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Порталус

Red Terror in Revolutionary Russia

Дата публикации: 04 сентября 2007
Публикатор: Научная библиотека Порталус
Рубрика: RUSSIA (TOPICS) - Soviet Russia (1917-53) →
Источник: (c) http://russia.by
Номер публикации: №1188914415


Could the Bolshevik regime have established its authority without using terror and coercion?

Viewpoint: Yes. Initially the Bolsheviks enjoyed widespread support for their policies of ending Russian participation in World War I and redistributing agricultural land. The reliance on terror came with Josef Stalin's rise to power.

Viewpoint: No. Terror was crucial in ensuring loyalty and allegiance to the new regime.

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Recent work on communism, including Stéphane Courtois's The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression (1999), makes a strong case that terror was the only real means of ensuring stability and security for communist governments. In the Russian case, émigrés and other opponents of the Soviet regime have long repeated this argument. Terror, enforced by a secret police, concentration camps, arbitrary killings, and other coercive practices and institutions, helped ensure Bolshevik power.
Other historians disagree, however. Terror may have been present, but many other factors seem to have played a role in stabilizing Bolshevik rule. Russia's vast peasant population, for example, received more or less unobstructed ownership of its own land and land it was allowed to seize. In the absence of Bolshevik rule, this practice would have been brought into question. Workers liked Bolshevik rule because it offered what they wanted: control of employment terms and conditions and the promise of a better life. Even some upper-class Russians favored Bolshevism because they saw it philosophically as Russia's choice, and the best and most effective means of continuing projects of reform and modernization that were beginning under tsarist rule. Terror, in this view, was unnecessary in capturing the loyalties of these many large and important groups.



Viewpoint: Yes. Initially the Bolsheviks enjoyed widespread support for their policies of ending Russian participation in World War I and redistributing agricultural land. The reliance on terror came with Josef Stalin's rise to power.

Emigré memory, passionate political opposition, and Cold War politics all combined to argue that the Bolshevik regime would have been incapable of surviving in the absence of terror. Without a secret police, concentration camps, and a general environment of fear, the argument follows, communism could never have conquered Russia or lasted for more than seven decades as its dominant ideology. One should recognize, however, that many other factors played a role in establishing popular support for Bolshevism and that political terror, awful and arbitrary though it may have been, was neither the regime's sole pillar nor the only motivator for its people.

The immediate circumstances of the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 reveal much about terror's rather minor role. The seizures of Petrograd and many other urban centers (Moscow being a notable exception) turned out to be virtually bloodless. At the direction of the Bolshevik Party, important offices, administrative buildings, and centers of communication were simply taken over by groups loyal to the party and to the popular Soviet movement. Few were willing to defend the Provisional Government, which had become discredited in the eyes of most of the population, and urban life continued in an almost surreal fashion even as the takeovers were taking place. Theaters performed, trams ran, restaurants served, and people largely went about their business. Violent opposition remained isolated and lacked real organization in most parts of the country for at least several months. Even the creation of the vaunted Bolshevik secret police, the Cheka, did not occur until a whole six weeks after the Petrograd coup, and neither its numbers nor its powers became strong for some time thereafter.

What accounted for this rather peaceful regime change? Passivity was certainly a key cause. Few Russians saw much of a future for the Provisional Government. It had failed to extricate the country from World War I, a conflict that had led with an almost equally small amount of resistance to the collapse of tsarism in February 1917. Its moderate leaders had been compromised--and forced from government--for secretly continuing to support tsarist war aims, which most of the population vilified. It had not settled outstanding questions about the nature of property rights, land reform, or social relations, burning issues that had already begun to tear the fabric of the country and that many Russians were beginning to decide on their own, in a way that complemented socialist ideology. Its approach to the future government of Russia had been indecisive and, apart from Premier Aleksandr Kerensky's weak proclamation of a republic in September 1917: noncommittal. Kerensky's adoption of military bearings, questionable relationship with the army commander in chief Lavr Kornilov (who led what many believed to have been a military coup plot in August 1917), and alleged idolization of Napoleon Bonaparte convinced many that he was intent on establishing a dictatorship.

