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The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: 1972 to the Present

Дата публикации: 20 сентября 2007
Публикатор: Научная библиотека Порталус
Рубрика: RUSSIA (TOPICS) ARMED FORCES →
Источник: (c) http://russia.by
Номер публикации: №1190296290


The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: 1972 to the Present

(from Part 4: Arms Control Activities Since 1945)

___________________

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 prohibits the United States and the Soviet Union--now replaced by Russia as the United States' principal treaty partner--from deploying nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. While neither superpower ever entirely abandoned the search for defenses against the nuclear threat, the ABM Treaty was based on a recognition by both superpowers that no foreseeable technology could provide an effective defense against the fearsome destructive power of nuclear weapons, and that building a missile defense would only force the other side to augment its offensive forces to overcome it, in order to maintain its nuclear deterrent. The resulting race between missiles and missile defenses would be expensive and potentially dangerous, would make negotiated restraints on offensive strategic forces impossible, and would undermine the predictability necessary for strategic planning.

Despite some compliance controversies--and one clear violation on the Soviet side, which will be discussed below--the ABM Treaty has been highly successful. Neither side has deployed a nationwide missile defense. While offensive forces have increased substantially since the treaty was signed, the ABM Treaty has "forestalled an explosion of offensive development on both sides," in the words of former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, speaking in 1985 (quoted in Bunn, p. 17). Schlesinger referred to the treaty as "the cornerstone of restraint." Today, the treaty is regarded by many as the foundation for both the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the accord on deeper strategic arms reductions announced by President George Bush and the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, at their June 1992 summit. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown described the ABM Treaty as "the most substantive and important arms control agreement ever reached by the two superpowers" ("The SALT Negotiations: 1969-1972," in Henry Owen and John Thomas Smith II, eds., Gerard C. Smith: A Career in Progress [Lanham, Md., 1989], p. 67).

Since the mid-1980s, however, the ABM Treaty has been the focus of intense controversies within the United States and between the two signatories, as it places strict limits on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)--better known as "Star Wars"--launched by President Reagan in 1983. The treaty's future remains a critical unresolved issue in American security policy.


The Treaty's History

From the dawn of the nuclear age, both the United States and the Soviet Union searched without success for an effective defense against nuclear attack. Through the 1940s and much of the 1950s, bombers posed the primary strategic nuclear threat. Both superpowers responded with large-scale air-defense systems, including thousands of radar-guided missiles and hundreds of fighter aircraft.

By the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, the advent of long-range Soviet ballistic missiles forced a reevaluation of the United States air defense program. The system could not intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) and was extremely vulnerable to direct ICBM attack, making it ineffective even as an anti-bomber defense. Consequently, U.S. strategic defense spending gradually shifted away from air defenses to the new problem of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMS). The former Soviet Union, however, facing a large United States bomber force as well as air threats from Europe and China, continued to maintain and upgrade its massive air-defense system.

Some preliminary research on the ABM problem had been under way since the immediate aftermath of World War II, in projects such as Thumper and Wizard. But the first large-scale program began in 1958, when the army got the go-ahead to develop the Nike-Zeus ABM missile, a long-range, nuclear-tipped interceptor.

Over the next several years, as work on Nike-Zeus advanced, the army regularly proposed rapid deployment of the system, but was rebuffed by a coalition of critics in the White House, the office of the secretary of defense, and the air force. These opponents pointed out that the system's mechanically steered radars would be overwhelmed by a large attack and were themselves vulnerable to blinding or destruction, and that the system could be overcome by potential Soviet countermeasures such as warhead-mimicking decoys and radar-reflecting chaff. Moreover, the cost of a widespread Nike-Zeus system would be extremely high, and such a deployment might provoke the Soviet Union to increase its offensive forces to overcome it. And since any missile defense would be more effective against a reduced, disorganized retaliation than against a massive, well-planned first strike, substantial missile defenses on both sides could increase the incentive to strike first in a crisis, undermining stability and increasing the risk of nuclear war. This basic troika of arguments--technical weaknesses, cost, and strategic implications--has remained the backbone of the anti-ABM case through all subsequent debates, reflecting the enduring obstacles to mounting an effective defense against a sophisticated adversary armed with the devastating destructive power of modern thermonuclear weapons.

In July 1962, Nike-Zeus scored the first in a series of test successes, intercepting an ICBM for the first time. But it was clear that Nike-Zeus was simply too primitive to handle the likely future Soviet missile threat. In 1963, the Zeus program was replaced by Nike-X, which incorporated an electronically steered "phased-array" radar, capable of simultaneously tracking many targets, and a short-range interceptor called Sprint, designed to intercept Soviet missiles inside the atmosphere. In addition, the long-range Zeus interceptor was eventually up-graded, to become the Spartan. Consideration of deployment was deferred while the more advanced system was developed.

Despite these technical advances, critics continued to raise both technical and strategic doubts. Indeed, the outlines of the missile-anti-missile race predicted by ABM opponents were already beginning to emerge. In the early 1960s, intelligence on Soviet ABM activities led to increased United States spending on decoys and other anti-defense "penetration aids," and was a significant factor in the U.S. decision to develop and ultimately deploy multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVS) allowing each missile to deliver several warheads to separate targets. Ultimately, U.S. MIRVS drastically increased the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union, more than compensating for whatever protection its limited ABM defense could offer. The first Soviet ABM deployment around Moscow also created powerful domestic pressure for deployment of a U.S. ABM system. In this environment, then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and others concluded that the only way to avoid a long-term arms race in both offensive and defensive strategic arms was to negotiate an arms agreement, placing particularly strict limits on ABMs.

By the mid-1960s, the possibility of such agreed restraints on strategic arms was gaining increasing currency. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had warmed somewhat following the Cuban missile crisis, leading to the successful negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The United States had deployed large offensive nuclear forces, and the Soviet Union was rapidly catching up, creating a deterrent balance in which neither side could launch a nuclear attack on the other without facing certain and devastating retaliation. Arms control proponents argued that maintaining that balance through negotiated limits on the arms competition was more likely to lead to lasting security than an unlimited race in ABMS and strategic offensive forces. At the same time, the advent of satellite reconnaissance increased confidence in the possibility of adequate verification.

