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Russia's World War I Alliances

Дата публикации: 04 сентября 2007
Публикатор: Научная библиотека Порталус
Рубрика: RUSSIA (TOPICS) - Imperial Russia →
Источник: (c) http://russia.by
Номер публикации: №1188907564


Was Russia's alignment with France and Great Britain a wise strategy?

Viewpoint: Yes. France and Britain were reliable counterweights to Germany and Austria-Hungary and shared Russia's interest in blocking the Germans' and Austrians' eastward expansion.

Viewpoint: No. Russia would have been better served politically and economically by aligning itself with Germany and Austria-Hungary, which could have helped, instead of hindered, Russian aims in the Balkans and were far better markets than France or Britain for Russian goods.

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Russia's pre-World War I alliance with France, in effect since 1892, and its looser alignment with Britain, effective after 1907, were cornerstones of early-twentieth-century European and world diplomacy. Sharing an interest in countering German power, the three nations established a relationship that prefigured the Allied camp in World War I. Indeed, some historians believe that the alliances set in place before 1914 were fundamental causes of the conflict, which was created--according to conventional European diplomatic history--by a belligerent Germany that threatened the interests of most other great powers.
This chapter assesses the wisdom of the Russian commitment to its World War I allies. While it shared France and Britain's resistance to expanding German power, Russia does not appear to have served its long-term interests by taking part in the war. After all, Russia was one of the major losers, and its alliance with France played an important role in dragging it into the conflict. Before 1914, Russia had cordial relations with Germany, and German diplomatic goals posed almost no threat to Russian interests. The Russian government shared the conservative social and political values of its wartime opponents far more than it shared the democratic values of its allies, and the implications of the war for Russia's long-term domestic stability were inauspicious. Some revisionist scholars therefore see few benefits for the empire in the diplomatic constellation of prewar Europe.



Viewpoint: Yes. France and Britain were reliable counterweights to Germany and Austria-Hungary and shared Russia's interest in blocking the Germans' and Austrians' eastward expansion.

In the years leading up to World War I, the Russian Empire faced two major threats to its interests and security: Germany's imperial push toward the Middle East and the Austro-Hungarian Empire's expansion at the expense of Russia's clients in the Balkans. The decline of Russian influence in southeastern Europe would have aided the German drive toward the Middle East, added a new competitor to Russian ambitions in the region, and threatened Russian interests in the Black Sea littoral. Failing to support its Balkan clients against Austria-Hungary would have tarnished Russia's image in the world as a powerful and reliable ally and damaged its government's domestic prestige. These consequences would have greatly reduced Russia's ability to function as a great power. In order to counter these threats, it was logical and sensible for the Russians to look to France and later Britain as allies.

Not only were France and Britain logical allies, but they also had economic, political, and military strengths that made them useful counterweights to Germany and Austria-Hungary. France was a large, populous nation, industrially advanced, economically strong, and able to field a large, powerful army. Together Russia and France could threaten Germany with a two-front war. In addition to these tangible factors, the French in the years leading up to World War I were still aching to avenge their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. The French wanted to reclaim the Alsace-Lorraine region, which they had lost to Germany in the peace settlement at the end of that war. The British, although slower to respond to events on the Continent, were nonetheless concerned about German efforts to dominate Europe, a development that they viewed as a direct threat to their security. Britain was also an economically powerful nation, backed by the resources of a vast empire. After 1898, ambitious German naval efforts posed a direct threat to the British Empire, and--despite rivalries between Russia and Britain in the regions along the southern borders of the Russian Empire--building closer ties with Britain was a logical move for Russia. In short, the Triple Entente alliance of Russia, France, and Britain served the needs of the Russian Empire.

Any reckoning of Russia's diplomatic position in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries must consider the role of Germany. Under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's leadership, Germany had forged a united country in 1864-1871. Bismarck had won impressive military victories in wars against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870-1871); challenged France's position as the preeminent European power; and altered the European status quo. He then established Germany as a status-quo power. Realizing that the large, populous, militarily powerful nation posed a new threat to established European powers, Bismarck shrewdly pursued diplomacy designed to reassure most of his European neighbors of his commitment to stability and to prevent the French from establishing any alliance that could threaten Germany. Bismarck understood that aggressive policies would invite other European powers to unite in hostility against Germany. He also realized that Germany's location in central Europe made it vulnerable to war on multiple fronts, which greatly worried German military leaders. Calculating how best to preserve Germany's position in the new European configuration of powers, Bismarck became a champion of conservative diplomacy and the status quo.

