by language." And because every aspect of social existence is mediated thoroughly by language, rationality is buried within interpretation and is elusive.
While borrowing from Wittgenstein, Lyotard asserts that all knowledge is derived from "language games." What this means is that every source of information is imbued with interpretation. For example, positive science and formal logic are nothing more than two different linguistic games. Even objectivity, according to Barthes, is "only one image-repertoire among others." Stated differently, social reality constitutes merely a set of linguistically instituted assumptions that are not often questioned. This is what Jacques Lacan has in mind when he avers that truth is a product of language, rather than an accurate reflection of an objective referent.
With regard to conceptualizing social life, what is the impact of the antidualist viewpoint? In sum, the social world should not be imagined to consist of brute facts and individuals who behave like logic machines. Instead, to use a term popularized by phenomenologists, the social milieu is a "life-world" (Lebenswelt) ]Rather than a "dead," empirical presence, social reality is replete with linguisically inscribed prescriptions. As Michel Foucault describes, social existence is organized according to various "discursive practices" that have limited validity and are unstable.
Once the social world becomes the Lebenswelt, Simon's search for an indubitable reality becomes fruitless. There is simply no way to avoid the strictures imposed by language use. Indeed, how could knowledge unaffected by the human presence be conceptualized, examined, or publicly discussed? Particularly important for this discussion is that reason is socially manufactured, like any other cultural artifact. Reason, therefore, is value-based.
Interpretation and Rationality
Considering the anti-dualist philosophy that has recently emerged, Simon's notion of bounded rationality needs to be expanded. The absence of perfect rationality should not be understood to stem from inadequate cognitive skills, but the inability of traders to overcome the influence of interpretation. Therefore, improved methodologies, expanded data bases, and the assistance of technical experts will not necessarily enhance decision making. The rationale for this conclusion is that traders do not necessarily strive to perfect a particular style of ratiocination.
The only way in which more insight will be gained into economic activity is by consulting the world-view of traders. Once this is accomplished, social scientists can begin to appreciate that reasoning consists of far more than identifying, comparing, and judging data, in order to optimize the ratio between input and output. In point of fact, Lyotard declares that this kind of "performative principle" does not guide reasoning.
This is not to suggest that traders do not engage in these cognitive activities. But instead, as described by Lyotard, the argument is that reasoning can never be completely formalized or axiomatic. Achieving closure or completeness is impossible because interpretation antedates reasoning. Any system of formalized reasoning, in other words, originates in the Lebenswelt. And before facts are included in the reasoning process, they are interpreted. To borrow from Sartre, interpretation precedes reasoning.
Reason can never become a complete system because interpretation is volatile. Because there is no ultimate justification for interpreting an event in one way or another, reasoning can begin anywhere and proceed in any number of directions. Therefore, the only way to anticipate trading and detect continuity in this activity is to enter the trader's interpretive world. There is no guarantee that this realm will not change, but this linguistic framework is the source of behavioral stability.
Simon's effort to describe trading in a socially sensitive manner should be applauded. Nonetheless, he does not totally abandon the position that humans are information processors, albeit inefficient ones. But subsequent to accepting the Lebenswelt as the ground of knowledge, persons should be understood to socially construct reason and all other components of culture. Hence, as Lyotard recognizes, reason is thus truly "localized."
But how does this revelation affect economics? Economists should not despair because reason cannot be extricated from interpretation. Instead, the attempt should be made to comprehend the local nature of markets. According to this shift in philosophy, economists should no longer ignore common sense as a source of reason. They should begin to recognize, like scholars in many other fields, that the mode of interpretation utilized to regulate or structure everyday life is reason.
Accordingly, in this paper Simon's contention is accepted that reason is bounded. The rationale for this conclusion, however, is significantly different from his. Reason is bounded because it cannot be differentiated from interpretation. Interpretation is finite, and thus reason is not universal. Clearly, some significant implications are related to this radicalization of Simon's thesis.
First, to act in less than an optimal way, or fail to reflect reality, does not signal a breakdown in rationality. Due to the ubiquity of interpretation, credence cannot be given to a priori conceptions of either reason or reality. Therefore, not adhering to the dictates of a particular reality merely signals that primacy has been given to another mode of interpretation. An apparently faulty trading gambit should not be dismissed as irrational, but instead should be approached as a novel style of reasoning.
Second, increasing the amount of data collected will not necessarily provide more insight into trading behavior. Remember that a failure to optimize does not necessarily result from a lack of information or improper judgment. Relevance, instead, should be the theme that guides data collection. This does not mean that information is idiosyncratic, for, as Sartre says, "collective praxis" is possible. The point is that economic models are not automatically refined by making logistical improvements. Implied is that the interpretive activity persons use to organize their daily lives--their socially constituted reality--should be built into these devices.
