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Порталус

Novgorod

Дата публикации: 20 сентября 2007
Публикатор: Научная библиотека Порталус
Рубрика: RUSSIA (TOPICS) SUBDIVISIONS →
Источник: (c) http://russia.by
Номер публикации: №1190293864


Novgorod, a contraction for novyi gorod (new town), was the most important settlement in the early history of the north Russian plain. Though the Russian Primary Chronicle speaks of the existence of Novgorod in the middle of the ninth century, extensive archaeological excavations conducted since the end of World War II have found no evidence of artifacts datable prior to the mid tenth century. The name of "new town" has persuaded historians to believe in an earlier establishment, an "old town," but no consensus exists for the location of the earlier foundation.

Individual settlements on both sides of the river Volkhov joined together to become the city of Novgorod. River networks facilitated trade both near and far. Two major arteries gave access to distant markets. The Dnieper, reached via portages, flowed south to the Black Sea; and the majestic but sluggish Volga wound its way to the Caspian Sea, allowing access to entrepôts in Constantinople and the Near East. Moreover, proximity to the Baltic gave Novgorod an initial trading advantage and later contributed greatly to its prosperity when trade revived in northern Europe.

Novgorod had evolved into a city-state of huge proportions. It embraced an area of more than 320,000 square kilometers, which stretched from a vertical line in the west marked by Lake Peipus to the Ural Mountains in the east. A portion of the northern frontier reached the shores of the White Sea, and in the south the boundary stopped at the edge of the principalities of Tver and Muscovy. Most of that vast land was unsuitable for agriculture and unattractive to settlers. Population figures for the early centuries are a matter of speculation. A late-fifteenth-century cadastral survey, though somewhat incomplete, established a population of at least 520,000 for all the Novgorodian territories. The capital contained 32,130 residents, and eight smaller towns embraced another 16,233 inhabitants. Most of the populace lived in the southwest, with the capital at the hub. Here the calculated density was three persons per square kilometer, whereas the north was almost empty. (The overall average was 1.8 persons for each square kilometer.) The capital's population, with 6.18 percent of the total for the state, exceeded that of any other city on the Russian scene, except Moscow, and testified to its economic vitality.


Development of Republican Institutions

Novgorod's political and social evolution mirrored its commercial interests. It was the only Russian polity (aside from several of its offshoots) to develop a republican form of government. The early mercantile activities and the indifference of its overlords favored the shift. The Viking adventurers, who initially penetrated the area where the Novgorodians settled, located their capital at Kiev, some 500 miles to the south. Advantageously situated on the edge of the steppe and on the lower Dnieper River, Kiev stood below the funnel of the major tributaries, which allowed the ruling princes better access to the tribute-paying tribes, as well as to the collection of natural products and slaves for trade with Byzantium. Yet the Kievan princes did not abandon their suzerainty over Novgorod and their demands for tribute. The northern town's importance may be deduced by the assignment of viceroys, who ruled in the name of the senior prince. Each delegated a son, usually his eldest, as prince of Novgorod and required that two-thirds of his income be sent to the Kievan treasury.

Disillusioned by their subordinate status, the drain upon their taxes, and the lack of interest in their affairs, the inhabitants of Novgorod resolved to alter relations with their overlords. The Kievan princes were primarily interested in steppe politics and trade with Constantinople. Subsequently, dynastic struggles developed for the senior princely throne, and Asiatic invaders began to threaten the east European steppe. The weakening of the suzerains' position encouraged the Novgorodians to strike out on their own. Their commercial interests favored a broader governing structure. Martial prowess was not esteemed by the upper classes, an attitude that played some role in the republic's ultimate demise.

The Novgorodians began the disengagement from their Kievan overlords in the late eleventh century, when they decided to select their prince from the reservoir of Rurikid descendants who sprouted in the divided land. The Novgorodians' attitude was best expressed in the speech attributed to the envoys sent to Svyatopolk II of Kiev in 1102: "We are sent to you, oh Prince, with positive instructions that our city does not want either you or your son. If your son has two heads, you might send him."

Once the Novgorodians succeeded in the hiring of their princes, they sought to erode their authority. Traditionally, the prince-viceroy had resided inside the city and had his "court" on the right bank of the Volkhov River near the marketplace. He named his own officials, made law, dispensed justice and collected the fines for himself, guarded the frontiers, protected the trade routes, and maintained domestic tranquillity. There was little the inhabitants could do about a corrupt or uncooperative viceroy, other than complain to Kiev.

