Anti-Satellite Weapons and Arms Control

(from Part 4: Arms Control Activities Since 1945)

________________________

Satellites provide important support services to military forces on earth and, therefore, contribute significantly to the stability of the strategic balance. The importance of military space systems in times of both war and peace led to the development of ambivalent policies on the part of the United States and the former Soviet Union. From the late 1950s on, each country sought to acquire anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons to reduce the combat effectiveness of the other's satellites. Each country also, at various times, sought to undertake arms control negotiations to reduce the threat posed by the other's anti-satellite weapons (ASATS).

The policy dilemma was in trying to decide which threat was greater--that posed by an opponent's military satellites to one's own terrestrial military forces, or that posed by an opponent's ASATS to one's own military satellites supporting terrestrial military forces. Concern about the threat from an opponent's military satellites--that is, their capacity to provide information for launching a preemptive or first strike--was the basis for the development of ASAT systems; concern about the threat produced by an opponent's ASATS to one's own military satellites was the basis for proposing ASAT arms control measures.

As of 1992 there were no limitations or controls on the testing or deployment of anti-satellite weapons. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty precludes the stationing in orbit of nuclear weapons, but places no limits on other types of ASAT weapons. The 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) agreement prohibited attacks on satellites used for verification, but placed no limits on the acquisition of systems for conducting such attacks. Negotiations for controlling ASAT weapons were held in the late 1970s, but proved inconclusive.

The case for controlling or limiting ASATS has been complicated by the fact that the technology required to intercept satellites in space is quite similar to that needed to intercept ballistic missiles or their warheads. Therefore, the development or deployment of anti-missile weaponry leads to the development of ASAT capability. Given the relatively small numbers of critical military satellites in orbit, even a modest anti-missile capability could constitute a significant ASAT capability. The prospects for ASAT arms control measures, consequently, are inextricably tied to the status of limitations placed on anti-missile systems. And during the 1980s, the ASAT arms control debate was closely tied to the debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

In 1983 the Soviet Union proposed a moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite weapons. Despite objections from the Reagan administration, the United States Congress responded favorably to this initiative. The informal moratorium has remained in place since 1985.

Neither the United States nor Russia, in the early 1990s, had the capacity to pose a significant threat to their respective rival's satellites. The operational Russian ASAT had significant limitations and was of doubtful military utility. The United States had deployed several ASAT systems in the past, and developed several more, but lacked an operational system as of 1992. During the Cold War, neither superpower regarded anti-satellite weapons as a high priority. With the Cold War's end, the utility of anti-satellite weapons may be called into further doubt.


ASAT Missions

The growth of interest in anti-satellite systems in the 1980s resulted from the increased use of satellites to directly support military forces on earth, both in low-level conventional conflicts and as part of plans for the conducting of a protracted nuclear war. Although military satellites themselves are not lethal devices, they provide information that may increase the effectiveness of military forces by enabling improved targeting and damage-assessment capabilities. Communication, navigation, weather, and other satellites serve to supply the information needed to increase the combat potential of terrestrial weapon systems. These satellites also provide early warning of a nuclear attack as well as support for retaliatory forces; thus, these satellites are a critical component of a strategic deterrence posture.

Both the United States and the former Soviet Union have been dependent on military satellites, and both countries have consequently had an interest in reducing the vulnerability of these vital devices. As the well-respected authority Paul Stares points out, arguments claiming that anti-satellite weapons are destabilizing stem from the threat they pose to satellites supporting strategic deterrence. He notes in "Reagan and the ASAT Issue" in the Summer 1985 Journal of International Affairs that "the destruction or disruption of early warning and strategic communication satellites could, at least in theory, facilitate a first strike and reduce the retaliatory options of the attacked state" (p. 92).

Scenarios presented during the peak of the United States-Soviet ASAT debate, in the early to mid-1980s, focused on a first-strike attack on the full range of reconnaissance, navigation, early warning, and communication satellites. Such a planned assault would disrupt an initial retaliation and greatly reduce subsequent retaliatory efforts. These scenarios placed great emphasis on the initiation of hostilities and a general nuclear exchange, and had very negative implications for crisis stability.