The Soviet leadership first opposed limits on missile defenses. But it soon became apparent that the Soviets were involved in a debate of their own, over both ABMS and the advisability of entering negotiations on strategic arms. Eventually, Soviet leaders came to see arms control as an important means of certifying and protecting their attainment of strategic nuclear parity with the United States. And like their U.S. counterparts, Soviet officials apparently calculated that agreed limitations would better serve Soviet security in the long term than an unlimited offense-defense competition--a realization probably spurred by the clear superiority of United States ABM and MIRV technology.

But this resolution of the Soviet debate did not come until well after the United States began to press for arms talks. In December 1966, in response to continuing pressure for United States deployment of an ABM system, President Lyndon Johnson decided to include several hundred million dollars for construction of an ABM system in the following year's budget, but to withhold the funds pending an attempt to negotiate an ABM agreement with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, at the June 1967 summit meeting in Glassboro, New Jersey, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin resisted Johnson and McNamara's arguments for strict ABM limitations, and no agreement to initiate strategic arms negotiations was reached. President Johnson then decided to proceed with construction of a "thin" nationwide ABM system based on Nike-X technology, dubbed Sentinel.

McNamara announced the Sentinel decision in a remarkable speech on 18 September 1967. Most of the speech was devoted to the case against deployment of a "thick" ABM system, arguing that no ABM could protect United States urban society from the devastating power of Soviet nuclear weapons, and that such a system would inevitably accelerate the arms race and destabilize the nuclear balance. Only at the end of the speech did McNamara reveal the decision to deploy a "thin" ABM system, ostensibly to defend against the developing Chinese missile threat.

The Sentinel decision, coming in the midst of increasing antimilitary sentiment provoked by the Vietnam War, launched a wave of criticism from scientists and congressmen, which soon escalated into public protests. But for the moment, initial steps toward deployment went forward largely unimpeded.

On 1 July 1968, the day the Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed, President Johnson was finally able to announce that the Soviet Union had agreed to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). But the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August, on the eve of the scheduled announcement of a summit meeting and a date for the talks, forced Johnson to postpone the negotiations, leaving the ABM issue for President Richard Nixon's administration to grapple with. The same month, United States MIRV testing began.

From the outset of his presidency, Richard Nixon abandoned his campaign call for "clear-cut military superiority" over the Soviet Union, accepting the more modest goal of "sufficiency" and thereby laying the foundation for SALT. In March 1969, after a review of the U.S. strategic posture, Nixon announced his conclusion that an ABM population defense could not be achieved, and his decision to reorient the Sentinel program to defend missile silos, under the name Safeguard. But the change of name and mission only intensified the ABM debate--particularly as the Sentinel technology was not well suited to its new role. In August 1969, the administration won Senate approval for the first phase of Safeguard by only a single vote--in part by arguing that the system was needed as a SALT bargaining chip. In October, President Nixon announced that he had agreed with the Soviet leaders to begin talks on strategic arms.

The SALT negotiations finally began on 17 November 1969, in Helsinki, Finland. Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, headed the United States delegation, while Ambassador Vladimir Semonov led the Soviet team. In the first rounds of talks, both sides proposed strict limits on ABM systems, but major differences over offensive limitations soon emerged. These disagreements reflected large differences in the makeup of the two sides' strategic forces, particularly the heavy Soviet reliance on large landbased ICBMS, and the Soviet desire to weigh in the balance both the strategic forces held by American allies and United States forward-based weapons on aircraft carriers and foreign bases.

With the disagreements over offensive limitations delaying progress, the Soviet Union soon switched course and proposed that the sides agree on an ABM treaty while leaving offensive forces to a subsequent negotiation. But the United States insisted on a dual agreement, hoping to use its ongoing ABM deployment program to gain Soviet concessions on offensive arms. In May 1971, Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser, and Anatoly Dobrynin, then Soviet ambassador to the United States, reached agreement in a "backchannel" negotiation that a comprehensive ABM accord would be accompanied by a more limited agreement on offensive arms, leaving more complete offensive limitations to SALT II.

A year later, on 26 May 1972, President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT I agreements, including both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive arms. The ABM Treaty banned nationwide ABM systems, while the Interim Agreement froze for five years each side's missile launchers at the level then operational or under construction. SALT I, however, did not place any limits on MIRVS, allowing a major buildup in missile warheads on both sides, or on bomber forces.

The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the ABM Treaty on August 3 by a vote of 88 to 2, and both houses of Congress gave similarly overwhelming approval to the Interim Agreement, reflecting the domestic consensus in support of both accords. The agreements entered into force on 3 October 1972. Two years later, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed a Protocol to the ABM Treaty, reducing the number of permitted ABM sites from two to one.


The Treaty's Terms

The ABM Treaty's fundamental provision is its ban on nationwide missile defenses. But the basic prohibition is bolstered by a variety of restraints designed to ensure that several years of observable illegal activity would be required before either side could have such a nationwide defense in operation, preventing either side from gaining the ability to "break out" of the accord more rapidly than the other could respond. The terms of the treaty form an interlocking structure: each of the substantive articles of the accord is key to the whole, for each is carefully designed to block a potential avenue for evasion or circumvention. As a result, the ABM Treaty has enabled both sides to confidently plan their strategic missile forces in the knowledge that the other side cannot rapidly construct nationwide defenses against them.

The ABM Treaty begins with a preamble, outlining the sides' agreement that limits on ABM s would reduce pressures to build up offensive arms, contribute to chances for offensive arms control, and help reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Article I then sets out the fundamental prohibition, with each side agreeing "not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense."

Article II defines the ABM systems and components limited by the treaty. The term "ABM system" is defined functionally, to include any "system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory." The components of such a system are listed as "currently consisting of" ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars--the most visible elements of the ABM systems of 1972. This listing, and the use of the word "currently," became controversial when the Reagan administration reinterpreted the ABM Treaty in 1985, as described in more detail below.