These points answer many questions about the nature of the October Revolution. The Bolsheviks did not need to rely on terror in the early weeks of their rule because they posed, dishonestly yet credibly, as defenders of democracy. At least in official pronouncements, their seizure of power was not a unilateral coup but a preemptive measure to safeguard the existing democratic revolution, which many Russians felt to be under threat from antidemocratic forces. This was dishonest posturing, but the public statements of Vladimir Lenin and his associates all indicated that their purpose was to invest power in the soviet (council) institutions that had been elected in Petrograd and all over Russia over the course of 1917, a measure that many non-Bolsheviks had long advocated in any case. Significantly, the coup was timed to coincide with a meeting of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, a national body to which Lenin presented his party's actions as a fait accompli. To increase his democratic credentials, Lenin also announced that his government would hold previously planned elections for a national Constituent Assembly. These duly took place in late November 1917, and, despite cases of electoral fraud, they returned a decisive non-Bolshevik majority. Although the Assembly was dissolved shortly after it began meeting in January 1918, its election was in a general sense Russia's first truly democratic poll, and, however incongruously, it took place under a Bolshevik government that claimed to accept its mandate.

Despite their attempts to establish democratic credentials, the Bolsheviks' seizure of power was quickly rejected by many members of the All-Russian Soviet Congress and by the leaders of most other political parties. Some saw through Bolshevik rhetoric, while others, including even some members of the Bolshevik leadership, thought a rushed seizure of power to be incompatible with orthodox Marxism and thus, or otherwise, doomed to failure. Yet, the Bolsheviks did not need to cow these opponents with terror for the simple reason that they largely absented themselves from national political leadership out of principle. Lev Trotsky, a prominent Bolshevik and organizer of the Petrograd coup, could tell the rival Menshevik Party's leadership to "go where you belong--the dustbin of history" with such drama because they were literally walking out of the Soviet Congress as he pronounced the words. To the Russian public, the Bolsheviks held the lion's share of government responsibility not because a small number of hotheads had imposed their will on the land by force, but because many inexperienced politicians lacked the will to respond effectively to the new political climate and its challenges.

In certain cases, however, some political groupings proved willing to work with the new government. The Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), the main governing party, although initially Bolshevik-dominated, soon came to include members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, who opposed some Bolshevik policies, and whose party won an absolute majority in the democratic Constituent Assembly elections. In Russia's provinces many urban local governments and soviets emerged with coalitions that included Mensheviks, anarchists, and nonparty representatives, in addition to Socialist Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks. In frontier areas, especially the Caucasus and Central Asia, elites who had been loyal to the Provisional Government and even the tsarist regime supported Bolshevism because they viewed it mainly as an ethnic Russian movement that would ensure continuing Russian dominance. Beyond governing political bodies, a significant number of people who had held responsible administrative positions before the coup placed themselves and their services at the Bolsheviks' disposal. Innumerable clerks, engineers, technicians, and other lower-level officials followed this course, but so, too, did some relatively important people. General Aleksei Brusilov, Russia's only real military hero from World War I, accepted a senior position in the new Red Army because he believed that the Bolsheviks represented the will of the Russian people and that his loyalties should remain with them. Many officers, including two tsarist war ministers, Aleksei Polivanov and Dmitrii Shuvaev, and other prominent generals, followed his lead. Vladimir Teliakovsky, the longtime director of the Imperial Theaters who continued in office for more than two months under the Provisional Government, reentered state theater administration under the Bolsheviks and ran the former imperial theaters' managerial department until he retired with a pension in 1923. Baron Rolf von Ungern-Sternberg, the tsarist and Provisional Government's minister to Portugal, placed himself at the Bolsheviks' disposal despite being safely in Lisbon. So, too, did Count Aleksei Ignatiev, the Russian military representative in Paris, who aided Lenin and began a distinguished career as a Red Army general upon his return to the Soviet Union in the 1930s. These figures, and others like them, did not need coercion to stay on the job for new masters, whom they saw as their country's only credible leaders.