At that time, however, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had a strategic force that could come close to conducting a credible first strike. There were, in the early 1990s, approximately 150 Russian satellites in orbit, 90 percent of which were used by the military. At the same time, the United States ASAT system under development would provide only 60 to 75 interceptors; however, Defense Department officials claimed that this number would be sufficient to destroy the most important Russian satellites and their backups.

Yet in the absence of an effective "sky-sweeping" ASAT capability, it is difficult to imagine a plausible scenario for the use of counterforce, first-strike weapons. Communication, navigation, and targeting satellites could be used to coordinate surviving strategic forces, which would continue to be used in selective countervalue strikes as part of the "inter-war bargaining process," thereby effectively negating the strategic aim of the first strike.

Thus, there would be powerful incentives for a belligerent to launch a "sky-sweeping" ASAT campaign at the outset of a general war. At the same time, such action would virtually guarantee that the ensuing conflict would involve massive exchanges, with little prospect for control or damage limitation. It is the prospective loss both of command-and-control facilities and of attack characterization capabilities that would make a persuasive case for unleashing one's strategic forces, which might otherwise remain dormant, at the outset of a general war.


U.S. ASATS

The United States first started work on ASATS in the 1950s. Fortunately, the threat that these systems were intended to counter--that of orbiting nuclear weapons--failed to materialize. These early nuclear-armed ASATS, moreover, had major operational limitations, in that detonation of an ASAT's nuclear warheads would damage U.S. satellites as well as intended enemy satellites.

Because of the limitations of early guidance systems, these anti-satellite weapons could be counted on to place a warhead only within a few miles of a target, which meant that the weapon required nuclear warheads to make sure the target was destroyed. High-altitude nuclear tests in the early 1960s demonstrated, however, that the electromagnetic pulse from an explosion would be lethal to satellites over a much longer range. A 1962 test, for example, set off burglar alarms and darkened streetlights across Hawaii, hundreds of miles away, and disabled several U.S. satellites that happened to be in its vicinity.

The sensitive electronics on satellites proved to be particularly vulnerable to nuclear explosions in space. The military utility of indiscriminate anti-satellite weapons was discounted, since these weapons threatened to do as much or more damage to friendly satellites as they did to intended targets. When the threat of orbiting nuclear weapons did not materialize, the U.S. ASAT systems were dismantled.


Early ASAT Efforts

During the late 1950s and early 1960s several air-launched ASAT systems were tested by the United States. These systems tests grew out of ongoing efforts to develop strategic air-launched ballistic missiles and did not result in operational systems; but, these tests were indicative of an early and abiding interest in ASAT weapons.

Project Bold Orion, an ASAT tested by the air force beginning in October 1959, was launched by rockets from a B-47 bomber. In the two HiHo tests in 1962, the navy launched rockets from an F-4 fighter. Interestingly, both the Bold Orion and HiHo ASAT test programs of the early 1960s used the Altair rocket motor as a second stage, the same rocket upper stage as the later miniature homing vehicle ASAT. The U.S. Army's Nike Zeus ASAT was originally developed as part of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. After years of research it became clear that the Nike Zeus ASAT would be largely ineffective as an ABM. According to Paul Stares, writing in his 1985 text The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984,


The U.S. Army's proposal to convert the Nike Zeus missile to the ASAT role in November 1957 and later in January 1960 marked the beginning of an almost symbiotic relationship between ABM and ASAT research and development. This was inevitable given the similar requirements and methods to detect, track and intercept both missiles and satellites. Moreover, the possession of exoatmospheric ABM missiles by definition provided a limited ASAT capability or certainly a system that could be transformed into one with relative ease (pp. 117-118).

The first successful U.S. space anti-satellite intercept took place on 23 May 1963, from Kwajalein Island in the Pacific Ocean. Throughout Project MUDFLAP, or Program 505 as it became generally known, at least eight Nike Zeus ground-launched missiles were fired from 1963 until 13 January 1966.

