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Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918

Дата публикации: 20 сентября 2007
Публикатор: Научная библиотека Порталус
Рубрика: RUSSIA (TOPICS) - Soviet Russia (1917-53) →
Источник: (c) http://russia.by
Номер публикации: №1190294392


Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918

Did the Bolsheviks cede permanent domination of the Russian periphery in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk?

Viewpoint: Yes. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk clearly gave Germany control over Eastern Europe, and only the German defeat in World War I kept Russia from permanently losing its buffer zone against invasion from the West.

Viewpoint: No. Desperate to end Russian involvement in World War I, the Bolsheviks agreed to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, confident that they would regain control of the ceded territory when the proletarian revolution spread to Germany.


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On 3 March 1918, the Bolshevik government of Russia signed one of the most punitive peace treaties in history. Having come to power the previous November with a promise to extricate the country from the destruction of World War I, revolutionary leader Vladimir Lenin was prepared to accept even the most Draconian peace conditions to quell popular discontent, an objective crucial to the survival of his regime. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Soviet Russia pledged to give up vast Russian territories inhabited by nearly 60 million people and containing much of the Russian Empire's industry, farmland, and resources. These territories included modern Finland, Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Georgia--borderlands once (and later) thought vital to Russian security.
Germany was obliged to remove its troops from the East after the general World War I armistice, signed in November 1918, and the terms of Brest-Litovsk became irrelevant. This chapter debates what this massive renunciation of territory would have meant for the future of Eastern Europe if Germany had won the war. A common interpretation has held that the Germans would have established permanent hegemony over what had once been the periphery of the Russian Empire, with puppet governments facilitating German strategic and economic exploitation of the region. Another body of thought maintains that the Germans' purpose was to create a buffer zone, a belt of border states to isolate the Soviets from the heart of Europe. Scholars who hold this view argue that, instead of operating as German puppets, many of the new regimes in these states pursued ambitious national policies designed to institutionalize ethnic identities and assert their independence from outside control.



Viewpoint: Yes. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsky clearly gave Germany control over Eastern Europe, and only the German defeat in World War I kept Russia from permanently losing its buffer zone against invasion from the West.

World War I dragged on for more than four years not because the military situation produced a constantly shifting drama, but because the Western Allies could not accept the German occupation of Belgium and parts of France and because Germany would not surrender these gains. Initially, the Germans refused because their possession was in keeping with their visions of elevating the international stature of Germany. As the war dragged on, the Germans saw these and other gains as compensation for their losses in the war and as a way of paying off the debt they had piled up. When the Russian Imperial government and its army collapsed in 1917, the Germans saw the potential for more material gain in the East. By 1918, Germany had clearly decided on a policy of permanent domination of Eastern Europe at the expense of Russia. The March 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the peace settlement between Germany and Soviet Russia, is a clear indication of Berlin's desire to rule over the region indefinitely.

This conclusion can be backed by evidence that stretches back into the nineteenth century. Lacking a substantial colonial empire like Britain or France and having created a nation-state only in 1871, many Germans felt dogged by a sort of inferiority complex. Despite an international mania for all things German and unequaled economic and industrial growth in Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century, many Germans still thought their country did not yet have its proper place in the international community. With a dwindling number of available overseas possessions, many of the so-called geopoliticians of Germany envisioned a European empire dominated by their nation. A substantial obstacle to this vision, however, was the colossus to the East, the Russian Empire. At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, many leading Germans--including Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, traditionally considered a moderate--saw the war as a means to usher in the era of a new German Empire. Scholars, statesmen, intellectuals, and Kaiser Wilhelm II called for the reduction of Russia to its seventeenth-century status, when its borders were hundreds of miles further east and its ability to threaten Europe was negligible.

The human, material, and financial costs of World War I quickly ballooned far beyond what anyone had expected. The political contours of the war changed dramatically. The German parliament, the Reichstag, voted in July 1917 in favor of a compromise peace and reconciliation among the warring nations. This peace resolution included a particularly revealing provision: it called for the establishment of a parliamentary democracy in Germany. Before the end of World War I, Germany was only a limited democracy. While there were indeed free and open elections, those elected to parliament had little power, and the kaiser alone had the authority to choose and dismiss governments and ministers. After the peace resolution of July 1917, however, Germany did not become more democratic. The head of the German Army High Command, General Paul von Hindenburg, and his chief of staff, Erich Ludendorff, called for--and got--the dismissal of Bethmann-Hollweg in favor of someone agreeable to conservatives and the military. This change was the culmination of the unofficial but clear wartime transition of Germany from a monarchical authoritarian state to a military dictatorship.