The most popular sources of Bolshevik popularity, however, were two simple promises: ending the war and sanctifying the wholesale redistribution of agricultural land. With the simple slogan "Peace, Land, and Bread," the country's most pressing concerns found easy and appealing answers in Bolshevik rhetoric. Pledging to extricate Russia from the war, Lenin immediately negotiated an armistice with Germany and began formal peace talks. Although his government was put off by the Germans' harsh initial terms and attempted to stall in the hope that revolution would overtake Germany, too, it did sign a treaty formally ending Russia's war at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. In addition to freeing millions of soldiers who no longer wanted to fight, the peace treaty's popularity can be judged by the failure of its exceedingly punitive effects to provoke major unrest, despite some serious contention in the ranks of the Bolshevik leadership itself. Brest-Litovsk cost Russia a huge swath of its border territories, many of its most important resources, and some sixty million people, yet no palpable opposition threatened to topple the government that had signed it. Getting out of the war--no matter the price--was a major asset to Bolshevism.

So, too, was Lenin's first domestic measure--a decree that formally "socialized" agricultural land, but recognized the right of local peasant communes to control, distribute, and farm it for productive use. To the 80 percent of Russia's population who still lived in the country, the Bolsheviks offered what many of them had wanted for generations: government sanction for the uncompensated seizure of property belonging to the gentry, monarchy, Orthodox Church, and the more recently emerged private peasant farmers who had departed from their communes. In many places, especially the overcrowded rural regions of central Russia (where, together with urban areas, the Bolsheviks found their greatest support), this merely affirmed what many peasants had already done by carving up estates on their own initiative, and gave them the right to continue doing so. Lenin's decree was also a literal adoption of the popular Socialist Revolutionary Party's agricultural platform, further suggesting that one-party rule was not a top priority. Alternatives to the Bolshevik government, the organized White forces and governments that began to appear in 1918, for the most part promised to reverse the redistribution of land, restore seized property to its original owners, and punish those who had carried out the confiscations. More- conciliatory approaches were rare until late in the Civil War and then too ineffectual or complicated to make much difference. White commanders, moreover, often acted with extreme brutality when they entered territory that had been under Red control, responding to the excesses of Bolshevik terror only with more and often equally brutal terror. Needless to say, many peasants who stood to suffer from the Whites supported the Bolsheviks without having to be terrorized. In Siberia alone more than one hundred thousand partisans took up arms against the various White governments that aspired to control the region. Violent grain confiscations, peasant uprisings against Bolshevik authorities (often tellingly phrased as demonstrations of support for "Bolsheviks" as opposed to "communists," despite the interchangeability of those terms after 1917), and the horrible collectivization campaigns of the 1930s did take place, but many farmers at first looked upon the Bolshevik regime as the best guarantor of their liberty and prosperity.

Workers and other members of the urban lower class also looked positively on the Bolshevik regime and its promises. If they had not, the Bolshevik takeovers in most Russian cities would have been neither easy nor bloodless. At least theoretically the Bolsheviks promised the proletarians ownership and management of the means of production--that is, control over their places of work and the power to end exploitative conditions and the monopolization of profits by owners and managers. This was accompanied by a sweeping redistribution of housing space and luxury items in favor of the lower classes at the expense of the upper, preferential treatment for workers in employment and educational opportunities, and the abolition of prerevolutionary social hierarchies and distinctions. Never having experienced the practical difficulties of the new arrangements or how they would reshape the Bolshevik approach to government--brutal as it turned out to be in many cases--few workers believed they would be worse off under the new system. Their proletarian identities, early support for the new regime, and, for a rapidly expanding number, Communist Party membership, ensured that many would rise to positions of responsibility and status of which they could never have dreamed under the old regime. Indeed, party membership skyrocketed from a skeletal 23,600 in February 1917 to 730,000 four years later and peaked at nearly 20 million in the 1980s. Bolshevik and pro-Bolshevik workers could and did become factory managers, policemen, Red Army officers, diplomats, journalists, local government officials, ministers, and, in the cases of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, leaders of the Soviet Union. Once again, terror did not have pride of place in determining their convictions.