The U.S. Air Force, not to be outdone, also tested and deployed several Thor rockets that were modified for the anti-satellite mission. This capability grew out of the 1962 Operation Dominic series of high-altitude nuclear tests. These nuclear-tipped ASATS became operational on Johnston Island in the Pacific in 1964 and could intercept a target at a much greater range than the Nike Zeus. The system, according to the 14 October 1963 issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology, consisted of "a thrust-augmented Douglas Thor-Delta with three strap-on solid rockets, a combination giving the high acceleration needed to intercept satellites in near earth orbit" (p. 25).

The Program 437 Thor system was tested at least sixteen times from 1964 to 1970, prior to its retirement in 1976. This system could have been restored to operational status on six months' notice, since the booster components were stored as part of the U.S. capability to resume nuclear testing in the event of the demise of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).

Analyst Frank Leary, writing in the June 1969 issue of Space/Aeronautics, claimed that "Program 437 ... laid the technological groundwork for the Sentinel, Spartan, Sprint and Safeguard [ABM systems]" (p. 44). Both the Nike Zeus and Thor ASAT systems would have utilized nuclear warheads to destroy their targets. This, coupled with the complexity of their launch procedures, resulted in a limited capability with severe operational constraints. "The respective advantages of the two systems," Stares wrote in The Militarization of Space, "were that the Nike Zeus could react more quickly due to its solid propellant, while the Thor missile could be fired against targets at higher altitudes" (p. 81). Following the retirement of the Thor program, United States' emphasis shifted to non-nuclear kinetic "kill" mechanisms.


Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle Program

The air-launched miniature vehicle (ALMV) was the primary U.S. ASAT effort of the early 1980s. This weapon, launched from an F-15 fighter aircraft by a small two-stage rocket, carried a heat-seeking miniature homing vehicle (MHV) that could destroy its target by direct impact at high speed. The F-15 could also bring the ALMV under the ground track of its target, as opposed to a ground-based system, which requires a target satellite to overfly its launch site.

An operational force was planned to ultimately number more than one hundred interceptors. However, by 1986 the program, initially expected to cost $500 million, was projected to require $5.3 billion to complete. In an attempt to limit costs, the air force scaled back the MHV program by two-thirds in 1987. Subsequently, the Reagan administration canceled the program in 1988 after encountering technical problems with its homing-guidance system, as well as testing delays and significant additional cost increases.


Kinetic-Energy ASAT

The army's kinetic-energy (KE) ASAT was the Pentagon's main satellite-attack weapon under research and development in the early 1990s. As with the air force's air-launched project, this ground-based interceptor would destroy satellites by homing in on and colliding with them. The three-stage missile would extend a sheet of Mylar, known as a "kill enhancement device," which would strike the target and render it inoperative without shattering the satellite. This interceptor, however, would only be able to reach satellites in low earth orbit, up to ranges of several thousand kilometers. The technology is similar to the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) "hit-to-kill" interceptor, which was first tested successfully in the 1984 homing overlay experiment (HOE), and subsequently in the exoatmospheric reentry vehicle interception system (ERIS) tests, conducted under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) anti-missile program.

The army has plans to start flight-testing its missile in late 1996--seven flight tests would include two actual interceptions of inactive U.S. satellites in orbit, the other five tests would involve close passes to orbiting satellites. Deployment is scheduled to begin in June 1998. According to Defense Department estimates, the KE ASAT could be built and operated for twenty years for $2-2.5 billion.

The nearest-term ASAT for the United States, in the early 1990s, was the mid-infrared advanced chemical laser (MIRACL) located at the White Sands testing range in New Mexico. Originally an SDI project, the laser has been sought by the Pentagon to be adapted for use against satellites. In addition to MIRACL, the Pentagon has been working on two other directed-energy, ground-based ASATS based on excimer and free-electron lasers. Both technologies could be operational in the late 1990s. The directed-energy systems, in contrast to the KE ASAT, would have the ability to destroy large numbers of satellites in a very short period of time.


Soviet ASATS

In 1968 the Soviet Union began testing a new type of anti-satellite weapon, launched atop a rocket known as the SL-10--a modified version of the SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The rocket would place a multiton satellite into low earth orbit, and this interceptor satellite would maneuver within striking range of its target. When the interceptor came within a few miles of its target, a small explosive charge would be detonated, showering the enemy satellite with shrapnel. Delicate satellites could be readily destroyed by this type of explosion. The system has been tested a total of twenty times since 1968. From 1968 to 1971, an interceptor was tested that used an active radar to direct it to the target within two orbits after launch. It achieved a 70-percent success rate in seven tests.