While the German civilian leadership--in particular Foreign Minister Richard von Kuhlmann--came to realize that a compromise or negotiated peace would be the best outcome for Germany, Ludendorff, who professed a negligible understanding of politics, saw the war in terms of total victory or total defeat. This conflict yielded different responses to the collapse of tsarist Russia in 1917. Kuhlmann believed that Germany should withdraw from Eastern Europe and let the area sort itself out; in this way Germany and Austria could move the resources used fighting the Russians to the Western Front. Ludendorff, however, wanted Germany to hold whatever territory it could take in the East and establish a broad zone of unchallenged hegemonic dominance. As Ludendorff had essentially taken over the German government by the beginning of 1918, his vision prevailed. Thus, on the opening day of the Western Offensive, 21 March 1918, Germany still had one million men in the East.

Ludendorff's rise to power had profound effects on the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. On seizing power in November 1917, Vladimir Lenin called for an armistice and negotiations to end the fighting with Germany. Negotiations opened in December 1917 at Brest-Litovsk and were finalized in March 1918. Germany's position, although negotiated by Kuhlmann, was completely under Ludendorff 's direction: Russia was to be cut back roughly to the western frontiers it had before the Great Northern War (1700-1721).

The Germans envisioned a chain of client monarchies stretching from the Caucasus to the Arctic Circle under the leadership of the German emperor. Germany itself would gain some strips of territory in the Polish realm of the Russian Empire. Even allies of Germany were on its list of targets. In February 1918 the German High Command demanded that the Austrians hand over the Dumbrowa coalfields, which they had seized earlier. At Brest-Litovosk, the Germans presented demand after demand, while the Soviet delegates watched the Russian Empire fall to pieces. Civil war broke out in Finland, which had declared its independence from Russia in December 1917, and the Germans assisted the new Finnish leader, Carl Mannerheim. A month before the final Brest- Litovsk settlement with Russia, the Germans recognized and drew up a peace treaty with the weak, democratic Ukrainian government, which had declared independence from Russia in January 1918. In February 1918 the frustrated chief Soviet negotiator, Foreign Affairs Commissar Lev Trotsky, declared a policy of "neither peace nor war." This pronouncement triggered further German military advances. At the end of the month Lenin recognized the inevitable and declared that Russia had to acquiesce and hope that in the long run a pan-European revolution of the proletariat would reverse Soviet losses. The Soviets surrendered Poland, Finland, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and the territory of the modern Baltic States--Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia--a huge swath of land inhabited by nearly 60 million people. Vast quantities of Russian industrial and agricultural resources came under direct German control, and the economic provisions of the treaty demanded that Russia turn over in perpetuity huge quantities of agricultural produce and raw materials. Another clause forced the Soviets to reverse all nationalizations of German business and investment in Russia since 1914.

Ludendorff 's vision of a German-dominated Eastern Europe was vague. The German Foreign Ministry may have had a concrete plan, but it was marginalized by the German High Command, so its vision had little impact. Ludendorff was left to make his own improvisations. He made unilateral decisions, and the civilians in the government learned of developments--including the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk--only after the fact.

Ludendorff's control extended beyond the purely military and strategic. As he and the German ruling elite began planning for the establishment of German-controlled dominions in Eastern Europe, they sketched out substantial and serious long-term commitments for the region. In some cases, there would be royal ties between the constituent states of Germany (which had retained their traditional monarchs after 1871) and the client monarchies of the East. Wilhelm Karl, Duke of Urach, in the Kingdom of Württemberg, campaigned for and briefly held the new throne of Lithuania, while Prince Friedrich Karl of Hesse wanted to become the king of Finland and was elected to its throne by the Finnish Diet in October 1918. A German prince was chosen to hold modern Latvia and Estonia as a fiefdom of Wilhelm II, while Emperor Karl of Austria wanted to make a relative, Archduke Wilhelm, king of Ukraine.