Article III then sets out the very limited deployments of ABM systems permitted by the accord, permitting only two ABM sites--one to defend the national capital, as the Soviet Union was then doing, and one to defend an ICBM field, the approach the United States was pursuing--each armed with no more than one hundred fixed ABM launchers. Specific restraints are also placed on the radars at each site. As mentioned above, a 1974 protocol reduced the number of permitted sites to one, which can be of either type.

With the permitted ABM defenses limited to a single site armed with only one hundred ABM launchers, the firepower and scope of the permitted defense are far too small to pose any threat to either side's offensive deterrent forces, each of which consists of thousands of ballistic missile warheads. If, on the other hand, the treaty were amended to allow a significantly larger number of deployment sites--as some have recommended in order to facilitate construction of a defense against limited strikes, such as a third world country might eventually be capable of--the much larger permitted ABM infrastructure, including more widespread ABM radars, would give either side the ability to expand its defenses much more rapidly, eroding the treaty's buffer against rapid "breakout" from the accord.

Article III bans all ABM deployments not explicitly allowed, implicitly prohibiting any deployment of ABM systems and components other than interceptors, launchers, and radars--such as lasers or particle beams used to perform the same functions. Agreed Statement D makes this ban explicit. While the language is somewhat tortuous, both sides agreed that under this provision, future ABM components "based on other physical principles" and "capable of substituting for" ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars, could only be deployed if both parties agreed to amend the treaty to provide specific limitations on them, analogous to the treaty's limits on traditional-technology ABM components. Otherwise, the possibly superior capabilities of such new-technology systems might have undermined the specific restraints on ABM firepower contained in Article III.

Article V further limits the capabilities of the permitted ABM systems. The first paragraph of Article V prohibits development, testing, and deployment of all mobile ABM systems and components, including those that are "sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based." This broad ban on mobile ABMS prohibiting their development beyond research, is critical to the treaty's effectiveness, for ABM systems based on mobile components would be inherently expandable beyond the single permitted site, creating a danger of rapid breakout toward a nationwide defense. Space-based ABMS, in particular, would inherently provide nationwide or even global coverage. Requiring little site preparation, mobile ABMS might be rapidly deployed once produced, further undermining the treaty's protections. Mobile ABM components would also make numerical limits on deployment more difficult to verify.

The second paragraph of Article V bans the development, testing, and deployment of multiple-launch or rapidly reloadable ABM launchers, which might otherwise have undercut the limit on defensive firepower imposed by the one-hundred-launcher ceiling. Agreed Statement E broadens that limitation to include a similar ban on multiple-warhead interceptors, which could have had a similar effect.

Article V's limits begin at the development stage. No prohibitions were placed on research, which would have been very difficult to verify. During the ABM Treaty negotiations, it was recognized that the line between permitted "research" and prohibited "development" is difficult to define. Soviet negotiators implicitly accepted the United States interpretation of "development" as a stage following research, when prototypes or breadboard models of ABM components left the laboratory and were ready for field testing, but no formal agreed interpretation was sought. Subsequent experiments conducted in the SDI program pressed the somewhat ambiguous line between permitted research and prohibited development and testing.

Article VI addresses the possibility that non-ABM systems such as air defenses or anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons might be upgraded to serve as strategic missile defenses, thereby circumventing the accord. Article VI prohibits giving any such non-ABM components "capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles," or testing them "in an ABM mode." The phrase "testing in an ABM mode" was clarified in agreed interpretations negotiated in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) in 1978 and 1985. The treaty permits defenses against short-range tactical ballistic missiles, such as the Patriot system used to intercept Iraqi Scud missiles in the 1991 Gulf War, but under Article VI, such systems cannot be given the capability to defend against longer-range strategic missiles, or tested in an ABM mode. The line between permitted tactical defense capabilities and prohibited strategic defenses is a somewhat fuzzy one, however, creating an ambiguity that has already led to some compliance controversies, and may become a central issue as both sides pursue more capable tactical missile defenses.

The second paragraph of Article VI addresses the dual-capable technologies issue as it applies to large radars. The treaty's restraints on radars are particularly important, since large radars are the guiding eyes of traditional-technology ABM systems, and take years to build. The beginning of construction of large numbers of radars in violation of the ABM Treaty would provide ample warning of an effort to construct a nationwide missile defense. A ban on all radars that might have an ABM potential was not possible, however, since radars capable of detecting and tracking ballistic missiles are necessary for other essential purposes, such as early warning and treaty verification. (In later SDI concepts, large radars were superseded in part by difficult-to-monitor infrared sensors, creating new dilemmas--particularly as these new technologies would also have important early-warning and verification potential.)

To address these conflicting concerns, Article VI permits early warning radars, but limits future deployments of such radars to the periphery of the country and oriented outward. Located that way, an early-warning radar's coverage is almost entirely outside the country's territory, hobbling its ability to serve as a battle-manager for a missile defense. Moreover, early warning radars on the periphery of a country's territory would be especially vulnerable to attack, making it less likely that either side would rely on them as the basis for a widespread missile defense. Agreed Statement F broadens these radar restraints by prohibiting the deployment of any new large "phased-array" radars--a type that can be rapidly electronically steered to track large numbers of targets simultaneously, offering greater ABM potential than any other type--except as ABM radars at agreed ABM sites or test ranges, early warning radars limited by Article VI, or for space tracking and treaty verification. Phased-array radars for all other purposes are limited to a size too small to offer any significant ability to search the sky for fast-moving strategic ballistic missiles.