Under the new system, the invited princes became hired agents, and their tenure was generally short. Required to guard Novgorod's freedoms and to respect its laws, the princes were carefully supervised. As a precaution against interference or a coup, princes were to reside in their own abode outside the town walls and could recruit no more than fifty military retainers. They were forbidden to hold land or to engage in trade or even to make loans to Novgorodians and could take no action without the approval of the elected senior official. And while they could not make laws without popular consent, the town assembly did not require their concurrence to pass legislation. The princes' income came from an annual stipend, a portion of the taxes, tolls, and judicial fines. Audits were made of their income to guard against illegal activities.

The desired diminution in princely authority could not be fully implemented for some time. Rival financial interests within Novgorod sought to use the princes to best their opponents. Each side sought a prince who would advance its own selfish aims. Election or the deposition of a prince often led to popular divisions and sometimes erupted into large-scale violence. Polarized politics favored the hired princes and allowed them considerable latitude. When the great families finally determined to settle commercial rivalries among themselves at the end of the thirteenth century, the prince's position declined in importance. For example, treaties with other commercial powers were written in the name of the prince prior to 1302; after that date they contained the names of the posadniki and the tysyatskii (elected officials) and all Novgorod, meaning the assembly, but the prince's name disappeared.

The Novgorodians set about developing their own institutions. An ancient tribal institution, the veche (an assembly of freemen), became the sovereign political power. While all freemen in the realm were able to participate, in practice only those within range of the sound of the great bell's summons could assemble. For all practical purposes, the veche became a city institution. Any freeman had the right to convene it, but most often the responsibility rested with the prince or a senior elected official. The assembly voted on all issues concerned with the general welfare. These included declarations of war, the endorsement of military and commercial treaties, the deposition or selection of princes, the election of senior officeholders, and the nomination of the ecclesiastical primate. The major officials elected by the veche were the posadniki (the heads of the civil administration), the tysyatskii (literally the commander of a unit of a thousand men, and initially the republic's militia leader), as well as the candidates for the senior ecclesiastical position. In 1156, upon the death of their bishop, the assembly decided to select a Novgorodian as their candidate. Their success persuaded them, in 1165, to demand archiepiscopal rank for their religious leader. Once selected, the local candidate required investiture by the metropolitan of all Rus, the ranking Russian primate, who resided in the capital of the senior prince (in Kiev until the end of the thirteenth century and in Moscow from early in the fourteenth). The Novgorodians found in their archbishops willing ecclesiastical supporters of their secular aspirations. The archbishop's influence gave him an unusual say in the republic's affairs. He played a pivotal role in defusing domestic conflicts and often represented Novgorod in tempering demands made by suzerain princes.

Growth as well as politics affected Novgorod's political organization. Economic prosperity and population increase created pressure for administrative reorganization of the city's districts. In 1291 the number of kontsy (literally: ends) was increased to five. The hinterland mirrored these divisions. Five pyatiny (fifths) embraced the remaining lands, each radiating from the capital to the outer limits of the state. These largely superseded the older "hundreds," the administrative and military subdivisions of the kontsy. In time of danger each had raised its own militia under an elected commander. This pattern remained, but now the senior posadnik rather than the tysyatskii led the combined militia of Novgorod. The latter assumed the duties of a chief constable, responsible for the protection of the marketplace, the foreign merchants, and domestic tranquillity. He also participated in economic negotiations and treaty formulation.

Sectional interests were not neglected in the 1291 reforms, for local autonomy remained in force. Each konets retained its assembly and elected its own posadnik as chief executive, while a senior posadnik headed the combined city administration. Local issues were left to the requisite units, while general concerns were voiced in the city veche. Wealth and status determined eligibility for high office. The great landlords and financiers formed the highest class of boyars. In practice only they held the offices of the posadniki and tysyatskii. Beneath them came the more important merchants and middling landholders. The majority of the merchants formed the third echelon. The lowest class of freemen were the "black people": the laborers, artisans, peasants, and sharecroppers. Beneath them stood the unfree--the slaves and the indentured. Differentiation developed within each class, including the highest. In Novgorod's later history some few boyar families contributed the greatest number of posadniki.

Structure often belies substance. An elite dominated Novgorodian politics despite the sovereignty of the veche. This situation had to have the formal support of the upper orders and the acquiescence of the lower. Economic coercion by landlords, workshop owners, and other employers probably played a role in obtaining desirable voting blocs in the elections; nevertheless, individual self-interest had to make compromises and accommodations with various borough and class interests.