In 1976 the Soviets began testing an active radar interceptor that could attack targets in orbits that were somewhat different from that of the initial orbit of the interceptor. Interceptors using radar-homing have demonstrated a 30-percent failure rate, and subsequent tests using a heat-seeking sensor failed in six attempts, including the last Soviet ASAT test in June 1982.

Continued testing of the two-orbit radar interceptor has yielded a 66-percent success rate in three tests since 1976. The system had only marginal effectiveness as it required the intended target satellite to fly over the Baikonur launch facility before an interception could be attempted. With a maximum vertical range of 1,500 kilometers (about 900 miles), it was unable to reach most major U.S. satellites.

Under any plausible arms control agreement, the Russians would retain a certain residual ASAT capability in such systems as their Galosh anti-ballistic missile (ABM), and in some of their manned and unmanned spaceflight systems.


Arms Control Efforts

The sporadic character of ASAT weapon development has been matched by equally sporadic efforts at negotiating controls or limitations over their development. The Soviets ceased temporarily the testing of the co-orbital system at the end of 1971 and conducted no tests over the next four and a half years, including during the period of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). U.S. concern over the Soviet Union's activities in space at this time was quite minimal. In 1970 the operational readiness of Program 437 was reduced from twenty-four hours to third days.

According to Paul Stares's account in The Militarization of Space, several individuals within the Defense Department at this time believed "that a tacit arrangement could be reached with the Soviet Union whereby space would remain a sanctuary for the unhindered operation of their respective military space systems" (p. 172). Also, some observers attributed this test pause to a decision by the Soviets to abandon their ASAT program, and this perception may have contributed to the 1975 deactivation of the U.S. nuclear-armed ASAT.

In an article comparing U.S. and Soviet military space programs written for the Spring 1985 issue of Daedalus, Stares noted that:


by 1976, the increasing military use of space on the part of the Soviets had become a source of concern to the United States. ... The resumption of Soviet satellite interceptor tests in 1976 was the primary catalyst for the United States' reconsideration of the usefulness of anti-satellite weapons. While the new Soviet tests were not markedly different from the earlier series (and if anything had an inferior performance), the tenor of U.S.-Soviet relations had changed significantly. ... As a result, President Gerald Ford in one of the last acts of his administration authorized the development of a new U.S. anti-satellite system. While the ostensible rationale was to counter the indirect threat from Soviet military satellites--especially ocean reconnaissance satellites--the real reason appears to have been an unwillingness to accept any imbalance in U.S.-Soviet ASAT capabilities. (pp. 134-135)

The interest of President Jimmy Carter's administration in negotiating limitations on ASATS was initially hampered by the fundamental asymmetry between the Soviet and U.S. arsenals. The Soviets had an ASAT of some description, and the United States did not. President Carter announced in a March 1977 press conference that he had decided to pursue a two-track strategy. On the one hand, he approached the Soviets about foregoing "the opportunity to arm satellite bodies and also to forego the opportunity to destroy observation satellites." At the same time, he sought to develop a United States capability that could be traded for the Soviet destruction of their co-orbital system.

The air-launched miniature vehicle (ALMV) ASAT was the solution to this problem. Largely based on previously developed "off-the-shelf" technology, it was a near-term option, one that could be quickly developed, which could be "traded" for the existing Soviet ASAT should negotiations succeed, or subsequently upgraded in the event the negotiations failed. Other, more capable systems seemingly were rejected on the basis of cost and the time needed to develop them.

The United States and the Soviet Union conducted three negotiating sessions in 1978 and 1979 concerning ASATS. During these negotiations, the Soviets initiated a test pause, which lasted from May 1978 to April 1980. The Soviets advocated a permanent test ban, while the U.S. delegation called for a one-year test moratorium. These talks were discontinued when the Carter administration decided to concentrate its arms control efforts on ratification of the SALT II agreement. They were never resumed because of the general deterioration of United States-Soviet relations following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. The Soviet test pause ended when it became clear that the United States had little interest in resuming the talks.