As described in more detail below, the Soviet Union has violated these provisions with its early-warning radar near Krasnoyarsk, but that radar is now being dismantled. Two U.S. phased-array radars, one at Thule, Greenland, and the other at Fylingdales Moor, United Kingdom, also raise serious questions of compliance with these provisions, though the issues there are more ambiguous than in the case of Krasnoyarsk--and Soviet and Russian complaints over these radars have grown muted. A number of former Soviet early-warning radars are outside Russian territory and are still being operated by the Commonwealth of Independent States, but this would not appear to violate the ABM Treaty's ban on deploying "future" early-warning radars outside each party's national territory.

Other articles address other potential avenues for circumventing the treaty's restraints. In Article IV, permitted testing of fixed, land-based ABMS is limited to agreed test ranges and a total of no more than fifteen test launchers, preventing test ranges from being used as a guise for a widespread ABM deployment. Article IX prohibits either side from deploying ABM systems and components outside its national territory, or transferring them to other states not limited by the accord. Agreed Statement G extends the "no-transfer" provision to include transfers of "technical descriptions or blue-prints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components."

Verification of the ABM Treaty depends on "national technical means" (NTM), a euphemism for photoreconnaissance satellites and other technical intelligence systems used to collect information on treaty-limited activities. Verification is greatly facilitated by Article XII, which bars deliberate concealment of ABM activities and interference with the other party's NTM.

Article XIII established the United States-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, to discuss measures to implement the accord, additional agreements to improve its effectiveness, and questions of compliance with the agreement. The SCC has effectively resolved many ambiguities and compliance disputes, providing an essential mechanism for reinforcing arms control agreements.

Under the terms of Article XV, the ABM Treaty is "of unlimited duration," signalling that the accord was intended to last as far into the future as either side could then predict. Either side may, however, withdraw from the treaty after giving six months' notice, if "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." Notice must include a statement of the reasons for withdrawal. Although not specifically included in the treaty's terms, the accepted principles of international law also permit either party to withdraw or to take appropriate and proportionate responses if the other party commits a "material breach" of the accord.

Together, the provisions of the ABM Treaty have successfully prevented either side from deploying any large-scale defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. However, there are ambiguities in the ABM Treaty's provisions that are becoming more critical as ABM-related programs in both the United States and the former Soviet Union begin to come close to the boundaries. Just as the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of freedom of speech must constantly be interpreted in the age of electronic media, any agreement covering as broad and complex a technological area as ballistic missile defense will need refinement as specific technical issues arise. The ABM Treaty explicitly envisioned periodic reviews and clarification, and gave the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) that task. There is little doubt that with superpower cooperation, the ABM Treaty could be adapted and strengthened to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.


From Salt to Star Wars

After the ABM Treaty entered into force, both the United States and the Soviet Union continued research and development of ABM systems. The single U.S. Safeguard ABM site was completed in 1975, but was soon deactivated, as the extremely limited protection it offered was judged not to be worth the cost of continued operation and maintenance. U.S. ABM research and development continued, focused primarily on close-in defenses for hardened concrete missile silos, rather than wide-area defenses. The former Soviet Union maintained and modernized its ABM system at the permitted MOSCOW ABM site, and continued an active ABM development program.

During the 1970s, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) successfully managed the few ABM compliance and implementation issues that arose, and in 1977 conducted the first treaty-mandated ABM Treaty Review Conference, reaffirming the accord's importance. At the same time, follow-on strategic arms talks continued, and the SALT II Treaty was finally signed in 1979.

But anti-Soviet sentiment in the United States was on the rise, fueled by Soviet behavior in regional conflicts and by the rapid increase in Soviet missile capabilities as the Soviet Union followed the U.S. lead in deploying (MIRVS). When the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan in December 1979, President Jimmy Carter's administration had no choice but to ask the Senate to defer consideration of SALT II. In the same period, the potential threat to American silo-based missiles led to renewed consideration of ABMS as a possible response; but systems for this purpose never proceeded into full-scale development or deployment.

The downward trend in United States-Soviet relations contributed to the election of President Ronald Reagan and reached its nadir in the early years of his term, with the Soviet shoot-down of a civilian airliner and Reagan's description of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire." Reagan brought to the presidency a belief in the urgent need to build up U.S. military forces and a deep skepticism about arms control. Reagan had also long yearned for a defense against nuclear attack, and his advisers made no secret of their disdain for the ABM Treaty. Richard Perle, then the top arms control official in the Department of Defense, told Congress in 1982 that the treaty "was a mistake in 1972, and the sooner we face up to ... that mistake the better" (quoted in Bunn, p. 15).

But while funding for strategic forces was significantly increased in the first years of Reagan's presidency, missile defenses remained in the background. A 1981 Defense Science Board study of the space laser concept advocated by a few senators was unenthusiastic, and air force studies flatly rejected the 1982 "High Frontier" proposal put forward by retired General Daniel Graham, a former Reagan military adviser. In 1982, the second five-year ABM Treaty Review Conference again reaffirmed the accord, albeit with far less enthusiasm than had the 1977 review.

On 23 March 1983, however, President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars," with a speech calling for an all-encompassing shield that would render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete."

SDI soon became the focus of intense controversy, both domestically and internationally. Some SDI advocates, particularly President Reagan, envisioned a perfect or nearly-perfect defense that would "protect us from nuclear missiles just as a roof protects a family from rain," as Reagan once put it (quoted in Bunn, p. 4). Others, recognizing that such perfection would be impossible to achieve, argued that a mix of missile defenses and offenses would provide a more stable strategic balance, and might protect against some more limited types of missile attacks. Some saw the program as a lever to force the Soviet Union to agree to reductions in its offensive forces; others saw it as a response to the substantial Soviet ABM development program. SDI critics raised many of the basic arguments of the ABM debates of the 1960s, zeroing in on the technical weaknesses, cost, and troubling strategic and arms control implications of the program. The Soviet Union angrily criticized the program as an aggressive American effort to recapture military superiority and gain the ability to attack the Soviet Union without fear of retaliation. NATO countries expressed concern over the costs and risks of an ABM race. Domestic critics, Soviet negotiators, and NATO allies all emphasized the importance of maintaining the ABM Treaty.