In Ukraine, the original government, the Rada, though kept in power by the German Army, proved insufficiently subservient and was quickly replaced by a new puppet, a former tsarist general, Pavlo Skoropadsky. Skoropadsky worked with five hundred thousand German troops under the command of Field Marshal Hermann von Eichhorn, who had been managing the German war economy since 1916. Ludendorff also supported the White (tsarist) Finns against the Bolsheviks, in hopes of developing a long-term strategic alliance that could dominate the eastern Baltic and help to stop the spread of Bolshevism.

There is little doubt that under Ludendorff's direction, the Germans had a grand vision of creating a dominion over Eastern Europe. Monarchist ties would bind the satellites of Eastern Europe to the ruling houses of Germany, while military and economic cooperation in the newly created states would create the basis for long-term cooperation and, many hoped, economic exploitation. Just as the relationship between Berlin and Vienna was unequal, the relationships forged with the new states of Eastern Europe were going to be dominated by Germany. While the German Foreign Ministry envisioned leaving Eastern Europe to sort out its own problems, these civilian government officials lacked influence by the end of 1917, and adopting their policy was out of the question. If Germany had won the war, there is little indication that civilian control over the state would have been reinstated. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk gave Germany monarchical, militaristic dominion over Eastern Europe, and only the collapse of the German Empire in the fall of 1918 kept it from enduring.

-- Phil Giltner, Albany Academy


Viewpoint: No. Desperate to end Russian involvement in World War I, the Bolsheviks agreed to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, confident that they would regain control of the ceded territory when the proletarian revolution spread to Germany.

Soviet intentions during the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk underwent several changes. What had brought the tsar's reign to an end was not the Russian masses' commitment to Marxism but their dissatisfaction over the continued involvement of Russia in World War I. Capitalizing on the failure of the Provisional Government to withdraw from the conflict, the Bolsheviks staged a successful coup in November 1917 by promising to end Russian participation. Had they not been able to deliver on their promise--or at least to appear to be making a serious attempt--the Bolsheviks too would likely have been overthrown by whoever next promised to end the suffering of Russians on the battlefields and in the cities, where the war had created food shortages.

In beginning to negotiate an armistice with Germany in mid December 1917, the Soviets delivered on their most important promise to the masses. Negotiating a treaty seemed almost an anticlimax to many Russians. Initially, at least, the Soviets treated the entire process with the enthusiastic optimism that their revolution had lit a flame certain to spread rapidly over the rest of Europe. Thus, they believed they could accept any terms for the sake of expediency because Germany was soon to be governed by fellow communists who would offer the Soviets more-favorable terms. Their confidence in this belief was evident in the behavior of the main Soviet negotiators. Lev Trotsky, a brilliant theoretician and tactician, brought up obscure points made by Karl Marx in debate with his German counterparts, carrying out the conversations almost as effortlessly in German as in Russian. His able assistant, Karl Radek, a radical journalist who was also fluent in several languages, including German, enjoyed taunting the German officers seated across the table by occasionally blowing smoke from his pipe into their faces. Nothing in their demeanor, or in their selection of topics to pursue on any given day, indicated that Trotsky and Radek sought a carefully constructed and lasting peace. Their entire purpose was to buy time until German workers rose up in their own proletarian revolution.

The demand of the Soviet negotiators for "peace without annexations or indemnities" was less a realistic stance than a declaration of principles for posterity. Trotsky was under no illusions that such a position could be acceptable to the German side without a major political upheaval. When Trotsky responded to continued German demands for territory by breaking off the peace talks in February 1918, it was not to resume fighting but to declare a unilateral end to hostilities. This move was met with some incredulity by the Soviet leadership and by the Germans. One of the German negotiators called Trotsky's declaration "unheard of!" Many Bolsheviks rightly feared the Germans would resume hostilities, which they did in due course and met with almost no opposition. Trotsky's reply to the German territorial demands provides the key to understanding the Soviets' underlying principle: they had entered the talks to demonstrate the Germans' greed to their own public and thereby garner support from the German proletariat.

It is not surprising that the Germans seized most of the Baltic States and Ukraine, further weakening the Soviets' negotiating position. Furthermore, the failure of any worker protests in Germany and Austria-Hungary caused the Soviets to rethink their policy. The terms they accepted on 3 March 1918 were worse than those offered earlier, but signing the treaty had the salutary effect of ending the war--the Bolsheviks' originally stated aim. The formal end to the participation in the imperialist global conflict came at a staggering price. Giving up Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Ukraine, and the Caucasus left the Soviet government with a significantly smaller country than the Russian Empire, not only in geographic area but also in terms of population, industry, and arable land. The Soviets' willingness to accept such a loss demonstrated their desperation at the military situation and their expectation that such losses would be temporary.

