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The Open Skies Negotiations

Дата публикации: 20 сентября 2007
Публикатор: Научная библиотека Порталус
Рубрика: RUSSIA (TOPICS) ARMED FORCES →
Источник: (c) http://russia.by
Номер публикации: №1190296469


Open Skies refers to a proposal that allows participating countries to fly over each other's territory in order to build confidence that no untoward or threatening activities are going on below. It was first put forward by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1955 and was intended to allow the United States and the Soviet Union to overfly each other, but the negotiations went nowhere. In 1989, President George Bush revived the idea, expanding it to include all members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. On 24 March 1992, after three years of negotiation during which the political relations of the parties were completely transformed and the Warsaw Pact disappeared, the Open Skies Treaty was signed.


The 1955 Proposal

In mid-1955 the Cold War was enjoying its first thaw. With the signing of the Austrian State Treaty on 5 May 1955, the Soviet Union had agreed to withdraw its troops from Austria and leave that country neutral. The United States, Great Britain, and France then invited the USSR to participate in a four-power summit that July. The Soviets agreed and simultaneously made new disarmament proposals at the United Nations that moved significantly closer to the Western position on many issues.

In this relatively optimistic atmosphere, Nelson Rockefeller, special assistant to the president, convened a meeting of academics and other experts to consider what proposals the U.S. might make at the summit and thereafter. Meeting over several days at the Quantico marine base in Virginia, the group concluded that a prime aim should be to test the seriousness of the new Soviet attitude toward reducing armaments.

Although in 1955 the U.S. possessed clear military superiority over the Soviet Union, experts were warning that the Soviets could catch up within a few years if agreement was not reached on arms control measures. The USSR had tested a thermonuclear device in 1953. The Quantico panel concluded that the U.S. should put forward a proposal to determine whether the Soviets would be willing to accept the type of intrusive inspection that would be needed for any disarmament agreement to be verified. At the time, two years before the launch of Sputnik ushered in the satellite age, the United States had few means of gathering information on Soviet military activity, and aerial inspection was believed to be an essential component of verification. If the Soviets rejected a proposal to allow overflights, the experts felt, this would indicate that the Soviets were not serious about disarmament, and the U.S. should then take steps to maintain its military superiority.

Within the U.S. bureaucracy, the idea of Open Skies encountered substantial resistance. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initially objected, in part because he did not want the United States to put forward any specific propositions during the summit and in part because the proposal was initiated by Nelson Rockefeller, his political rival, rather than by the Department of State. Nonetheless, after the opening days of the summit had seemed to indicate that the United States did not have any new ideas at this critical time in international affairs, President Eisenhower decided to proceed with the Open Skies proposal. On 21 July 1955, Eisenhower, speaking "principally to the Delegates from the Soviet Union," proposed a two-part arrangement, to begin immediately:


To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other; lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.
Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country--we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study; you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tensions.
Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning.

The immediate Soviet reaction was mixed. Premier Nikolai Bulganin, the ostensible head of the delegation, initially responded positively, saying that the proposal seemed to have real merit. Nikita Khrushchev's response more accurately foreshadowed the eventual Soviet response, rejecting the proposal as a bald espionage plot. By August, Bulganin was condemning aerial photography as useless because it would not prevent the two countries from being able to hide virtually anything in their respective vast territories. The Soviets emphasized two specific objections: an arrangement on aerial photography should follow, not precede, an arms-reduction agreement, and the U.S. proposal would not allow the Soviets to overfly U.S. forces and installations located in other countries.

Although the summiteers did not agree on Open Skies, they did agree to try to develop a comprehensive system of disarmament, working under the auspices of a United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) subcommittee, whose members included the four summit powers, plus Canada. As soon as this subcommittee began meeting in late August 1955, the United States submitted a plan for implementing Open Skies. In addition to unrestricted (although monitored) aerial reconnaissance, the plan called for an exchange of blueprints of military facilities. It also incorporated a previous Soviet proposal to establish ground control posts to monitor troop movements at key locations. Under the plan, each country would use its own planes and sensors to conduct overflights, and each flight would have aboard a representative of the country being overflown.

Despite continued Soviet objections to the plan, the U.S. persisted. In December 1955 a nearly unanimous U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution calling on the subcommittee to continue working on a comprehensive disarmament agreement, with special emphasis on Open Skies. The Soviet bloc voted against the resolution, and Khrushchev vociferously rejected Open Skies in a speech at the end of the month.