This controversy has remained a key focus of the debate over strategic weapons and arms control ever since. The political context has changed dramatically over the years, however. SDI was launched at a time of considerable superpower tension, and substantial domestic disagreement over defense within the United States and its NATO allies: hawkish arms control critics warned of Soviet military superiority, while demonstrations in the streets called for a nuclear freeze and opposed the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. With Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's ascension to power in 1985, superpower relations began a fundamental revolution, reaching a climax in 1989-1991 with the triumph of democratic forces in most of Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. President Bush continued to support the SDI program, though with scaled-back goals and less high-level emphasis than President Reagan gave it. In the aftermath of Iraqi short-range ballistic missile attacks in the 1991 Gulf War, Congress became more supportive of missile defenses, boosting SDI's budget and endorsing a goal of limited deployments. Russian president Boris Yeltsin, while reaffirming the importance of the ABM Treaty, has also spoken of an as-yet-undefined concept of joint missile defenses. And with the end of the Cold War, many see crises in the developing world rather than potential conflict between the United States and Russia as the key military threat the United States is likely to face--a change symbolized by the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf.

The complex ABM debate of the 1980s can be divided into three main areas: charges of widespread Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, the Reagan administration's reinterpretation of the pact, and the link between proposals for SDI testing and deployment and the efforts to negotiate a START treaty cutting offensive nuclear arms.


A Pattern of ABM Cheating?

In the summer of 1983, the United States announced that it had detected a large radar under construction near the Soviet city of Krasnoyarsk. The Reagan administration soon charged that this radar violated the ABM Treaty, and that a variety of other Soviet activities constituted "probable" or "potential" violations. The Soviet Union struck back with a list of charges of its own, and argued repeatedly that the entire SDI program was fundamentally contrary to the purpose of the ABM Treaty.

The Reagan administration gave these charges a high public profile. Reagan administration officials and arms control critics pointed to the Krasnoyarsk radar as the prime example of what they saw as a long-standing pattern of Soviet cheating, and questioned whether the Soviet Union would abide by any arms agreement it signed. Independent studies conducted by supporters of the ABM accord, however, concluded that charges of a "pattern" of Soviet violations were unfounded--and that most of the Soviet charges against the United States had even less merit. While the Soviet Union had pressed into several ambiguous areas, with the exception of Krasnoyarsk, the Reagan administration's charges of ABM violations rested on contentious interpretations of the available data and the treaty language. Similarly, while the Bush administration raised one new charge--that the communications link between the former Soviet Union's early-warning radars and its permitted MOSCOW ABM system violated the ABM Treaty--Paul Nitze, the chief negotiator of the relevant treaty provisions, dismissed this charge as "outrageously false and reckless."

The Krasnoyarsk radar, however, was an unambiguous violation of the treaty. Although never completed, it was clearly an early-warning radar, identical in design to other Soviet early-warning radars at permitted sites, and located to fill a major gap in Soviet early-warning coverage. Yet it was neither on the periphery nor oriented outward, as required by Article VI. For years, the Soviet Union claimed that the facility was not an early-warning radar but a permitted space-tracking radar. The United States rejected this explanation and demanded the radar's destruction; the issue sounded a sour note in arms control discussions through most of the 1980s. In 1988, the third ABM Treaty Review Conference collapsed in discord over the issue.

While both United States critics and supporters of the ABM Treaty agreed that the Krasnoyarsk radar was a violation of the agreement, there was great disagreement as to the radar's purpose and implications. Hawkish Reagan administration officials charged that the facility was not just an early-warning radar but potentially capable of ABM battle-management--part of a Soviet effort to gain the capability to rapidly break out of the ABM Treaty and build a nationwide missile defense. The Defense Department reportedly urged that the radar be declared a "material breach" of the ABM Treaty, and suggested that the United States take "proportionate" responses, some of which would also have violated the ABM Treaty. Supporters of the ABM accord, however, pointed to a reported CIA study that concluded the facility was "not well designed" for an ABM role, citing its extreme vulnerability to attack and the use of a radar frequency more than ten times lower than that used by modern ABM radars, which would make it very susceptible to blinding by "blackout" from nuclear blasts. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown summed up the treaty supporters' case in 1985: "Krasnoyarsk is an early warning radar that is located in the wrong place. I do not think it is a great threat to U.S. security because I do not think it has that much capability" (quoted in Bunn, p. 78).

By 1985, the Soviet Union had offered to halt construction at Krasnoyarsk if the United States did the same with its controversial radars at Thule and Fylingdales Moor--the Reagan administration refused, arguing that the U.S. radars were legal. In 1987, the Soviet Union ceased construction unilaterally, while Krasnoyarsk was still little more than an empty shell. In July 1988 the Soviet negotiators offered to dismantle Krasnoyarsk's "equipment"--rather than the entire structure--if the Reagan administration abandoned its reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty; later that year, the Soviets suggested turning the facility into a space research center. Finally, in September 1989, the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle Krasnoyarsk completely, without pre-conditions, and in October, then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze acknowledged that the radar was, "to put it bluntly, a violation of the ABM Treaty." Some 70 percent of the facility was dismantled by 1992, and local authorities have decided to turn the remainder into a furniture factory, putting an end to the only clear case of a Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty.

Why the Soviet Union chose to undertake the illegal Krasnoyarsk construction remains something of a mystery. Some Soviet officials have indicated that the illegal site was chosen because filling the same early-warning gap with a radar legally on the periphery would have required far more expensive construction in the permafrost of northeastern Siberia, far from any major roads or rail lines. Soviet leaders may have hoped that the United States would acquiesce to the "space-tracking" explanation, or may even have viewed the space-tracking provision as a genuine loophole in the accord.


The Reinterpretation of the ABM

Treat On 6 October 1985, then National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane announced a reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty. Under the new "broad" interpretation, the treaty's restraints on ABM development and testing would apply only to 1972-era ABM technologies such as rocket interceptors, launchers, and radars, and not to the more futuristic technologies being developed in the SDI program. Under what came to be called the "traditional" or "narrow" interpretation, by contrast, these treaty restraints applied equally to all ABM technologies.