The Reagan Administration

In August 1981 the Soviets submitted a draft treaty to the United Nations prohibiting weapons in space. However, there were a number of problematic elements in this effort. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, in his cover letter for the 1981 draft, characterized it as little more than an extension of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which banned the deployment in space of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. He noted that the 1981 draft would prohibit outer-space stationing of those kinds of weapons that are not covered by the definition of weapons of mass destruction. This treaty would not have restricted the testing, development, and deployment of ground-based or air-launched ASATS.

President Ronald Reagan's administration held that a treaty banning the possession of ASATS could not be verified; for this reason, the administration attested, it had little interest in the negotiations. The administration's major concern was that relatively few U.S. satellites would have to be neutralized in order to seriously impair the U.S. strategic posture. National security would be threatened if even a few ASATS escaped the verifcation process. Consequently, no further action was taken on the Soviet draft.

Next, on 18 August 1983, Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov proposed a moratorium on the testing of ASATS during the course of a meeting with a delegation of United States senators. He called for a "complete prohibition of the testing and development of any space-based weapons for hitting targets on Earth, in the air or in outer space." Furthermore, he committed the USSR "not to be the first to put into outer space any type of antisatellite weapon" as long as other countries "refrain from stationing in outer space antisatellite weapons of any type" (Dusko Doder, "Andropov Urges Ban on Weapons to Attack Satellites," Washington Post, 19 August 1983, p. 1).

On 22 August 1983, the Soviets introduced a revised draft treaty at the United Nations substantially different from the 1981 draft, banning the use of force in space and all testing of ASAT systems. It also called for the dismantling of existing ASAT systems. Apart from any other considerations, the scope of the new proposals seemed to suggest a serious Soviet interest in dealing with the major issues posed by the space weapons competition.

Recognizing the shortcomings of the Soviet proposal, the Union of Concerned Scientists, a prominent private arms control group, convened a panel of leading experts to prepare an alternative draft ASAT treaty. Its proposal generated considerable congressional interest in the issue. As the Reagan administration remained unresponsive to the Soviet initiatives, members of Congress began to apply pressure to begin negotiations and to halt testing. The first congressional action to place limits on the ASAT program was the passage of the Tsongas amendment put forward by Senator Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts in 1983, which prohibited in-space tests of the ASAT unless the president made certain certifications relating to progress on negotiating an agreement with the Soviets on ASAT limits and also the need for such tests. Similar language was passed again in 1984.

The administration's position was clarified in a report submitted to Congress on 31 March 1984, which stated:


No arrangements or agreements beyond those already governing military activities in outer space have been found to date that are judged to be in the overall interest of the United States and its Allies. The factors which impede the identification of effective ASAT arms control measures include significant difficulties of verification, diverse sources of threats to U.S. and Allied satellites and threats posed by Soviet targeting and reconnaissance satellites which undermine conventional and nuclear deterrence. ... Until we have determined whether there are, in fact, practical solutions to these problems, we do not believe it would be productive to engage in formal international negotiations.

In 1985 President Reagan submitted certifications to Congress, permitting the first and only test of the F-15 miniature homing vehicle (MHV) device against an object in space on 13 September of that year.

Starting in fiscal year 1985, Congress began to cut the administration's requests for MHV funding by substantial amounts. Congressional ASAT opponents felt that preventing complete testing of the MHV device could preserve the chance to negotiate an ASAT agreement with the Soviet Union. It was hoped by many, including Congressman George Brown of California, that a moratorium would "provide a window of opportunity to explore a mutual and verifiable ban on ASATS" (Congressional Record, 8 May 1984, p. E2005).

Congressional opposition to ASATS, as well as the administration's support for the program, was closely linked to the ongoing debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) anti-missile program. Both sides viewed the ASAT testing-and-deployment debate as a crucial testing ground for the impending debate over testing and deployment of SDI. From 1985 through 1988, Congress successfully imposed language prohibiting ASAT tests against objects in space until and unless the Soviet Union retested its ASAT device. The MHV program was finally canceled in December 1988.