The factional violence engendered by upper-class groups, which had allowed the prince significant leeway to maneuver and conditioned Novgorodian politics in the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries, evaporated after the creation of a supreme council in the 1291 reforms. This soviet gospod (council of lords) included the archbishop, the prince's representative, and the tysyatskii and posadniki then in office. In time the membership expanded to almost fifty, indicating the inclusion of previous major officeholders of the kontsy and the central administration. While this allowed the leading families a voice in the management of affairs, it also permitted them to settle their differences in private. The internal process is unknown, but it is noticeable that the issues that had earlier led to violence declined sharply after the creation of the council. Henceforth the prince was removed from the center of politics. Future agitation at the veche reflected the growing economic disparity between the wealthy and the impoverished, not the issues that had divided them earlier.


Economic Activities

Novgorod's prosperity derived from its favorable location and the development of regional and international commerce. In the eleventh century the Gotland merchants created a trading base in the city. The development of the Hansa by the thirteenth century increased the Baltic traffic, and the Hanseatic traders superseded the Gotlanders. They desired the luxurious furs, walrus tusks, wax, and flax brought from the Novgorodian hinterland as much as they did the silks, spices, and luxury goods imported from the Near East via the Volga route. In exchange they sold the fine woolen cloths of Flanders and England, wines, linens, and arms.

A city the size of Novgorod required provisioning and promoted specialization. Fish, meat, mead, flour, and dairy products came from the rural areas. Since Novgorod was situated in a marshy area and could not grow sufficient grain, the city depended on imports. Finished goods supplied the urban population and found their way into the rural settlements. Excavations have established the existence of a variety of workshops for copper, iron, and silver and for work in leather, wood, and bone. There were also workshops of carpenters, clothmakers, and masons. Products made of iron appeared in the form of kitchen utensils, scythes, axes, and plowshares. Since rural Russia contained isolated hamlets and villages, with few able to support blacksmiths, agricultural implements manufactured by town artisans, such as axe heads and scythe bars, were needed to fill the void.

The waterlogged soil on which Novgorod stands has aided in the preservation of types of medieval remains that have disappeared in other areas. Wood, leather, cloth, and iron survived in the layers of the city's growth. The Novgorodians paved their streets with small-diameter logs. Twenty-eight levels of wooden causeways have been uncovered. Soviet scientists have dated the layers through a study of the tree rings and the creation of a continuous growth-rate chart. They were aided in their quest by drawing upon chroniclers' accounts of fires, which were frequent and well reported, and they correlated them with the blackened remains in the burnt layers. Coin finds, also simple to date, aided in the process. Many specimens from Byzantium, Persia, and the West aid in the verification of trade relations.

Among the many discoveries are more than 400 documents written on birch bark. These strips of bark, often two to three inches wide and generally less than a foot long, contain scratched Russian letters. The soft inner bark was better for use with a pointed piece of wood or metal, but sometimes a longer message carried over to the reverse side. The document was then rolled for transmission or storage. While the contents were generally brief, they covered a wide range of use. These included petitions, orders, instructions, letters, agreements, and even a proposal of marriage. The existence of the birch bark documents has altered previous notions about prevalent illiteracy in medieval Russia, although the Novgorod experience may not have been typical of nonmercantile settings.


Subjection to Moscow

The republic had to depend upon grain imported from Suzdal, a finger of fertile soil in the forest zone to the northeast of Moscow. This allowed the grand princes, with their pretensions to suzerainty over "all Rus," to exploit Novgorod's weakness whenever differences arose. Interdiction of the grain supplies led to hardship and even famine. The de jure suzerains invariably won the day and demanded lucrative indemnities. Ever mindful of the potential danger to their independence, the Novgorodians embarked upon a policy of weakening the position of the grand prince whenever possible. The senior Moscow princes had wrested permanent possession of the grand princely dignity in the fourteenth century and thereby became the object of Novgorod's suspicion. Matters came to a head in the fifteenth century when a family successional crisis developed in Moscow. It began in 1425 and dragged on for about a quarter century. The Novgorodians gave sanctuary to the momentary loser, which at one time even included Grand Prince Vasilii II himself. A weaker Muscovy gave added insurance to the republic. In the final stage of the struggle Novgorod sheltered the defeated pretender and even allowed him to use its territory as a base of operations against Moscow.

Retribution was not long in coming. In 1456 Vasilii turned his anger and army against Novgorod, which in his view had committed treason against its overlord. He spurned overtures of peace in order to teach his enemy a lesson, his forces inflicting a bloody defeat upon the more numerous but less martial Novgorodians. He demanded an indemnity of 8,500 rubles and forbade them ever again to harbor his enemies. He also required that all future charters and treaties be submitted for his approval and seal. The message that they were shackled to Muscovite overlordship was not lost upon the vanquished, although they prudently postponed a response until Vasilii II died.