The government of the lost territories was to be placed under German-supported monarchs and other military rulers, though the Menshevik regime of Georgia survived until the Soviet reconquest. They were not ceded directly to Germany and its allies. That the new thrones of Finland, Lithuania, and Latvia were to come from German ruling houses was not unusual; throughout the Balkans one could find many examples of monarchs with different ethnicities than their subjects, including the German kings of Romania and Bulgaria. Furthermore, these states seemed bent on charting their own independent courses, not on accepting German control. The value of this buffer zone became apparent once it disappeared later in 1918, when the Allies negated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and began to get more involved in the Russian Civil War.

The most important aftereffect of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was the respite it gave the Bolsheviks, fulfilling their promise to end the war and protecting them from foreign influence as they attempted to pacify their opposition at home and consolidate their revolution. Many Russians were angry that the Bolsheviks had given away so much territory, which could conceivably have been used as a base for forces hostile to the communist regime. Yet, any peace was better than a complete military defeat, which would certainly have occurred if the war had continued and which would have ended communist control in Russia.

Many of the fourteen articles in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk crystallized the Soviets' goals. Article II committed the parties to cease engaging in propaganda or subversion against each other. Article III absolved Russia of any obligations (that is, reparations claims) that might come from the lost territories. In Article IX each side renounced all war claims against the other (though a war indemnity was later renegotiated to Germany's advantage in August 1918). Article X gave legitimacy to the Soviet regime by establishing diplomatic relations between it and Germany. Russia did lose more territory than it would have if the Bolsheviks had negotiated in good faith earlier in the process. From the Bolshevik point of view at the time, however, the loss of territory was a temporary setback that would be soon rectified by global revolution. Thus, the terms were not as bad as they could have been, given the military situation.

Peace had been achieved. Furthermore, the spirit of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Germany and their respect for one another's spheres of influence--which began with the treaty--were later revived at Rapallo (1922), Berlin (1926), and even, to a certain extent, with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939.

-- Vasilis Vourkoutiotis, University of Ottawa


TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK

Article I.

Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, for the one part, and Russia, for the other part, declare that the state of war between them has ceased. They are resolved to live henceforth in peace and amity with one another.

Article II.

The contracting parties will refrain from any agitation or propaganda against the Government or the public and military institutions of the other party. In so far as this obligation devolves upon Russia, it holds good also for the territories occupied by the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance.

Article III.

The territories lying to the west of the line agreed upon by the contracting parties which formerly belonged to Russia, will no longer be subject to Russian sovereignty; the line agreed upon is traced on the map submitted as an essential part of this treaty of peace. The exact fixation of the line will be established by a Russo-German commission.

No obligations whatever toward Russia shall devolve upon the territories referred to, arising from the fact that they formerly belonged to Russia.

Russia refrains from all interference in the internal relations of these territories. Germany and Austria-Hungary purpose to determine the future status of these territories in agreement with their population.

Article IV.

As soon as a general peace is concluded and Russian demobilization is carried out completely Germany will evacuate the territory lying to the east of the line designated in paragraph 1 of Article III, in so far as Article IV does not determine otherwise.

Russia will do all within her power to insure the immediate evacuation of the provinces of eastern Anatolia and their lawful return to Turkey.

The districts of Erdehan, Kars, and Batum will likewise and without delay be cleared of the Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the reorganization of the national and international relations of these districts, but leave it to the population of these districts, to carry out this reorganization in agreement with the neighboring States, especially with Turkey.

Article V.

Russia will, without delay, carry out the full demobilization of her army inclusive of those units recently organized by the present Government. Furthermore, Russia will either bring her warships into Russian ports and there detain them until the day of the conclusion of a general peace, or disarm them forthwith. Warships of the States which continue in the state of war with the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance, in so far as they are within Russian sovereignty, will be treated as Russian warships.

The barred zone in the Arctic Ocean continues as such until the conclusion of a general peace. In the Baltic sea, and, as far as Russian power extends within the Black sea, removal of the mines will be proceeded with at once. Merchant navigation within these maritime regions is free and will be resumed at once. Mixed commissions will be organized to formulate the more detailed regulations, especially to inform merchant ships with regard to restricted lanes. The navigation lanes are always to be kept free from floating mines.

