' > ' > '> ' /> ' />
Рейтинг
Порталус

RUSSIA'S TEST ON WEAKNESS, AMERICA?S TEST ON POWER

Дата публикации: 09 июня 2016
Автор(ы): SERGEY ROGOV
Публикатор: Научная библиотека Порталус
Рубрика: АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК
Источник: (c) Беларусь в мире, 01-01-99
Номер публикации: №1465464564


SERGEY ROGOV, (c)


SERGEY ROGOV Institute of the USA and Canada Studiesof the Russian Academy of Science, Director
I want to thank organisers of this seminar for their timely and important effort. Now I would like to continue analysis of the events that are very important for Russia and Belarus alike. It is too early to draw final conclusions on Yugoslavian conflict: there are different outcome options. Now it is too early to forecast one parti-cular outcome. That is why now it is better to make conclusions on how we have come to this situation.

The events in Yugoslavia and not only in Yugoslavia, which we witness now, have their own roots. If we look at ourselves and think about the mistakes that we made ourselves, we will find their roots in 1991, in Byelovezhskaya woods. The way the Soviet Union had dissolved predetermined greatly following events both in our countries and on the international arena. Instead of embarking on the path of evolution, symbolised by Mikhail Gorbachev, decision was made to solve everything in one sweep, change everything radically. As a result, we have been wandering for eight years now, looking for the way out, and, it looks like we do not see light in the end of the tunnel. We will see the light if we are able to give a new impulse to the integration process, first of all to that between Russia and Belarus.

Concerning the tripartite alliance of Belarus, Russia and Yugoslavia, even if we take into consideration all our fraternal feelings towards Yugoslavia, the idea of creation of such an alliance is a kind of misdeed like that of Byelovezhskaya woods, but the other way round. While providing help to fraternal Yugoslavia, developing co-operation with it, we should not take on the path of the other adventure, which by its effects could lead to no less tragic results, reversing the zigzag-like reintegration process that has started. To my mind, from the point of view of reintegration process, our relations with Ukraine are more important. For the first time over many years the reaction by Ukraine to the situation in Yugoslavia gives grounds for a very cautious optimism.

The second conclusion concerns position of the West. It would be wrong to explain the current actions by the West, the USA and NATO, making suggestion that once upon a time there had been developed CIA?s cunning plot that was activated in 1991. The evolution of the position of the West and our feeling that the West did not fulfil its promise have been the result of the most radical change in balance of power that followed the 1991 crucial events. The ideas that from the end of the 1980s through beginning of the 1990s seemed to be shared by all of us came under a hard test. This is true first of all for the West, which suddenly appeared to be in a position of an enormous economic and military superiority. This superiority - same as our weakness - is bad. This abundance of power that the United States revel in now is in reality a problem of the same scale. I want to remind you of the words by U.S. Senator Fullbright, the outstanding American politician, about "complacency of power". This very complacency of power can turn out to be deadly for the West, for we see that in fighting evil the Western society starts to resort to evil instruments.

In the early 1990s attempts were made to implant democratic foundations and market eco-nomy in Russia, taking Western model of these as a benchmark. After-effects that resulted from failure of our economic reforms and triggered respective reaction in Russia, and those that resulted from what the West is doing now in Yugoslavia, - all these can push us to a quite opposite assumption: that the Western model has proved to be false, that it does not suit us and, therefore, neither democracy nor market eco-nomy are good for us. I think that if we came to such an assumption, rejecting Western model and at the same time reversing democratic transformation and market reforms, it would have been a grave mistake.

We have to continue these reforms, but not mindlessly copying as it was done in 1990-1992, when we were following a wishful model of democracy and Western market economy. Now we realise well that this model is not ideal. But this does not mean we have to embark on authoritarian path in our political development and get back to "mobilisational" national economy. We have to look for our own way, not falling into extremes, as we sometimes like to do in Russia.

Concerning possible outcomes in the deve-lopment of Yugoslavian situation, the most probable one is further military escalation. Though both New York Times and Washington Post published articles criticising Clinton?s administration, the US is moving ahead at full speed towards escalation of the conflict. Having pushed itself into the corner, the Clinton?s Administration wants to reach its goal by way of military victory now. If we think over what this strategy leads to, it will be clear that military victory cannot be reached by bombings. Accordingly, mi-litary victory means that at a certain time the escalation of the conflict should lead to ground operation, to the attempt to occupy part of Yugoslavian territory. This will be a catastrophic scenario because in this case the USA and its allies will have no chances to reach their political goals. The war will go on, expanding to a point that neighbouring states - Croatia and Macedonia - might be involved in the conflict.

In these conditions, one cannot exclude that this way or the other Russia may be dragged into the conflict. But even if this will not happen, we will have a protracted Vietnam-like conflict in the centre of Europe. This will mean, of course, the new division of Europe. In such a situation new confrontation between Russia and the West will be institutionalised. Belarus, Ukraine and, in fact, the whole Europe can become participants of this confrontation. This would mean that what we were trying to end ten years ago will be reborn at a new turn of history.