In 1956 the U.S. took a new approach, suggesting that techniques of aerial and ground observation be tested in a large test area (20,000-30,000 square miles) containing no sensitive military installations, except for units stationed in the area specifically for the experiment. The Soviet Union objected once again that the proposal was not connected to any concrete measures of disarmament.

Nonetheless, an apparent shift in Soviet thinking on Open Skies soon emerged. In a letter dated 17 November 1956, Chairman Bulganin told President Eisenhower that the USSR was willing to consider using aerial photography in Europe. Shortly thereafter, in February 1957, the U.S. revealed a new disarmament policy with a new role for Open Skies. Rather than a necessary precondition for comprehensive disarmament, Open Skies would instead serve as a tool for preventing surprise attack.

With these new proposals, Open Skies took on an entirely different hue. The discussions began to center upon setting up regional inspection zones. Through the spring of 1957, the two sides traded proposals on defining a test zone in Europe, but they reached no agreement. Canada, which had strongly supported Open Skies from the beginning, had previously suggested to the U.S. that the Canadian Arctic might serve as one of the test sites for Open Skies. In August 1957, on behalf of Canada, France, Britain, and the U.S., Secretary of State Dulles presented a new set of proposals to the UNDC subcommittee. He proposed that the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union be entirely open to inspection. As a fallback, these three countries' territories north of the Arctic Circle, along with the Arctic possessions of Denmark and Norway, could form an inspection zone. In either case, the Soviets would also have to agree to accept one of two inspection zones in Europe defined in the U.S. proposal.

The Soviets responded angrily to the proposals for new zones, charging that "the object of the United States proposal is the collection of reconnaissance data; that it would not result in an improvement but rather in a deterioration of the international situation; and that its real purpose is to contribute to the preparation of aggressive war, not to the removal of the threat of war" (Disarmament Commission Official Records, 1957-1958). When the U.S. tried again in April 1958, this time in the U.N. Security Council, to promote the idea of an arctic test zone for Open Skies, the Soviet Union again opposed it as an espionage plot of little value in preventing surprise attack.

The substantial differences between the U.S. and Soviet views of how an aerial inspection system might work emerged clearly at a conference on preventing surprise attack, in November and December 1958. Although Open Skies was not on the agenda, the Soviet Union did repeat its proposal for a European zone to be subject to both aerial and ground inspection, adding implementation details that differed greatly from Western versions. Under the Soviet proposal, each country would be photographed only by its own nationals, albeit accompanied by representatives of the other side, and data processing and interpretation would be carried out at a joint center. Like the Open Skies discussions, the surprise-attack conference led nowhere.

By the end of the decade, Open Skies seemed both unattainable and obsolete. The first U.S. spy satellites were in orbit by 10 August 1960, which provided complete aerial coverage of the vast Soviet empire, and within a few years the Soviets orbited their own "spies-in-the-sky." Other issues soon took precedence in the disarmament negotiations and the Open Skies concept seemed lost to history.


Open Skies Rekindled

After lying dormant for three decades, the Open Skies proposal suddenly gained new life in the spring of 1989. The story of its revival bears striking resemblance to the history of Open Skies in the 1950s. Once again, the United States sought to test Soviet intentions with a sweeping proposal for increased openness and once again, the Soviet response appeared to be largely conditioned by fears of espionage. Their differences reflected disagreements over the types of measures needed to build confidence.

The differences between 1955 and 1989 are also significant. The original Open Skies proposal represented, in part, an effort to determine whether arms control verification was even feasible--a less urgent task in the late 1980s after twenty years of experience with arms control. The 1989 proposal was a more purely political test of intent as well as an effort to recapture political momentum. In 1989 the USSR, under President Mikhail Gorbachev, was scoring one propaganda victory after another by suggesting far-reaching arms control measures, in marked contrast to the slow pace of President George Bush's administration regarding arms control. Within the NATO alliance, a divisive debate that threatened to dominate the upcoming NATO summit in late May was raging over the modernization of short-range nuclear forces (SNF). At the same time, Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, or openness, appeared to offer new opportunities for a fundamental transformation of U.S.-Soviet relations.