The "broad" interpretation was immediately denounced by the Soviet Union, many of the NATO allies, and by American experts--including all but one (Paul Nitze) of the United States negotiators of the ABM Treaty. Gerard C. Smith, the chief U.S. negotiator, called the reinterpretation "little short of a scandal," and argued that since the treaty's restraints on development and testing were critical to its protection against rapid breakout from the agreement, the reinterpretation would effectively render the treaty "a dead letter."

The Reagan administration soon attempted a partial retreat, saying that while the new interpretation was "fully justified," the issue was "moot," as the United States would respect the traditional view of the treaty for the time being. But the issue was far from moot, for the broad interpretation would enshroud the SDI program and the arms control negotiations in constant controversy for the rest of Ronald Reagan's term in office.

Reinterpretation advocates based their case on what they believed were ambiguities in the treaty's text and negotiating record. The definition of ABM system components in Article II, they argued, could be read as including only the components specifically listed there--ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars. Under that reading, Article V's ban on development, testing, and deployment of space-based and otherwise mobile ABM systems and components would not apply to other technologies. Supporters of the "broad" view pointed to numerous instances in the negotiating record where Soviet negotiators had resisted limits on future-technology systems, and concluded that the final text and record left enough ambiguity that the Soviet Union could reasonably claim that it was not bound to restraints on such exotic-technology systems. Therefore, they argued, the United States should not be bound either. With a few exceptions, however, reinterpretation advocates agreed that deployment of exotic-technology ABMS would still be prohibited under Agreed Statement D.

Critics of the reinterpretation rejected all of these arguments. They caustically pointed out that new State Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer had carried out his study justifying the new view in only two and a half weeks, consulting only one of the U.S. negotiators, and no legal experts on arms control within the State Department or other agencies. They argued that the treaty language was clear on its face, defining ABM systems not by technology but by function, as systems "to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory," and specifically indicating that the list of components is simply those that ABM systems "currently" consist of, not an exhaustive list. The language of Article V did not suggest any huge loophole of the kind suggested by reinterpretation supporters.

Moreover, critics pointed out that both parties' interpretation of the pact after it was signed--referred to as the "subsequent practice," and cited in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as the most critical indicator of a treaty's meaning, after the text itself--strongly supported the traditional interpretation. On the United States side, there were thirteen years of consistent interpretation, and there were a number of key statements on the Soviet side as well, including an authoritative statement by the chief of the Soviet General Staff specifically rejecting all of the claims raised by the broad view, even before they were raised in the United States. (Despite the central place of the subsequent practice in the law of treaty interpretation, the Reagan administration did not complete any study of this issue until nearly two years after it had announced its new interpretation.) Supporters of the traditional view argued that the negotiating record, too, supported their interpretation: the chief Soviet negotiator of Article V, for example, had confirmed to U.S. negotiators that it would cover "any type of present or future components," and U.S. negotiators had specifically inserted the word "currently" before the list of components in Article II, with Soviet agreement, to ensure that both present and future technologies would be covered.

Reinterpretation critics, particularly in the Senate, also pointed out that the statements of top Nixon administration officals during the ABM Treaty ratification hearings explicitly supported the traditional view of the accord. Sofaer, after being forced to retreat from early claims that the ratification record supported the broad interpretation (he blamed his faulty studies on "young lawyers" on his staff), argued that the president has broad latitude to disregard interpretations presented to the Senate during the ratification process, a view that became known as the "Sofaer doctrine." This undermining of the Senate's role in the treaty process provoked considerable controversy, with one 1987 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report calling the reinterpretation "the most flagrant abuse of the Constitution's treaty power in 200 years of American history."

The highly charged reinterpretation fight soon became entwined with debates over the defense budget and other treaties. Led by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the Senate attached an amendment to the defense authorization bill in 1987 barring any SDI tests beyond the limits of the traditional interpretation. After lengthy maneuverings, including a Republican filibuster and a presidential veto, a modified version having the same effect was finally approved. Similar language has been approved with far less controversy every year since. Similarly, in 1988, the Senate attached a condition to its advice and consent to ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty requiring that the treaty be interpreted on the basis of the understanding shared by the Senate and executive branch at the time of ratification. While the so-called Byrd-Biden condition did not specifically mention the ABM Treaty issue, it was based on the "treaty clauses of the constitution," and both supporters and opponents made clear their understanding that it would apply to other agreements, including the ABM Treaty.

One irony of the reinterpretation debate is that it is by no means clear that even the broad interpretation would permit testing of the space-based rocket interceptors that have long been the focus of near-term SDI plans. These would appear to be "ABM interceptors," one of the ABM components specifically listed in Article II, and hence covered under any interpretation. While some reinterpretation supporters argued that interceptors that did not use nuclear weapons and were not guided by radar should be considered new technologies, this view was widely rejected--even by Paul Nitze, the only U.S. ABM Treaty negotiator who supported the broad interpretation. As of the early 1990s, any large-scale testing of lasers or particle beams seemed unlikely to occur before the twenty-first century, postponed more by budget constraints and shifting SDI emphases than by ABM Treaty restraints.

In the end, the broad interpretation was stillborn, having been rejected by a strong majority of the United States Congress, legally preventing its implementation. Nevertheless, the interpretation and future of the ABM Treaty remain major issues in strategic arms negotiations.


The ABM Treaty and Offensive Arms Reductions

The controversy over SDI and the ABM Treaty has been a central issue in arms reduction efforts throughout the Reagan and Bush administrations. In 1984 and 1985, the Soviet Union bitterly attacked the SDI program and United States ASAT development programs, and called for negotiations to ban what it called "space strike weapons." Soviet negotiators had walked out of negotiations over both intermediate-range missiles and strategic arms in late 1983, in response to the United States deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, and the Reagan administration saw the Soviet interest in negotiations on space weapons as a means to get the talks started again. The United States suggested talks with a broad focus that would cover all these issues, and after one or two false starts, the Soviet Union agreed.