This sort of developments will make it possible to see a very serious rapprochement between Russia and China. For some months now we have seen that with the efforts by the United States a common strategic threat to China and Russia is emerging, something that has never happened before. I do not mean just events in Yugoslavia and Iraq. The US anti-missile defence policy is far more dangerous for China than for Russia. In a foreseeable future we will be able to overcome any anti-missile defence system created by the United States. America is very far from creating truly reliable anti-missile defences. But whatever Americans can develop both tactically and strategically - on Alaska, this practically makes China?s nuclear doctrine worthless. We can easily foresee that China will not agree to such situation. Therefore, Europe will not be the only place of the geopolitical division, which I spoke about. This will be a global division.

However, I see the opportunity to end the present conflict in a positive way - if sober evaluation of the situation and understanding that war cannot substitute diplomacy and political decisions are back in the West. If we start to evaluate parameters of political decision we can say that they were clear a month ago. It is absolutely clear that the bloodshed should be stopped. It is clear that the Kosovo autonomy should be reinstated in some form. It is clear that peace-keeping force should be deployed. But now the end of bloodshed means the simultaneous end of bombings and military operations in Kosovo.

Concerning the form of autonomy - the conditions that the West was trying but failed to impose upon Yugoslavia in Rambouillet will be unacceptable for Yugoslavia. What we could suggest? Autonomy like the one of 1989 that was cancelled in 1992. Or establishment of a union republic? One can discuss these suggestions, but they should be acceptable both for the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. It is natural that no proposal can be discussed until negotiations begin. The fact that now I. Rugova, not the most extreme wing of the Kosovars, joins negotiation process gives hope that the solution will be found. As far as the division of Kosovo is concerned, I think this is a bad variant. However, this is better than continuation of war.

Now, let me dwell on peace-keeping operation. Why did this war begin? Because the United States and their allies convinced themselves of the idea that NATO accepts a special role of European and global policeman. The new strategic concept of NATO, which will be adopted soon, should translate this idea in a refined diplomatic manner, and Kosovo should have demonstrated NATO?s efficiency in fulfilling this role. Now it is perfectly clear that NATO is not able to fulfil this. The NATO?s success is connected with its role in collective defence. It has been successfully dealing with this task and is able to do so now, when nobody threatens NATO at all. NATO as a policeman is doomed to failure and collapse. The sooner NATO understands this, the more the West will gain. I am sure that whatever the result of Yugoslavian war NATO?s American allies will never enter so enthusiastically into any other conflict - either in the Middle East or in Africa. Especially, if the number of combat losses of Yugoslavians and NATO will be getting even.

Peace-keeping force can be formed only under the aegis of the UN Security Council or OSCE. It was clear a month ago. Peace-keeping operation is the function of universal world?s and European institutions - the UN and OSCE. Any organisation with the limited membership cannot fulfil such a mission. This means that we have to come back to the basis of the international law and UN Charter. If this does not happen then in the coming months we, for example, will witness a complete collapse of all arms control regimes. I do not mean only the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is about to fall apart, or only the START-2, which has been buried for the second time with the help of the United States, or the ABM Treaty, which the Pentagon threatens to withdraw from.

On March 30 this year the consultative group agreed on a document on adaptation of the CFE Agreement in Europe. It is to be signed in November this year. Now let us think what kind of arms control regime we have in Europe that it makes it possible to start a big war in Europe. What all these ceilings, limits and figures written down there are about - if one can build-up a grouping for war against sovereign European state and even invade its territory? The document of March 30 contains commonly used cliches that these limits will not be applied to peace-keeping operations, which have to be conducted only with the UN Security Council or OSCE mandate. To conduct these operations the parties shall conclude special agreements on commitment of troops to peace-keeping operations. Why should we sign such a document if the majority of the parties to the agreement conduct war, not a peace-keeping operation, in Europe? I do not think that the West or we in Russia and Belarus need this scenario.

I think that understanding of the deadlock, which escalation of Yugoslavian conflict leads to, is increasingly emerging in Western Europe now. From this point of view, I want to discuss some points of the statement, which was mentioned by Sergey Karaganov. I think that in some nuances this document goes too far, stating the division between Russia and the West as if the Yugoslavian conflict had only one possible outcome. If there is a political, diplomatic solution, it is too early to make conclusion that co-operation between Russia and the West in military field is impossible. Especially, if it is clear that we are not going to stop our co-operation with the European Union, which is the point that Sergey Karaganov has already mentioned. The European Union and NATO - whether we like it or not - are, in fact, two organisational forms of the Western community now. We cannot have good partner relations with one organisation being in the state of confrontation with the other from the same community. This cannot happen in real life. Though, I cannot exclude that, if the situation will develop in a wrong way, the formulas, which were used in the document of the Council, will prove to be too cautious, and it will be necessary to use much tougher language.

Опубликовано на Порталусе 09 июня 2016 года

Новинки на Порталусе:

Сегодня в трендах top-5


Ваше мнение?



Искали что-то другое? Поиск по Порталусу:


О Порталусе Рейтинг Каталог Авторам Реклама