The decision to revive Open Skies flowed out of discussions in the U.S. National Security Council over ways to test the depth of the Soviet commitment to glasnost, in particular the Soviets' professed willingness to accept any means of verification, no matter how intrusive, on a reciprocal basis and to put forward a significant U.S. proposal that might divert attention from the NATO-SNF debate. It originated early in 1989 with Robert Blackwill, the president's special assistant for European and Soviet affairs, and was soon approved, despite some resistance within the NSC, by Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's national security adviser.

Even in this age of extraordinarily capable spy satellites, aerial overflights of the kind envisioned by the Open Skies plan still have some significant advantages, many of which are technical and economic. Satellites are generally far more expensive because they must be lighter, more reliable, and able to observe from a much greater distance than aircraft. They generally travel in fixed and easily predicted orbits, thus allowing an observed country the time to hide activities of interest before the satellite passes overhead. Although it is possible to shift satellites to different orbits, doing so depletes the fuel needed to keep them in orbit. The types of sensors they carry cannot be changed once the satellite is launched. Aircraft, however, are cheaper and more flexible, able to change routes and sensors as needed. But aircraft have one key flaw: the amount of territory they can cover in a single flight is limited. Thus, satellites and aircraft could serve complementary, rather than competing, roles.

Even before it was made public, the proposal received encouragement from Canada, which had learned of the proposal through informal contacts. On 4 May 1989, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Foreign Minister Joe Clark met privately with President Bush, making a number of crucial suggestions that Bush incorporated into the proposal. Among these was a recommendation that Open Skies be expanded to include the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as the superpowers.

Bush made the proposal public in his first foreign-policy speech as president, a commencement address on 12 May 1989 at Texas A&M University. He called for consideration of "a broader, more intrusive, and radical" version of Open Skies, one that "would include allies on both sides." Bush argued that "such surveillance flights, complementing satellites, would provide regular scrutiny for both sides. Such unprecedented territorial access would show the world the meaning of the concept of openness."

The proposal failed to reap many propaganda points at home. Within the United States, pundits and the media dismissed Open Skies as an unimaginative resurrection of a dated idea. Most assumed, incorrectly, that the advent of satellites had rendered aerial reconnaissance obsolete.

The reaction from abroad was more positive. The Canadian government was the first to respond, releasing a statement by Prime Minister Mulroney on 12 May supporting the proposal, followed in early June by a New York Times op-ed article by Foreign Minister Clark. Although the other NATO allies had not been informed in advance, at the NATO summit at the end of May, the allies welcomed the initiative and promised careful study and consultations.

Allied acceptance of Open Skies had two causes. First, the proposal was the first positive sign of U.S. leadership on arms control from the new Bush administration. Second, Open Skies represented a means by which the allies could observe Soviet-bloc countries directly, rather than having to rely on U.S. statements based on closely held and rarely shared data from U.S. spy satellites. Virtually all NATO members have at least some technical capability for aerial reconnaissance, although sophisticated sensors and the ability to process information are not uniformly available. Yet, as of 1989, only France planned to launch its own spy satellite in the near future; and it would be substantially less capable than those operated by the United States.

The first official Soviet response came in the form of a letter from Gorbachev delivered to Secretary of State James Baker by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at their ministerial meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on 22-23 September 1989. The letter generally favored Open Skies, but it expressed certain concerns that foreshadowed what later proved to be serious obstacles to agreement on the proposal. Gorbachev stressed the need to rule out any chance that information from Open Skies overflights could be used to the detriment of the security of the observed country. He argued that all parties should have full equality of access to information, regardless of geographical and/or technological differences among the parties, an implicit reference to the much larger size and less-sophisticated technology of the Soviet Union. The letter also mentioned the need for "agreed constraints." Gorbachev suggested that these concerns might be addressed by establishing a multinational pool of aircraft and sensors and by sharing with all parties all the data gathered during overflights.

Despite these reservations, Shevardnadze indicated that the USSR would participate in the first round of negotiations, to be held in Ottawa. At their Malta summit in early December, Bush and Gorbachev confirmed that both countries would actively participate in the Open Skies talks.