Article VI.

Russia obligates herself to conclude peace at once with the Ukrainian People's Republic and to recognize the treaty of peace between that State and the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance. The Ukrainian territory will, without delay, be cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. Russia is to put an end to all agitation or propaganda against the Government or the public institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Esthonia and Livonia will likewise, without delay, be cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. The eastern boundary of Esthonia runs, in general along the river Narwa. The eastern boundary of Livonia crosses, in general, lakes Peipus and Pskow, to the southwestern corner of the latter, then across Lake Luban in the direction of Livenhof on the Dvina. Esthonia and Livonia will be occupied by a German police force until security is insured by proper national institutions and until public order has been established. Russia will liberate at once all arrested or deported inhabitants of Esthonia and Livonia, and insures the safe return of all deported Esthonians and Livonians.

Finland and the Aaland Islands will immediately be cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard, and the Finnish ports of the Russian fleet and of the Russian naval forces. So long as the ice prevents the transfer of warships into Russian ports, only limited forces will remain on board the warships. Russia is to put an end to all agitation or propaganda against the Government or the public institutions of Finland.

The fortresses built on the Aaland Islands are to be removed as soon as possible. As regards the permanent non-fortification of these islands as well as their further treatment in respect to military technical navigation matters, a special agreement is to be concluded between Germany, Finland, Russia, and Sweden; there exists an understanding to the effect that, upon Germany's desire, still other countries bordering upon the Baltic Sea would be consulted in this matter.

Article VII.

In view of the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent States, the contracting parties obligate themselves to respect the political and economic independence and the territorial integrity of these states.

Article VIII.

The prisoners of war of both parties will be released to return to their homeland. The settlement of the questions connected therewith will be effected through the special treaties provided for in Article XII.

Article IX.

The contracting parties mutually renounce compensation for their war expenses, i.e., of the public expenditures for the conduct of the war, as well as compensation for war losses, i.e., such losses as were caused [by] them and their nationals within the war zones by military measures, inclusive of all requisitions effected in enemy country.

Article X.

Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties will be resumed immediately upon the ratification of the treaty of peace. As regards the reciprocal admission of consuls, separate agreements are reserved.

Article XI.

As regards the economic relations between the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance and Russia the regulations contained in Appendices II-V are determinative. . . .

Article XII.

The reestablishment of public and private legal relations, the exchange of war prisoners and interned citizens, the question of amnesty as well as the question anent the treatment of merchant ships which have come into the power of the opponent, will be regulated in separate treaties with Russia which form an essential part of the general treaty of peace, and, as far as possible, go into force simultaneously with the latter

Article XIII.

In the interpretation of this treaty, the German and Russian texts are authoritative for the relations between Germany and Russia; the German, the Hungarian, and Russian texts for the relations between Austria-Hungry and Russia; the Bulgarian and Russian texts for the relations between Bulgaria and Russia; and the Turkish and Russian texts for the relations between Turkey and Russia.

Article XIV.

The present treaty of peace will be ratified. The documents of ratification shall, as soon as possible, be exchanged in Berlin. The Russian Government obligates itself, upon the desire of one of the powers of the Quadruple Alliance, to execute the exchange of the documents of ratification within a period of two weeks. Unless otherwise provided for in its articles, in its annexes, or in the additional treaties, the treaty of peace enters into force at the moment of its ratification.

In testimony whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty with their own hand.

Executed in quintuplicate at Brest-Litovsk, 3 March, 1918.

Source: "The Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk," World War I Document Archive http:www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918/brestlitovsk.html.

FURTHER READINGS


References


Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton, 1967).

Holger H. Herwig, "German Policy in the Eastern Baltic Sea in 1918: Expansion or Anti-Bolshevik Crusade?" Slavic Review, 32 (June 1973): 339-357.

V. I. Lenin, The Revolutionary Phrase "Left- Communist" Mistakes on the Brest Peace: Articles and Speeches (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965).

Judah L. Magnes, Russia and Germany at Brest-Litovsk: A Documentary History of the Peace Negotiations (New York: Rand School of Social Science, 1919).

Woodruff D. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

Ariadna Tyrkova-Williams, From Liberty to Brest-Litovsk: The First Year of the Russian Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1919).

John Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918 (London: Macmillan, 1938)

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