The cautious nature of German diplomacy changed when Wilhelm II succeeded to the German throne in 1888. Disdainful of what he felt to be Bismarck's patronizing treatment, Wilhelm, who was much younger than his chancellor, decided to embark on a "New Course" in German policy. The young emperor sacked Bismarck in 1890, replacing the superior statesman with men of inferior ability who spent the next twenty-five years provoking crises, antagonizing neighbors, and threatening to disrupt the balance of power in Europe, even as Germany was becoming more isolated diplomatically. Wilhelm withdrew from a secret defensive agreement with Russia; cast a covetous eye toward the Middle East; acquired colonies in Africa and the Pacific; provoked or heightened crises over the French occupation of Morocco; and tried to intimidate other powers into accepting alliances on German terms.

From the Russian standpoint, Germany's increasing aggressiveness in the years after 1890 was particularly problematic because of its interest in spreading power and influence into the Middle East, a step that brought it into conflict with Russian interests in the Balkans and the Black Sea littoral. Although Russian claims that they were protectors of the Slavs were overblown and self-serving, considerable Russian effort had been committed to the independence of Orthodox Christian South Slavs, who were agitating for autonomy within, or independence from, Germany's closest ally, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. A successful German push toward the Middle East would undermine the interests of the South Slavs and Russia's credibility as a regional power. German influence over the Ottoman Empire--as evidenced by German military missions and economic investment in the years before 1914--could have given them control over the strategic straits linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. Black Sea commerce was far too important to Russia for them to permit German control over this vital sea artery.

With Germany and Austria posing the major threat to Russia, it was logical for the Russians to seek closer ties with France and Britain. Having been hostile to one another for years, these two nations had been brought closer together in response to the inept policies of Wilhelm II and his ministers. The British and French had considerable strengths to offer Russia in an alliance.

In the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, there were understandable doubts about France's future as a great power. The Germans had defeated France rapidly, and then imposed a peace treaty designed to slow French resurgence. One of the main tools Bismarck used in his attempt to slow the pace of French recovery was the required repayment of war indemnities, but--contrary to expectations--the French used their ample capital reserves to pay them early. They then spent significant sums to expand and modernize their army, and by 1900 their army was larger than that of Germany. Angry about their territorial losses in the Franco-Prussian War, motivated to meet the new German threat, and capable of combining with Russia to confront the Germans with a two-front war, the French were suitable allies for the Russians. In 1892 the two nations concluded a military alliance.

The British also had much to commend them as friends of Russia even though--owing to their historic desire for the freedom to maneuver diplomatically--they were reluctant to enter into binding alliance commitments. Despite their desire to refrain from continental entanglements, the British had long known the dangers they would face if Europe were dominated by a single power. With Germany moving in precisely that direction, the British developed a vested interest in acting to prevent such an occurrence, and they were able to bring considerable commercial and naval power to bear in such an effort.

To work closely with the British required an historic change of course in Russian policy. For decades the Russians and British had been potential rivals all along the vast perimeter of the Russian Empire, from the Mediterranean to China. New realities changed the nature of Anglo-Russian relations, however. Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 forced Russia to moderate its expansion in the Far East, the region where it had been the most active since its conquest of Central Asia in the 1880s. By 1907 the threat posed by Germany had become much more serious than disputes with the British over Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet, or other Asian borderlands. The British and the Russians negotiated a broad settlement of all outstanding colonial issues.

The British brought much to their relationship with Russia. Great Britain was an economic powerhouse. In 1900 Britain produced more coal than the continental powers combined and as much iron as Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary combined. Only Germany produced more steel than Britain. Even though relative British economic power was declining, the British retained the manpower reserves and resources of their global empire. The British also maintained an impressive navy. After 1889, realizing that maritime power was the key to their empire, the British governed naval expenditures according to the "Two-Power Standard," which required them to maintain a navy larger than the next two largest navies combined. By 1910, Britain was spending as much on its navy as Germany, France, and Russia together.

Given the challenges the Russians were facing from Austria in the Balkans and Germany in the Near East, they needed friends elsewhere in Europe. France brought a strong economy and army, hostility to Germany, and the ability to join the Russians in trapping the Germans in a two-front war. The British were committed to resisting German domination of continental Europe. Together, the three allies furnished strengths that could help the Russians preserve their position as a great power. It made perfect sense for the diplomats of the Russian Empire to build close connections with the British and the French.

-- John Soares, Cincinnati, Ohio


Viewpoint: No. Russia would have been better served politically and economically by aligning itself with Germany and Austria-Hungary, which could have helped, instead of hindered, Russian aims in the Balkans and were far better markets than France or Britain for Russian goods.