The succession of Vasilii's son, Ivan III (1462-1505), encouraged them to test Moscow's resolve. Since the Lithuanian government had expressed anxiety over Muscovite penetration into what it considered its sphere of influence, the Novgorodian leadership hoped that Lithuania would counter Muscovite aspirations. Lithuania, which had once desired to expand eastward, had shifted its principal orientation to central Europe once its grand princes were also elected as kings of Poland. Veche endorsement allowed the leadership to form an alliance in 1471 with Casimir, grand prince of Lithuania (who was also king of Poland). Casimir accepted Novgorod's conditions: His nominee as prince of Novgorod had to be Orthodox, and no Catholic churches were to be allowed. Given the religious animosities between Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy in the aftermath of the Council of Ferrara-Florence and the aggressive Latin campaign to obtain control over the Eastern church, the Novgorodians feared that religious issues would further inflame the Muscovite ruler.

Ivan III confirmed their apprehensions. He enlisted the aid of the metropolitan, who vigorously warned the Novgorodians against apostasy. Meanwhile the grand prince collected every available contingent to counter the expected Lithuanian involvement. The Lithuanians never appeared--the Polish involvement in central European politics had aborted Casimir's plan. Once again the Novgorodians stood alone, and the fiasco of 1456 was repeated but at greater cost. The chroniclers, who are not reliable for correct estimates, claimed that 12,000 Novgordians fell in one battle and did not bother to record the carnage in a second. Even then, the city remained defiant until reduced by hunger.

Uncertainty about Casimir's reaction prompted Ivan to reimpose the earlier conditions. The two bloody battlefield defeats sapped much of Novgorod's resistance, although some still determined to oppose the demeaning settlement. Ivan had executed some of the boyars and had jailed others in 1471, yet he suspected that clandestine opposition would continue. In 1475 he reappeared in Novgorod, determined to undermine resistance and to drive a wedge between the affluent and the oppressed. He won popularity with the lower classes by siding with the weak and punishing their alleged oppressors. His primary purpose was to seek out political dissidents. He arrested several boyars for voicing a pro-Lithuanian point of view. His actions so unnerved the boyars and the affluent merchants that they showered Ivan with costly gifts. Ivan willingly fleeced them and planned for more. He tightened the noose in a series of calculated moves, aided unwittingly by intimidated Novgorodians, who believed that they could appease him. The grand prince decided in 1477 to press for recognition as sovereign and demanded full judicial authority in Novgorodian affairs. As the unhappy republicans scrambled to protect their remaining liberties, Ivan had his forces ring the capital with his troops. While prepared for the possibility of Lithuanian involvement, he pressed forward with the annexation of Novgorod in 1478. This time the men in the city avoided military action and relied vainly upon persuasion. The annexed land became a viceroyalty of Muscovy, administered by one of Ivan's boyars. The veche disappeared, as did the elected officials. By the end of the century Ivan had forcibly removed the Novgorodian upper classes to the Muscovite interior and had given their lands in conditional service tenure to his own men-at-arms.

Novgorod may have paid a price for its hostility to Moscow, but its disappearance was inevitable. Muscovy had embarked upon a program of annexation by which even docility did not ensure toleration. Pskov had accepted Muscovite suzerainty and grand princely dictates, yet it suffered a similar fate. In 1510 Vasilii III imposed the same solution upon that docile republican offspring that his father had designed for Novgorod.


-- Gustave Alef


FURTHER READINGS


The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1016-1471, Robert Michell and Nevill Forbes, trans. (1914, repr. 1970); Carsten Goehrke, "Gross-Novgorod und Pskov/Pleskau," in Manfred Hellman, ed., Handbuch des Geschichte Russlands, I (1981); Valentin L. Ianin, Novgorodskie posadniki (1962); Vasilii O. Klyuchevskii, A History of Russia, C. J. Hogarth, trans. (1960); Jorg Leuschner, Novgorod: Untersuchungen zu einigen Fragen seiner Verfassungs- und Befölkerungsstruktur (1980); The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text, Samuel H. Cross and Olgerd P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor, eds. and trans. (1953); M. W. Thompson, Novgorod the Great (1967); George Vernadsky and Michael Karpovich, A History of Russia, II and IV (rev. ed. 1961); Wladimir Vodoff, "Les documents sur écorces de bouleau de Novgorod," in Journal des savants (1966), and "Les documents sur écorce de bouleau de Novgorod: Découvertes et travaux récents," in Journal des savants (1981).

Опубликовано на Порталусе 20 сентября 2007 года

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