The Nuclear and Space Talks, including START, INF, and the Defense and Space Talks (covering the future of missile defenses and the ABM Treaty) began in March 1985. The Defense and Space Talks were essentially deadlocked from the outset. The Soviet Union began the talks with what might be called a "reinterpretation" of its own, insisting that the ABM Treaty prohibited even research; over time, however, the Soviet Union fell back to a position similar to that of the traditional U.S. interpretation. Moreover, Soviet negotiators insisted that unless both sides agreed to abide by the ABM Treaty, there could be no START reductions in offensive forces. The United States, by contrast, proposed that the two sides agree on a "cooperative transition" to defenses, in which both sides would agree to reduce their offensive forces while deploying defenses well beyond the bounds of the ABM Treaty. In essence, the two sides had switched sides since the late 1960s: Now it was the Soviet Union that favored strict ABM limitations, and the United States that sought to pave the way for testing and eventual deployment. The deadlock only deepened when the United States announced the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty in October 1985, and was apparent at the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit the following month.

United States supporters of the ABM Treaty pointed out that while the Soviet demand for a ban on SDI research was unjustifiable, the fundamental link the Soviet Union was drawing between defensive and offensive forces was the same linkage the two sides had agreed to in 1972, and still had a compelling logic. To reduce one's offensive forces while the other side was building up its defenses against them would only help the other side undermine one's offensive deterrent. In the words of a statement signed by six former secretaries of defense in 1987, it is only the ABM Treaty that "makes possible the negotiation of substantial reductions in strategic offensive forces." (The six secretaries also argued that the treaty continued to make "an important contribution to American security and to reducing the risk of nuclear war" [quoted in Bunn, p. 7].)

Critics of the treaty, by contrast, argued that by undermining the value of offensive ballistic missiles, missile defenses would encourage the Soviet Union to be more willing to bargain them away. Indeed, they argued that whatever flexibility the Soviet Union showed in the arms talks was largely a result of the U.S. pursuit of the SDI program.

The central importance of the ABM issue became even more apparent at the Reykjavík summit in October 1986. Intense expert negotiations at the summit laid the basic foundation that has since developed into the START Treaty, and Reagan and Gorbachev discussed even more visionary ideas such as the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles and even all nuclear weapons. But the summit then collapsed in rancor over the SDI issue. Reagan insisted on freedom to test under the broad interpretation and an eventual right to deploy missile defenses, and Gorbachev called for all SDI work to be limited to the laboratory: at that moment, neither side seriously explored potential compromises.

In the months after Reykjavík, the SDI issue erupted again in the United States domestic debate. Leaks from high-level meetings indicated that the Reagan administration was considering carrying out SDI tests that would violate the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty, to pave the way for "early deployment" of a large-scale defense that would destroy the treaty completely. Congressional and allied reaction was strong, and it was that year that the Nunn-Levin amendment requiring compliance with the traditional interpretation was approved.

With the warming of United States-Soviet relations and the increased support for arms control after 1987, SDI's fortunes declined, and the ABM Treaty's prospects improved. The SDI issue virtually vanished from the American political agenda during 1988, and Congress dealt the program its first real decline in funding--a trend that continued in 1989 and 1990, in concert with the rapid decline in perceptions of the Soviet military threat and the consequent reductions in the overall military budget.

During that period, United States-Soviet frictions over the ABM issue also moderated considerably. In September 1989, the Soviet Union removed the greatest remaining procedural roadblock to START by announcing that it was prepared to complete a START agreement even if no agreement on the interpretation of the ABM Treaty could be reached--though the Soviet Union would consider United States violation of the traditional view as potential grounds to withdraw from START. It was at that same meeting that the Soviet Union finally agreed to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar, a move the United States had insisted on before it would sign START.

Nevertheless, the ABM issue lurked in the background. The Bush administration continued to give strong support to the SD program, and to focus the program on preparing for a widespread near-term deployment of both space-based and ground-based ABM interceptors, which would require abrogating the ABM accord, or fundamentally renegotiating it in a way the Soviet Union rejected. The Soviet Union continued to indicate that violation or abrogation of the ABM Treaty would be grounds for withdrawal from START, and the Defense and Space Talks went nowhere.


The Future ABM Debate

The war in the Persian Gulf in early 1991 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of that year reinvigorated the SDI-ABM debate. Newscasts of Patriot rocket interceptors shooting down Iraqi Scud missiles created a widespread impression that effective missile defenses were possible and highlighted the potential threat posed by third world missiles, and the attempted Soviet coup in August 1991 raised concerns over the control of Soviet nuclear weapons. In his 1991 State of the Union address, President Bush announced that the SDI program would be refocused on a new concept, dubbed Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). Rather than providing a partial defense against a massive Soviet attack in an effort to enhance deterrence, GPALS would be designed to provide a nearly complete defense against attacks of less than two hundred warheads. The new threats of concern were attacks by a third world country or by a mad Soviet missile commander--fears remarkably similar to the justifications for the 1960s-era Sentinel plan. GPALS would include some 1,000 space-based rockets dubbed "brilliant pebbles," 750 ground-based rockets, and tactical missile defenses that could be deployed with U.S. forces and allies around the world.

Congress, also responding to the Gulf War's dramatization of the missile threat, changed direction on the SDI issue in 1991, with a measure known as the Missile Defense Act. After years of declining budgets, SDI received a billion-dollar increase over the previous year's funding. Congress approved a goal of deploying limited nationwide missile defenses, instructed the secretary of defense to prepare for a rapid deployment at the single site permitted by the ABM Treaty, and urged the president to negotiate amendments to the treaty permitting more extensive defenses. Executive-legislative disagreements over the ABM issue continued, however, as most members of Congress continued to oppose the space-based brilliant-pebbles interceptors the administration favored. Moreover, key supporters of the Missile Defense Act indicated that they favored only "modest" changes to the ABM Treaty, rather than the sweeping revisions the administration preferred.