-- John Pawl, Washington, D.C.


Viewpoint: No. Terror was crucial in ensuring loyalty and allegiance to the new regime.

The Bolshevik government attempted to attract and maintain popular support using a variety of methods. It labored, for example, to fulfill its promise of "Peace, Land, and Bread." It also offered its supporters opportunities to achieve positions of power and influence. In many cases, however, these enticements would have proved insufficient had it not been for the government's primary means of ensuring loyalty: terror. Both the central government and Bolshevik governments in outlying areas relied on terror to eliminate enemies and ensure loyalty (or outward loyalty, at least) to their regime. The Bolsheviks did not stumble into their policy of terror and coercion by accident; they assumed it eagerly. They expected the Russian populace to turn against the "bourgeoisie," the "kulaks," and other "enemies of the people." When the populace moved too slowly, the government created an organization, the Cheka, to "liquidate" disloyalty. By the end of the Civil War, the Bolsheviks had carried out widespread and systematic campaigns of terror against their political rivals, the press, the bourgeoisie, speculators, peasants, workers, and even the soldiers and sailors whose support had been crucial in bringing the Bolsheviks to power.

From the beginning, leading Bolshevik leaders stated openly, repeatedly, and unapologetically that they planned to govern through terror. "The state is an instrument of coercion," Vladimir Lenin asserted in a speech in November 1917, and the Bolsheviks would use the state "to organize violence in the name of the interests of the workers." Early the next year he wrote an article suggesting that the proletariat should try various methods "of accounting and controlling the rich, the rogues and the idlers":


In one place half a score of rich, a dozen crooks, half a dozen workers who shirk their work . . . will be put in prison. In another place they will be put to cleaning latrines. . . . In a fourth place, one out of every ten idlers will be shot on the spot.

Leon Trotsky, taking the French Revolution as a guide, asserted early on that "terror will assume very violent forms . . . the guillotine, and not merely the gaol, will be ready for our enemies." In June 1918 Felix Dzerzhinsky, the chief of the Cheka, openly asserted that "we stand for organised terror--this should be frankly stated--terror being absolutely indispensable in current revolutionary conditions."

To this end, the Bolshevik government created the Cheka in December 1917, only six weeks after it had first taken power. The Council of People's Commissars, the central organ of government, passed a resolution giving the Cheka--whose full title eventually became The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Speculation, Sabotage, and Misuse of Authority--the power "to suppress and liquidate all attempts and acts of counter- revolution and sabotage throughout Russia, from whatever quarter." The resolution defined counterrevolution broadly: "The Commission will devote prime attention to the press, to sabotage, to the Kadets, Right SRs, saboteurs and strikers." Possible punishments for such individuals included "confiscation [of property], expulsion from domicile, [and] deprivation of ration cards." In February 1918 the Cheka received the power to carry out immediate trials and executions. Two months later official Cheka detachments had begun to replace the informal security police already working throughout Bolshevik territory. Eventually, the Cheka was not only seeking out and punishing "enemies of the people" but also running concentration camps where these "enemies" could labor for the benefit of the new state. Historian George Leggett has estimated that by mid 1921, the Cheka "amounted to some 250,000 men"--all working to frighten "counterrevolutionaries" into submission.

The Cheka, however, was not the government's only means of coercion. For example, December 1917 saw the establishment of Revolutionary Tribunals with the power to try saboteurs, hoarders, and other lawbreakers. Those convicted could lose their property, civil rights, freedom, and (beginning in mid 1918) their lives. The Bolsheviks also used the press to reinforce citizens' loyalty. The pages of the newspaper Izvestiia were continually filled with reports of the Cheka's activities and with columns encouraging readers to take action against "enemies of the people."