The NATO position, formulated during the fall of 1989, differed markedly from Gorbachev's suggestions. As finally agreed on in December, the NATO basic-elements paper laid out a proposal for a highly intrusive and flexible Open Skies regime, with virtually no constraints other than "those imposed by flight safety rules or international law." It called on all countries to accept a large number of overflights of their territory, up to several overflights a month of larger countries, and at least one per quarter year for even the smallest countries. The only restriction on sensor technology prohibited "devices used for the collection and recording of signals intelligence." The paper permitted the sharing of data within an alliance, but it made no mention of the possibility of sharing data across alliances. Nothing was said about establishing a common pool of aircraft or sensors.

Open Skies raised unprecedented operational questions. How well could air-traffic controllers cope with Open Skies overflights with flight plans outside normal air corridors filed only hours before a flight? How much time would be needed for a host country to inspect the aircraft to check for forbidden sensors? To test possible procedures, on 6 January 1990, a month before Open Skies negotiations were to begin, Canada conducted a three-hour test overflight of Hungary. The plane, a Canadian C-130, crossed three air-traffic control corridors, flying over several Hungarian and Soviet military installations. The plane carried no sensors. Several Hungarian and Canadian officials, including the head of the Hungarian Air Force, were aboard. The test demonstrated the feasibility and safety of short-notice aerial inspections of the type envisioned under Open Skies. Canada invited Warsaw Pact countries, including the USSR, to undertake a similar flight over Canada. In January 1992 Hungary conducted a reciprocal overflight of Canada.


The Negotiations

By the time the negotiations formally opened in February 1990, the European security system had changed beyond recognition. The collapse of Communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe drastically affected the agenda of security issues for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The first subject for discussion in Ottawa was German reunification, which dominated the opening days of the Open Skies talks, taking advantage of the presence of all the relevant foreign ministers. The political transformation of Europe also changed the nature of the negotiations, initially intended to be bloc-to-bloc. For the first time, the Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact refused to support the Soviet position on a number of key issues.

Because of the Soviet policy of glasnost, the changes that the Soviets had allowed in Eastern Europe, and the drastic improvement in East-West relations, most Western analysts and negotiators hoped for a speedy and successful conclusion to the talks. Two rounds were scheduled, first in Ottawa in February and then in Budapest in April and May, a session at which organizers hoped a treaty would be signed one year to the day after Bush revived Open Skies.

But as the negotiations opened, striking differences emerged between the Soviet and Western views of what an Open Skies regime should look like. NATO, with U.S. prodding, was fairly well unified in its call for a simple, flexible approach with as few restrictions as possible. The Soviets argued for a far more restricted regime to prevent possible adverse uses of the information gathered from overflights. The other Warsaw Pact countries supported the Soviet position on a few issues and the NATO position on most others. The differences fell into four categories.


Aircraft and Sensors

NATO argued that each country that wished to conduct an overflight of another country should be free to use whatever aircraft and sensors, except signals intelligence (SIGINT) sensors, it had available. The host country would be given several hours to inspect the aircraft prior to the overflight to ensure that it did not contain SIGINT equipment. The Soviets, however, were not satisfied that an inspection would be adequate. They suggested that a common fleet of aircraft be operated by mixed crews or that the host country provide the plane and crew. They also expressed concern over the advantages that would accrue to the more technically advanced West if no other restrictions were placed on the sensors that could be used on Open Skies overflights, and they argued that all participants in Open Skies should have access to the same sensors. The other members of the Warsaw Pact generally shared this view, but they were willing to include far more sophisticated sensors than was the USSR, so long as the Warsaw Pact members would have equal access to sensor technology.

At the Budapest round of talks, NATO modified its stance on sensors to appeal to the Eastern Europeans. NATO agreed to relax export controls so that all participants could buy commercially available technology equivalent to whatever the West would use in Open Skies. Although the Soviets, then isolated, continued to call for a sensor package limited to relatively low-resolution cameras, they did indicate that very low resolution radar might also be acceptable.


Data Distribution

The NATO position would leave the use of Open Skies information up to the country that conducted the overflight and would allow the sharing of data only within an alliance. The Soviets wanted to give all participants access to all data to ensure that the information collected was not too sophisticated. The Eastern Europeans agreed, for such a provision would allow the Eastern European countries to see data that NATO had collected on the Soviet Union and on other Eastern European countries. Once NATO agreed to provide access to comparable sensor technology, most Eastern European countries dropped their support for data sharing.