Representative Brown introduced an amendment to the fiscal year 1989 Defense Department authorization bill that would have created a permanent ASAT test ban, but this measure was narrowly defeated. Following the defeat of the permanent ban, the Defense Department attempted to give renewed momentum to the development of a U.S. ASAT. On 6 March 1989, the Defense Acquisition Board approved programs for the development of both kinetic-energy and directed-energy ASATS and selected the army to manage the kinetic-energy ASAT program. The Defense Department proceeded to request $208 million for the rejuvenated program in fiscal year 1991, an increase of 181 percent over the previous year's level.

Critics questioned the rush to develop new ASAT systems at a time when momentous changes were occurring in the Soviet Union, changes that made the likelihood of a "space" war negligible. Congressional opposition to ASATS took the form of attempts to reduce funding levels, rather than efforts to prevent testing, which would not begin for several years. Senator John Kerry introduced an amendment in August 1990 for FY 1991 Defense Authorization designed to reduce funding for ASATS to the previous year's level. This effort was unsuccessful. The army ASAT program was funded at $51 million for fiscal year 1993. Congressional action was successful, however, in placing a one-year ban on testing of the mid-infrared advanced chemical laser (MIRACL) against objects in space.


The Bush Administration

Although the Soviets had not conducted an ASAT test since 1982, President George Bush's administration maintained its insistence that the Soviet co-orbital system was indeed operationally capable. According to General Colin Powell in Defense Department appropriations hearings for fiscal year 1991, "lack of a U.S. ASAT capability--in real military terms--remains a serious warfighting deficiency" (U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 5803/S. 3189, pt. 1, p. 207).

The president's national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, reaffirmed the status of the ASAT program as one of the administration's top priorities. In a letter dated 22 June 1990, Scowcroft claimed, "It is essential for the U.S. to develop an operational ASAT system to deter the Soviecs from exploiting their space control alld space-based targeting capabilities." He went on to say that the "Soviet ability to target our forces from space alone constitutes a compelling rationale for deploying a U.S. ASAT system" (Congressional Record, 3 August 1990, p. S12031).

Advocates of a U.S. ASAT system argued that it was needed to counter this perceived Soviet ASAT threat, as well as to effect the destruction of an opponent's satellites in the event of hostilities. The chief of naval operations stated in response to congressional inquiry in hearings for Defense Department Appropriations for fiscal year 1991 that


even in a climate of improving relations it is not clear that an ASAT test ban treaty and elimination of the co-orbital ASAT would enhance our overall security posture.... Of greater concern for maritime operations than an end to the announced ASAT test moratorium is the combination of a robust Soviet space-based surveillance, tracking, and targeting capability, and the lack of a demonstrated U.S. ASAT capability, which affords a sanctuary for Soviet satellites. (U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 5803/S. 3189, Part 3, p. 441)

The fundamental incompatibility of these two rationales has been repeatedly alluded to by members of Congress and other critics of continued ASAT development. A deterrence mission cannot coexist with the plan to use ASATS early in a conflict to disable enemy observation satellites. The administration has expressed a desire for space control. According to Army Secretary Stone, "the current U.S. national space policy recognizes that a space control capability is a key element of America's national security space posture. Space control requires an integrated combination of space surveillance, anti-satellite capabilities and satellite survivability/endurance."

These notions seemed increasingly anachronistic in the post-Cold War era, yet in the early 1990s they still appeared to be driving the U.S. ASAT program.


Conclusion

The future of the United States' anti-satellite capability has remained tied to the status of ballistic-missile defenses. Even if the U.S. Army kinetic-energy ASAT program, ongoing in the early 1990s, were to be discontinued, the establishment of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, as projected in Defense Department plans for the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes SDI program, would provide inherent anti-satellite capabilities. ASAT arms control efforts are not likely to be successful until the future of strategic defenses has been resolved.