The new government began by repressing its political opponents and the newspapers sympathetic to them. One of its first acts was to issue a decree legitimizing the closure of any newspapers that opposed the Bolsheviks or misstated "facts." Then, on 28 November 1917, the Council of People's Commissars declared all members of the Constitutional Democrat (Kadet) Party "enemies of the people." Leggett notes that Lenin and his party thus "introduced [this term] . . . into the Russian legal and political vocabulary." When the democratically elected Constituent Assembly convened in January 1918, the Bolsheviks walked out of the first session. Claiming that the guards were tired, they arbitrarily brought the session to a halt the following morning. The Assembly would never meet again. A public demonstration protesting its dissolution was fired upon by Cheka troops. In the following months the Bolsheviks expelled Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries from governing organs, arrested them, closed down their presses, and accorded their parties a semilegal status at best. They thus coerced citizens into supporting the government by removing all other political choices.

As Bolshevik leaders had promised, members of the nobility and middle class also learned to fear the new regime. City governments and Cheka detachments in Kiev, Odessa, Saratov, and elsewhere took prominent citizens hostage. In some places the Cheka executed the hostages. More often, the government demanded ransoms for their release. When the government overlooked potential victims, private citizens were often happy to turn them in. Historian Donald J. Raleigh quotes as typical a letter of 1921 in which a Saratov citizen wrote, "To the staff member on duty. Comrade! I request that you send a militia officer to search the private apartments of speculators. . . . I request that you requisition their clothing, which is bourgeois."

The well-to-do were not the governments' only targets, however. The Bolsheviks suppressed strikes by arresting workers, confiscating their ration cards, and sometimes executing their leaders. A list of demands compiled by workers at a metallurgical plant conveys the extent of government repression:


We demand that threats with pistols against workers at the meetings be abolished, and that arrests be abolished too, and that there be freedom of speech and assembly, so that there be a true power of soviets of peasants' and workers' deputies, and not of the Chekas. . . . We demand an abolition to the taking away of food and flour from the hungry workers, their wives and children, and an abolition to imposing fines on those peasants who sell [foodstuffs] and who deliver [food to cities]. . . . We demand an abolition of the death penalty without trial and investigation. There must be justice.

It seems unlikely that these workers had their demands met. Far from empowering workers with freedom of speech and assembly, the Bolsheviks severely restricted their freedom. In April 1919 the government decreed that employees could no longer leave one job for another unless they had their employers' permission. Offenders could be sent to labor camps.

The peasantry came in for its own share of repression. In 1918 the government established grain quotas. Any peasant who possessed more grain than the decree allowed and who failed to surrender the excess to the government--free of charge--was an "enemy of the people." He could forfeit all property and receive a jail sentence of ten years. The Bolsheviks sent out armed detachments, which eventually encompassed more than 100,000 individuals, to collect the grain. As Trotsky put it, "Civil war has to be waged for grain. We the Soviets are going into battle!" In response, many localities revolted. The Cheka and the Red Army repressed these revolts ruthlessly.

The government responded with force to signs of dissent or independence in any locality. An uprising in the city of Iaroslavl in July 1918 ended with the execution of more than four hundred antigovernment protesters. When Saratov's leaders proved too independent, Moscow replaced them. According to Raleigh, "Their departure . . . ushered in a new period for Saratov as it became run like an armed camp by outsiders who had few ties if any locally." Saratov was but one of many areas to experience martial law during the first years of Bolshevik rule. The government found Ukrainians especially intransigent. In January 1919 the Central Committee concluded that "it is necessary to conduct mass terror against rich Cossacks by exterminating them to the last man."

Lenin later claimed that foreign intervention in Russia forced the government to use terror. Other writers pointed to a failed assassination attempt on Lenin in August 1918 as the real impetus for a Red Terror. Yet, as has been shown, the Bolsheviks advocated and implemented the use of terror well before these events. In February 1918 the Cheka actually announced that its previous actions had been too lenient, and that it was instituting a new policy of "annihilating mercilessly on the scene of their crime all counter-revolutionaries, spies, speculators, thugs, hooligans, saboteurs and other parasites."

The "merciless" repression against all classes of people in all parts of the country left prisoners and corpses in its wake. Between January 1918 and June 1919 the Cheka arrested more than 80,000 persons and executed, at the least, 8,300 individuals without trial. Those numbers do not include the executions of persons tried by Revolutionary Tribunals and other governmental organs. By October 1922 approximately 60,000 individuals labored in 132 prison camps throughout Russia--and this number, too, leaves out the individuals imprisoned elsewhere. Numbers on this scale could not be the fault of a few corrupt or overzealous officials. Nor were they the work of a government that used force reluctantly. They came about because the Bolshevik government had a consistent and clear-cut policy of using terror to stay in power.