Quotas

The United States insisted that if Open Skies were truly to build confidence, each participant would have to accept enough overflights to cover its territory so that other nations could reassure themselves about military facilities and activities. The U.S. offered to accept one overflight a week and argued that the USSR should accept 2.4 times as many, being 2.4 times as large. The Soviets proposed drastically lower numbers: a total of thirty per year per alliance, with no single country having to accept more than half of these. At Budapest, the USSR increased the number of overflights it would accept to twenty-five, but with strict limits on the length (five hundred kilometers, 300 miles) and duration (the flight could last much longer, but the sensors could only operate for a total of three hours) of any single overflight.

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the quota issue has become extremely complicated. In addition to the matter of passive quotas (the number of overflights of its territory each participant must accept), negotiators have to resolve the thorny problems of how many overflights each participant may conduct and what other nations it may overfly. Originally, Open Skies was to allow members of one alliance to overfly members of the other. Several of the former Warsaw Pact members have now indicated that they wish to be able to overfly each other.


Territory

NATO proposed that all territory of all participating nations be opened for overflight, except for air-traffic safety restrictions. The Soviets proposed three categories of restrictions that would have closed off a substantial portion of their territory and wanted the right to overfly U.S. bases overseas in countries not participating in Open Skies, such as Japan and the Philippines.

From the U.S. perspective, the Soviet proposals would greatly reduce the confidence-building value of Open Skies. The chief U.S. ambassador, John Hawes, argued that "Open Skies is intended as a serious confidence-building measure, that is, one in which international confidence derives from the substance of what the regime produces, and not solely or even primarily from the symbolism or novelty of the fact that the regime exists at all," and that the proposed Soviet restrictions on sensor capability, territory, numbers of overflights, and control of aircraft were so great that, if accepted, Open Skies "would not increase confidence" (Hawes, pp. 8-9).

The Soviet position reflected several factors, particularly Soviet military resistance to a program that they feared could affect Soviet security and concerns about overlap with aerial inspections to be conducted as part of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. In addition, although Gorbachev's restatement of support in principle for Open Skies at the U.S.-Soviet summit in June 1990 indicated that Open Skies still enjoyed high-level political support in the USSR, the Soviet domestic political situation and the CFE and START negotiations left the leadership little time to concern itself with Open Skies.

The NATO allies other than the United States and the Warsaw Pact members other than the USSR were, for the most part, willing to accept compromises between the U.S. and Soviet positions, although on most issues they were closer to the U.S. than to the Soviet position. For these states, even a somewhat restricted version of Open Skies would provide a substantial improvement in their ability to gather information about the other participating nations.


After Budapest: Links to CFE

The Open Skies negotiations were substantively closely linked with the talks over reductions of conventional forces in Europe (CFE). In 1989, when expectations were high that an Open Skies accord could be rapidly concluded, many Western officials believed that the Open Skies provisions could simply be transferred to provide the anticipated aerial-inspection protocol (AIP) of CFE. The AIP would be a verification measure intended to help detect possible noncompliance with the CFE limits on numbers of various types of military equipment, a much clearer goal than the vague confidence-building aim of Open Skies. With the failure to reach agreement at Budapest, negotiators decided to suspend the talks until the CFE Treaty was completed, given that similar issues arose in both sets of talks and that CFE, a higher priority for most participants, was likely to divert attention from Open Skies for several months.

The CFE I Treaty was signed in November 1990 at a Paris summit of all twenty-two NATO and Warsaw Pact members. But for many of the same reasons that Open Skies had faltered, the parties were unable to include an aerial-inspection component in the CFE verification provisions and agreed instead to put off discussion of aerial inspection to the 1991 round of CFE negotiations. The summit did issue a joint declaration in which the participants reaffirmed "the importance of the 'Open Skies' initiative and their determination to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible."


Open Skies Becomes a Reality

With the CFE negotiations resolved, attention returned to Open Skies, which now seemed more important than ever. Because the CFE Treaty failed in the end to include an aerial-inspection component, Open Skies was seen as a potentially important source of verification of the CFE Treaty. This view was reinforced in late 1990, shortly before the CFE Treaty was signed, when the Soviet Union shipped substantial quantities of military equipment east of the Ural Mountains as a means of removing the equipment from CFE limitations. The verification regime of the CFE Treaty did not apply east of the Urals, but an Open Skies treaty would cover all of Soviet territory, allowing Europeans to monitor the moved equipment.