Many scholars contend that the entangling alliances of the nineteenth century paved the road to World War I, dragging unwilling adversaries into an inevitable conflict. This argument is often used to describe how Great Britain was pulled into another Franco-German conflict or how Germany was forced to support Austria-Hungary in another Balkan War. Perhaps the most lamentable consequence of the alliance system was the disintegration of Russia and its subsequent descent into chaos, civil war, and communist oppression. The fall of the tsar was a direct consequence of the Russians' unfortunate and ill-conceived alliances with Britain and France, who ultimately proved to be unreliable allies.

In retrospect, Russia would have been better served by a different choice of strategic partners. As Europe tottered on the brink of war in 1914, several governments reconsidered their political commitments. Italy and Romania, for example, extricated themselves from alliances with Germany and Austria-Hungary, first declaring neutrality and then entering the war on the side of the Entente (Britain, France, and Russia). Bulgaria reneged on its 1902 treaty with Russia and entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. Russian policy makers, however, opted to stay the course in their alliances with Britain and France.

The reasons for these alliances were many and complex. Nineteenth-century Europe attempted to achieve a balance of power in which the strengths and weaknesses of one state or group of states were compensated for, or matched by, those of another or others. Each alliance member brought something different to the table. In the Entente alliance of Britain, France, and Russia, Britain was the true superpower, with a global empire protected by the world's most powerful navy. Though France also had a far-flung empire, it was primarily a land power, with a three-hundred-year-old tradition of military dominance in Europe. Russia was also a great land power; it occupied about one-sixth of the world's land area, stretching almost halfway around the globe from western Poland to Alaska. This great physical size was of primary concern to Britain, as Russia bordered and exerted its influence in many areas where the British Empire sought domination. Russian spheres of influence rarely conflicted with French interests, however.

This last point is important to keep in mind when judging the wisdom of Russia's alliances. While relations between Russia and France had improved steadily after Germany became a threat to both nations, relations with Britain had not. After an alliance during the Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815), Russia and Britain clashed over spheres of influence in Persia and the Middle East, along the frontier of British-occupied India and Afghanistan, and in northern China. Starting with the Crimean War of 1853-1856, British policy for the rest of the century was largely Russophobic, characterized by racist bombast from British propaganda writers such as Rudyard Kipling, who portrayed the Russians as Oriental savages, a threat to civilized Europe. As with France, it was mainly fear of Imperial Germany that pushed Britain into a reluctant understanding with Russia. The rapid buildup of the German navy after 1898, aggressive German colonization of what little territory remained unclaimed in Africa, vocal support by the German emperor for the anti-British Boer rebels in South Africa, and other incidents led to the Anglo-Russian Alliance of 1907, which quickly became the Triple Entente.

Britain and France had specific interests, or war aims, that would be met more easily through alliance with Russia. However, Russian interests were not equally well served by such an alliance; indeed, they were largely hindered by it. For Britain and France, alliance with Russia was a tactical necessity in order to wage war against Germany; it did not harm their interests elsewhere. For Russia, the anti-German defensive posture was the only advantage to the Triple Entente, and it came at the price of economic and political concessions in Asia, the Near East, and even internally. Militarily, the alliance would have been beneficial only if France and Britain had been able to stop Germany from attacking Russia. Russia was in no condition to launch an offensive, let alone sustain a prolonged conflict on foreign soil. As it happened, France and Britain sat in trenches behind barbed wire on the Western Front for four years of stalemate, leaving Russia to stand alone against the Central Powers in the East. The Entente's Balkan allies of Serbia and Romania were overwhelmed, and eventually Russia was defeated.

Economically, commitment to the Entente cut Russia off from its natural markets, which were largely in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and places further afield that could only be reached by routes under German or Austrian control. Russia's industrial revolution was in its infancy. Russian goods could not compete in French and British markets, and the alliance created an unnatural isolation from its neighbors that hurt Russian modernization efforts. In turn, this situation led to increased frustration among the lower classes, who experienced all the horrors of early industrialization but did not see the emergence of a prosperous urban middle class.

Russia's neighbors could exploit its social unrest on many fronts. The Germans and Austrians took advantage of the tensions between the Russians and the Poles, two-thirds of whom were subjects of the tsar. Germany sent the firebrand Vladimir Lenin and other Russian revolutionaries back to Russia in the well-known sealed railcar during the war. Although Britain had long harbored the contagion of communism by sheltering Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and other dissidents, Germany introduced it into a weakened, war-torn host, allowing it to spread and oppress half the world for three generations. The Revolution of 1917 drove Russia out of World War I, while leading to the murder of its imperial family and slaughter of millions more Russians.