The position of the United States' treaty partner--now a democratic Russia rather than a Communist Soviet Union--has also changed somewhat. On 29 January 1992, in a wide-ranging speech on disarmament, Russian president Boris Yeltsin reaffirmed the ABM Treaty, calling it "an important factor of maintaining strategic stability in the world," but also suggested that Russia was ready "to develop, then create, and jointly operate a global defense system, instead of the SDI system" U.S. SDI supporters were quick to claim Yeltsin's statement as an endorsement of their view. But in the U.S.-Russian discussions since then, Russian negotiators have resisted U.S. proposals to rewrite the ABM Treaty drastically and have reiterated, according to Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev, that "the process of strategic offensive arms cuts is tied into observance of the ABM Treaty" (interview in Izvestia, quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Central Eurasia, 23 June 1992, p. 2). Russian officials have emphasized that in the near term, they are primarily interested in cooperation in treaty-permitted activities such as early warning. Any more widespread defenses, they argue, would have to be jointly developed and controlled--conditions the Bush administration made clear it will not accept. At the Washington Bush-Yeltsin summit in June 1992, the two sides issued a joint statement calling for continued high-level discussion of the ABM issue, but fundamental differences remained.

In these changed circumstances, the ABM debate continues. Critics of the treaty argue that if it was ever a useful agreement, the march of technological and political change has passed it by. They warn of the risks of limited strikes posed by the spread of ballistic missiles and uncertainties in nuclear control in the former Soviet Union, and argue that these dangers justify an urgent program to develop and deploy a GPALS system. Pointing to the Patriot, they maintain that whatever the past technological difficulties of missile defense, no fundamental technical barriers now stand in the way. They argue that to make way for the GPALS system, the ABM Treaty should either be abrogated or replaced with a new accord allowing both sides to develop and deploy widespread missile defenses, and that limited defenses such as GPALS will be compatible with arms reductions.

Supporters of the ABM Treaty disagree on all these points. Patriot's performance, some argue, may have been closer to total failure than to the near-perfect success the army initially claimed. In any case, Patriot proves nothing about SDI, as the program had no role in Patriot's development, and shooting down primitive, slow-moving, conventionally armed Scuds one at a time is a far cry from SDI's job of intercepting hundreds of fast-moving, nuclear-armed long-range missiles. Treaty supporters also argue that while missile technology is proliferating, no new countries seem likely to gain the more advanced technology needed for long-range missiles that could threaten the United States well into the twenty-first century. Moreover, they point out that a missile defense would provide no protection against other means by which a third-world fanatic might deliver a nuclear weapon, such as smuggling across United States borders. They recommend pursuing tactical defenses like the Patriot and potential successors, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty and could handle current third world missile threats. As for the risk of unauthorized missile attacks caused by potential chaos in the former Soviet Union, they point out that sophisticated safeguards such as electronic locks that prevent missiles from being armed without codes from higher authority greatly reduce the risk--and argue that safeguards improvements could reduce whatever danger remains with greater certainty and at less cost than a missile defense. Moreover, they point out that as Russia has shown few signs of agreeing to fundamentally rewrite the ABM Treaty, pursuing the GPALS program would require the United States to abrogate the accord, and would almost certainly mean sacrificing both START and the deeper strategic reductions agreed to at the Bush-Yeltsin summit in June 1992.

A number of developments could threaten the ABM Treaty in the years to come. As of 1992, the Bush administration continued to propose revising the treaty to eliminate or drastically loosen virtually all of its restraints, while the U.S. Congress also urged amendments, though more modest in scope. U.S.-Russian discussions of the subject continued, though Russian negotiators continued to resist any such amendment plans. At the same time, SDI officials indicated that their testing plans would collide with the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty by the mid-to-late 1990s and have urged Congress to remove its ban on such testing. Moreover, SDI's plans for tactical defenses include some systems that are likely to have a prohibited capability to defend against longer-range strategic missiles.

In short, the debate over the future of the SDI program and the ABM Treaty remains unresolved. This complex strategic, technical, and legal discussion is likely to continue for years to come, and to play a central role in the prospects for implementing the START agreement and the much deeper cuts in strategic arms agreed on by Bush and Yeltsin in June 1992.


Bibliography


Critical Overview

An illustrated, comprehensive account that surveys all the various issues surrounding the treaty is Matthew Bunn, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security (Washington, D.C., 1990). Other useful general accounts include William J. Durch, Jr., The ABM Treaty and Western Security (Cambridge, Mass., 1988) and Antonia Handler Chayes and Paul Doty, eds., Defending Deterrence: Managing the ABM Treaty Regime into the 21st Century (Washington, D.C., 1989). The essays contained in Cowen, Jasani, and Stutzle, eds., listed below, cover many of the same issues.


Terms of the Treaty

The most authoritative unclassified account of the ABM Treaty's terms is by the chief United States negotiator, Gerard C. Smith, "The Treaty's Basic Provisions: View of the U.S. Negotiator," in Regina Cowen, Bhupendra Jasani, and Walther Stützle, eds., The ABM Treaty: To Defend or Not to Defend? (Oxford, England, 1987). The testing of the American SDI program clashes with Article V. For a detailed account of these issues, see Matthew Bunn, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security (Washington, D.C., 1990): 90-103; and Raymond L. Garthoff's comprehensive account Policy Versus the Law: The Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty (Washington, D.C., 1987).


Compliance

For a useful account of the dispute over alleged violations of the ABM Treaty, see James P. Rubin, "The Superpower Dispute Over Radars," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43 (April 1987): 34-37; Gloria Duffy, Compliance and the Future of Arms Control (Cambridge, Mass., 1988); and Matthew Bunn's detailed discussion of each of the ABM charges, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security (Washington, D.C., 1990): 74-89. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Case of the Wandering Radar," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47 (July-August 1991): 7-9, reexamines Soviet decision making in the positioning of the Krasnoyarsk radar.


-- Matthew Bunn

Опубликовано на Порталусе 20 сентября 2007 года

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