By April 1991, the NATO allies had agreed to several modifications of their positions on Open Skies, such as sharing raw data, limiting sensors to those available to all participants, and allowing an observed nation to insist on use of its own aircraft (but only if the observed nation also paid the costs). NATO continued to insist, however, that sensors be good enough to be militarily useful, that all territory of all participants could be overflown without restriction, and that military bases of Open Skies participants in third countries would not be included. In August, the Soviets agreed to meet in Vienna in September for renewed discussions. Despite the intervening coup attempt in the USSR, the meeting opened on September 9 for one week, but the Soviet delegates had not yet received new instructions reflecting the changed political situation in their country. When the meeting reconvened on November 5, it was clear that the Soviets were prepared to make significant concessions, including acceptance of full territorial coverage and willingness to accept a much larger number of overflights. Even the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late December did not break the momentum. The Russian Federation took over the Soviet seat, and Ukraine and Belarus joined the talks as independent states.

In this optimistic atmosphere, negotiators set a target date of 24 March 1992, to coincide with the CSCE ministerial meeting in Helsinki. Although some technical and cost issues had to be deferred, the 100-page treaty was completed and signed on schedule. In final form, the treaty permitted the use of reasonably capable sensors: optical equipment with resolution as good as thirty centimeters and infrared sensors with resolution of fifty centimeters, which is adequate to recognize most military equipment, and synthetic aperture radar with resolution of three meters, adequate to locate possible concentrations of military equipment. It also called for fairly short notice. A party wishing to conduct an overflight must provide no less than seventy-two hours' notice, and on arrival it must submit a route plan to the host country. The actual flight can begin no sooner than twenty-four hours after submission of the flight plan. There are no territorial restrictions. All parts of all participating countries can be overflown. In addition, the treaty includes procedures by which members can agree to upgrade the permitted sensor capabilities or add new types of sensors. The treaty also establishes an Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) to review implementation of treaty terms.

The treaty covers a remarkable geographic scope. Signatories include all NATO members, all the non-Soviet members of the former Warsaw Pact, and four of the successor states to the Soviet Union: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia. All other CSCE members are eligible to join, with the consent of the existing parties (or later at the discretion of the OSCC). The treaty will enter into force sixty days after ratification by twenty signatories, including all the major parties.


Conclusion

Although Open Skies is somewhat more restricted in terms of sensor capabilities than the regime originally envisaged by the United States in 1989, it is still a major accomplishment. The terms add up to a remarkably flexible and intrusive regime, one that goes far beyond any previous confidence-building measures. Open Skies may help to stabilize relations among new nations in a volatile part of the world and could provide a model for confidence-building measures elsewhere. It could serve as the basis of a verification component for a wide range of possible arms control agreements. It could even fairly easily be adapted for environmental monitoring. Open Skies may not have received the attention of some of the more glamorous arms control negotiations, but it may prove to be among the most significant security treaties of the late twentieth century.


Bibliography

President Eisenhower's 1955 proposal is discussed by Jane Boulden, "Open Skies: The 1955 Proposal and its Current Revival," Dalhousie Law Journal 13, no. 2 (1990); and W. W. Rostow, Open Skies: Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21, 1955 (Austin, Texas, 1982). The 1989 proposal is examined by John H. Hawes, "Open Skies: From Idea to Negotiation," NATO Review 38, no. 2 (1990): 6-9; and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Back to the Future: The Open Skies Talks," Arms Control Today (October 1990): 20-24.

The various aspects of Open Skies are reviewed in Michael Slack and Heather Chestnutt, eds.., Open Skies: Technical, Organizational, Operational, Legal, and Political Aspects (Toronto, 1990) and in Peter Jones, "Open Skies: A New Era of Transparency;" Arms Control Today 22, no. 4 (May 1992): 10-15. The arms control aspects of the Open Skies concept are examined in Allen V. Banner, Andrew J. Young, and Keith W. Hall, Aerial Reconnaissance for Verification of Arms Limitation Agreements: An Introduction (New York, 1990); and Peter Jones, "CFE Aerial Inspections and Open Skies: A Comparison," in Heather Chestnutt and Michael Slack, eds., Verifying Conventional Force Reductions in Europe: CFE I and Beyond (Toronto, n.d.).


-- Ann M. Florini

Опубликовано на Порталусе 20 сентября 2007 года

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