Third, research should be based on communicative rather than technical competence. As might be suspected, technical competence improves as a consequence of procedural advancements. Communicative competence, on the other hand, is predicated on grasping the pragmatic thrust of language. What this means is that researchers should learn to appreciate how reality is generated through the use of language. The language game played by a community, for example, is entered and the relevant rules of logic are learned. In this way, what is meant by rationality in a specific social context can be understood. This kind is intimacy is referred to as "epistemic participation."
Fourth, to borrow from Robert Merton, perhaps only "middle range" models can be developed. This issue goes to the heart of the debate over the nature of social science. Simply put, if interpretation extends to the core of facts, reason, and all other social phenomena, how can this finding be ignored? Inventing economic models that have regional relevance should not be viewed as a liability. Unless reality exists sui generis not extending the parameters associated with a mode of interpretation should be recognized as prudent.
[1.] John W. Murphy, Postmodern Social Analysis and Criticism, (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1989) 107-109.
[2.] Susan Bordo, The Flight to Objectivity (Albany, NY: State U of New York P, 1987).
[3.] Robert D. Ley and L. E. Johnson, "Selecting Social Goals: Alternative Concepts of Rationality," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 49 (Oct, 1990): 469-481.
[4.] Cornel West, "The Politics of American Neo-Pragmatism," Post Analytic Philosophy, eds. J. Rajchman and C. West, (New York: Columbia UP, 1985) 259-275.
[5.] Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus Mind over Machine (New York: The Free Press, 1986) 101-121.
[6.] G. L. S. Schackle, Epistemics and Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1972) 106 107.
[7.] Schackle, 135 136.
[8.] John W. Murphy, "Phenomenological Social Science: Research in the Public Interest," Social Science Journal 23(3) July, 1986): 327-343.
[9.] Shaun Hargreaves Heap, Rationality in Economics (London: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
[10.] Herbert A. Simon, "Theories of Bounded Rationality," Models of Bounded Rationality, 2 vols., (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982) #2: 408 423.
 Simon, 419.
[12.] John F. Muth, " Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements," Econometrica 29(3) July!. 1961): 315 335.
[13.] Max Weber, Economy and Society, (Berkeley: U of CA P, 1878) #2: 929.
[14.] Simon 417 418.
[15.] Geoff Hodgson, "The Rationalist Conception of Action." Journal of Economic Issues 19(4), (Dec, 1985): 825-851; Hamid Hosseini, "The Archaic, the Obsolete, and the Mythical in Neoclassical Economics," American Journal of Economics and Sociology ,49(1), (Jan, 1990): 81-92.
[16.] Simon, 417-418.
[17.] Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976) 158.
[18.] Simon, "Rationality," Models of Bounded Rationality, 2: 405.
[19.] Simon, "Theories of Bounded Rationality," 415.
[20.] Simon, "Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought," Models of Bounded Rationality, 2:451.
[21.] Simon, "Theories of Bounded Rationality," 410-411.
[22.] Herbert A. Simon, Reason in Human Affairs (Stanford, CT: Stanford UP, 1983) 34.
[23.] Herbert A. Simon, "Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations," Models of Bounded Rationality, 2: 491.
[24.] Harvey Leibenstein, General Efficiency Theory and Economic Development (New York: Oxford UP, 1978) 21-26.
[25.] Simon, Reason in Human Affairs, 106.
[26.] Simon, 85.
[27.] Murphy, Postmodern Social Analysis and Criticism, 19-36.
[28.] Walter Benjamin, "On Language as Such and on the Language of Man," Reflections (New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1978) 313-332.
[29.] Simon, "From Substantive to Procedural Rationality," Models of Bounded Rationality, 437.
[30.] Roland Barthes, The Grain of the Voice (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985) 19.
[31.] Barthes, 153.
[32.] Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota P, 1984) 9 11.
[33.] Barthes, 52.
[34.] Jacques Lacan, Ecrits (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977) 306.
[35.] Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1970) part IIIA.
[36.] Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1989) 31-39.
[37.] Lyotard, 47-53.
[38.] Lyotard, 61.
[39.] Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964) 2: 64-88.
[40.] Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialactical Reason (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979) 505-524.
[41.] Jurgen Habermas, "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," Recent Sociology, No. 2, ed. Hans Peter Dreitzel, (New York: Macmillan, 1970) 114-148.
[42.] John W. Murphy, "Phenomenological Social Science: Research in the Public Interest," 327 343.
[43.] Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1949) 5-6.
Опубликовано 13 декабря 2004 года
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