Advocates of the continued need for ASATS have argued that the potential use or purchase of satellite intelligence services by third countries justifies the United States' continued efforts to develop anti-satellite weapons. The Chinese satellite reconnaissance program was cited as one possible reason for the resumption of Soviet ASAT testing in 1976. France has been developing its own reconnaissance satellite, Helios, which could be launched in 1994; and Israel reportedly has also been working on intelligence satellites. By the early twenty-first century, a number of other countries, including Brazil, India, and Japan, could also possess military reconnaissance satellites that could constitute attractive targets for an opponent's ASAT system.

The proliferation of military space systems may be matched by the proliferation of anti-satellite capabilities. While the development of a highly competent ASAT system has proven a challenge for the United States, less-sophisticated weapons capable of threatening a handful of low-altitude reconnaissance satellites might eventually prove to be within reach of any space-faring country.

Fortunately, much of the technology required for developing an ASAT is under the supervision of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). But achieving multilateral arms control agreements on anti-satellite weapons will prove at least as challenging as did the U.S.-Soviet ASAT arms control effort.


Bibliography


General Accounts

Marcia S. Smith, Space Activities of the United State, Soviet Union, and Other Launching Countries/Organizations, 1957-1984 (Washington, D.C., 1985), prepared by the Congressional Research Service, provides a general survey of space activities. Several books and articles focusing on military activities in space relate in various ways to the ASAT issue. Among these are the essays in William J. Durch, ed., National Interests and the Military Use of Space (Cambridge, Mass., 1984); and Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985) and Space and National Security (Washington, D.C., 1987).

Also, see Stare's useful essay, "U.S. and Soviet Military Space Programs: A Comparative Assessment," Daedalus 114 (Spring 1985): 127-145, which has examined the programs of the superpowers.


Anti-Satellite Weapons

Aspen Strategy Group, Anti-Satellite Weapons and U.S. Military Space Policy (Lanham, Md., 1986), provides an overview of the issues. Among articles that have focused on specific topics are those by Ashton B. Carter, "The Relationship of ASAT and BMD Systems," Daedalus 114 (Spring 1985): 171-189 and "Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible," International Security 10 (Spring 1986): 46-98; Kurt Gottfried and Richard Ned Lebow, "Anti-Satellite Weapons: Weighing the Risks," Daedalus 114 (Spring 1985): 147-170; and John Pike. "Anti-Satellite Weapons," FAS Public Interest Report 36 (November 1983) for the Federation of American Scientists.

The Reagan administration's position is discussed in Paul B. Stares, "Reagan and the ASAT Issue," Journal of International Affairs 39 (Summer 1985): 81-94.


ASAT and Arms Control

The literature on this theme is scattered and is usually found in essay, briefing, or report form. A Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) volume that collects the views of several individuals is Bhupenda Jasani, ed., Space Weapons--The Arms Control Dilemma (London and Philadelphia, 1984). These essays include Walter Slocombe, "Approaches to an ASAT Treaty," pp. 145-155; Kurt Gottfried, "All ASAT Test Ban Treaty," pp. 131-144 (includes a copy of the Union of Concerned Scientists' proposed treaty); Donald Kerr, "Implications of Anti-Satellite Weapons for ABM Issues," pp. 107-125; Jozef Scheffers, "Why Anti-Satellite Warfare Should Be Prohibited," pp. 77-,82; and Marcia Smith, "Satellite and Missile ASAT Systems and Potential Verification Problems Associated with the Existing Soviet Systems," pp. 83-91.

Other useful items include Union of Concerned Scientists, Anti-Satellite Weapons: Arms Control or Arms Race? (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), which has appended the UCS's proposed treaty; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control (Washington, D.C., 1985); Gray, Colin S., ed. American Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapons Systems and Arms Control (Cambridge, Mass., 1982). William J. Durch, "Verification of Limitations on Antisatellite Weapons" in William C. Potter, ed., Verification and Arms Control (Lexington, Mass., 1985): 81-106, provides an excellent summary of the basic issues; while Boris Mayorsky, "The USSR Initiative in the Struggle for Peace in Outer Space," in Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, ed., Maintaining Outer Space for Peaceful Uses: Proceedings of a Symposium Held in The Hague, March 1984 (Tokyo, 1984): 290-297, justifies the Soviet's 1980s proposals.


-- John Pike and Eric Stambler