Russian interests abroad suffered as a result of its alliance with France and Britain as well. Assured of German backing against the Russians, the Austrians annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, expanding further into the Balkans. A major element of Russian foreign policy was the protection and eventual liberation of Christians living in the Muslim Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Orthodox Christian lands of the Balkans. Millions of Orthodox Serbs lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina and had enjoyed the protection of the Russian tsar, even though they were nominally ruled by the Turkish sultan. Austria-Hungary had opposed nearly every national struggle for independence from Turkey: from the Greeks in the 1820s through Bulgaria in the early twentieth century. (Significantly, Britain opposed these independence movements too, preferring to deal with a central Turkish authority rather than a host of smaller states.) This opposition brought Austria into conflict with Russia.

Russia's isolation as a result of its alliances severely limited its ability to act on behalf of the smaller nations on its periphery. In addition to its annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Austria was able to impose major tariffs and political limitations on Serbia and Romania, particularly in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913; moreover, the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia in 1914, full of impossible demands, precipitated World War I. Elsewhere on the Russian borders, the Turks, who were also German allies, felt free to continue their depredations against Christians with much less fear of Russian reprisal. During World War I, the Turks butchered millions of Orthodox Armenians in the first modern genocide. Syrian, Lebanese, Egyptian, Iraqi, and Greek Christians in the Ottoman Empire were also persecuted, and millions of them were forced from their homes. Because of its alliances, Russia had to fight elsewhere against the combined armies of Germany and Austria and could do nothing to intervene.

Because of the Entente, Russia became the primary target of its three largest neighbors (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire), while France and Britain could rest easier knowing that Russian blood would be spilled for their protection. As for Russia's potential war aims, France and Britain had little interest in seeing them fulfilled and could not be relied on for support.

Britain did not use its immense naval power to aid Russia in any significant way during the war, and the vaunted French army did little to hamper German efforts on the Eastern Front. Even the addition of the United States to the Entente in 1917 could not push the Western Front over the German border. Worse yet, American war aims spelled the death of tsarist Russia, as President Woodrow Wilson made it public that he favored a kind of "national self-determination," geared to break up the Austrian Empire by giving independence to the various nationalities within its borders. The Russian Empire was also made up of disparate nationalities, and the proposal of the newest ally hindered Russian war efforts. Finally, once the Russian Civil War began, France, Britain, the United States, and twelve other nations invaded Russia, in an effort to control events there and keep Russian food, military supplies, and especially manpower directed toward their war. Ultimately, it was not an advantageous arrangement for the Russians. While it is difficult to predict with certainty, it is possible to imagine a different outcome had Russia followed another course and not pursued an alliance with distant powers that had little interest in Russian goals. Britain especially had had strong anti-Russian policies for many decades and consistently intruded in traditionally Russian spheres of influence. Russian aims could have been achieved through cooperation with her neighbors without the Entente Powers, either informally or through a series of mutually beneficial arrangements or even military alliances.

Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia all had roughly the same kind of government: a monarchy that ruled over disparate territories and peoples. Each had a strong and influential military tradition and an agrarian ruling class, and each was experimenting with social reform, state-sponsored economic growth, and limited representative government. The political values they shared had long coincided to keep the peace among them throughout the nineteenth century. One concrete example was their mutual interest in the so-called Polish Question. The three states had partitioned Poland more than a century earlier, and any lasting solution for the Poles had to involve all three states working together. There are many other possible scenarios as well, all of which support the basic premise that alignment with France and Britain dragged Russia into unnecessary conflicts and harmed its true interests.

-- Lawrence A. Helm, Washington, D.C.


THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE

On 18 August 1892 Russia and France signed a secret agreement pledging to defend one another against the forces of the Triple Alliance, then comprising Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. This agreement, which eventually obligated Russia to fight in World War I on the side of France and Great Britain, included the following provisions:

1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the Powers belonging to it, should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first news of this event and without previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces, and shall transport them as far as possible to their frontiers.

3. The available forces to be employed against Germany shall . . . engage to the full with such speed that Germany will have to fight simultaneously on the East and on the West. . . .

5. France and Russia shall not conclude peace separately.

6. The present Convention shall have the same duration as the Triple Alliance.

7. All the clauses enumerated above shall be kept absolutely secret.

Source: The World War I Document Archive http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/.

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FURTHER READINGS

References


D. C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War, third edition (Harlow, U.K.: Longman, 2003).

David McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia: 1900-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

Astrid Tuminez, Russian Nationalism Since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

Опубликовано на Порталусе 04 сентября 2007 года

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