Soviet historians noted, correctly, that the Bolsheviks' opponents in the Civil War also used violence and terror. Unlike their opponents, these historians argued, the Bolsheviks were justified in using terror because they were destroying an unjust society and creating a new and better one to replace it. The merits of this argument are left to the reader to determine.

The Bolsheviks' attempts to force the populace into loyalty eventually alienated many who had previously supported them. In late February 1921, strikes in Moscow and Petrograd spread to the Kronstadt naval base, whose sailors had been the Bolsheviks' champions in 1917. A committee of sailors produced a document detailing their complaints:


For three years the toilers of Soviet Russia have suffered in the torture chambers of the Chekas. Everywhere the Communist has wielded power over the peasant. A new Communist slavery has been created. The peasant has been transformed into a serf in the Soviet economy, the worker has become a mere employee in the state factories. The workers' intelligentsia has been eliminated. Those who tried to protest have been tortured by the Chekas. Those who continued to give trouble have been dealt with more expeditiously--they were shot. The air has become unbreathable. The whole of Soviet Russia has been turned into an immense penal servitude prison.

Unfortunately for the Soviet government, the sailors' rhetoric had more than a whiff of truth to it. Unfortunately for the sailors, their protests did not soften the hearts of Soviet leaders. In mid March, after a fierce battle that left thousands dead, Kronstadt was taken by Soviet forces. Most of the sailors who survived the battle were shot or sent to labor camps.

-- Catherine Blair, Georgetown University


BIRTH OF THE CHEKA

This decree was issued by the Sovnarkom, responsible for the general administrative affairs of the state. It had the authority to establish laws when congress was not in session:

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION TO FIGHT COUNTER-REVOLUTION

Decree of the Sovnarkom, December 20, 1917

The Commission is to be named the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission and is to be attached to the Soviet of People's Commissars. [This commission] is to make war on counter-revolution and sabotage. . . . The duties of the Commission will be:

1. To persecute and break up all acts of counter-revolution and sabotage all over Russia, no matter what their origin.

2. To bring before the Revolutionary Tribunal all counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs and to work out a plan for fighting them.

3. To make preliminary investigation only--enough to break up [the counter-revolutionary act]. The Commission is to be divided into sections:

(a) the information [section],

(b) the organizational section (in charge of organizing the fight against counter-revolution all over Russia) with branches, and

(c) the fighting section.

The Commission will be formed tomorrow. . . . The Commission is to watch the press, saboteurs, strikers, and the Right Social-Revolutionaries. Measures [to be taken against these counter-revolutionaries are] confiscation, confinement, deprivation of [food] cards, publication of the names of the enemies of the people, etc.

Source: University of Durham Web Page http://www.dur.ac.uk/~dml0www/cheka.html.

FURTHER READINGS


References


Vladimir N. Brovkin, Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War: Political Parties and Social Movements in Russia, 1918-1922 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Stéphane Courtois and others, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, translated by Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).

Orlando Figes, A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution: 1891-1924 (New York: Penguin, 1996).

Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution 1917-1932 (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

Lennard D. Gerson, The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976).

Diane Koenker and William Rosenberg, Strikes and Revolution in Russia, 1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

George Leggett, The Cheka, Lenin's Political Police: The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (December 1917 to February 1922) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

S. P. Melgunov, The Red Terror in Russia (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion, 1975).

Richard Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1995).

Donald J. Raleigh, Experiencing Russia's Civil War: Politics, Society, and Revolutionary Culture in Saratov, 1917-1922 (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002).

John Reed, Ten Days That Shook the World (New York: International, 1934).

Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Lenin Anthology (New York & London: Norton, 1975).

Rex Wade, The Russian Revolution, 1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Опубликовано на Порталусе 04 сентября 2007 года

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