Did Russia abandon its traditional role as protector of Serbia and other Balkan states during the Revolutionary period?

Viewpoint: Yes. Russia's role in the Balkans was self-serving and rarely resulted in meaningful protection of the region's peoples and nations.

Viewpoint: No. Russia helped the Balkan states facilitate the independence of the region's peoples before the 1917 revolution and protected them later.

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Russia's protective role of the Balkans has been a long-lasting cliché of European politics. Bound to their larger neighbor by Orthodox Christianity, Slavic roots, and a common heritage of opposition to the Muslim Turks, the Balkan peoples, many have argued, found earnest and reliable protectors in their Russian neighbors. Russia faithfully supported their revolts against the Ottoman Empire, crafted diplomacy to safeguard their interests, and intervened directly to help them achieve independence from Muslim rule. Russia in this view was noble, helpful, and beneficent.
Other scholars have questioned Russia's motivations in the Balkans. Despite the fraternal rhetoric, many have suggested that Russia wanted to grab as much Balkan territory for itself as possible, a policy designed to help deliver the Turkish Straits and access to the Mediterranean Sea for Russian warships and commerce. "Helping" the Balkans largely meant Russian attempts to control emerging Balkan nations, all of which experienced some kind of Russian interference in their internal affairs shortly after they achieved independence. Most of the Balkan states and peoples rejected these heavy- handed maneuvers, did their best to expel Russian influence, and, in some cases, aligned themselves with Russia's opponents.



Viewpoint: Yes. Russia's role in the Balkans was self-serving and rarely resulted in meaningful protection of the region's peoples and nations.

As the largest and most powerful Slavic nation, Russia often presented itself as the guardian of the Slavic peoples in the Balkans. Russian rulers dating at least to Peter the Great sought to play such a role. In 1774 Russia won treaty rights giving it formal diplomatic status as the protector of the Ottoman Empire's Orthodox Christian subjects. The Russian people, ranging from the Imperial family to common peasants, often made clear through their actions that they were concerned about the suffering of their fellow Slavs under the rule of foreign empires. Still, official Russian policies often failed to match the Pan-Slavic rhetoric of those who sought closer ties with other Slavic nations. However much they might sympathize with Slavs ruled by the Austrian Habsburgs or Ottoman Turks, Russia's rulers were reluctant to undermine the prerogatives of autocrats because of what that precedent could mean to their control of the various ethnic groups within the Russian Empire. Despite the fondest hopes of the most fervent Pan-Slavs, Russia's role in the Balkans was generally exaggerated and rarely resulted in meaningful protection of the region's peoples and nations.

Russia's most assertive pro-Slav policies often were the result of internal Russian dynamics, particularly between 1853 and 1914. In this period Russia suffered humiliating defeats in two major wars, various diplomatic embarrassments, and growing instability at home. These problems, rather than the needs of the Balkan Slavs, drove Russian policy. The humiliating defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856) left the Russians isolated among the great powers of Europe. The quest for a redemptive national mission, and suitable allies, turned Russia toward the Balkans. The Russians suffered another major humiliation in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), enduring the special disgrace of losing to an Asian nation previously thought inferior to the European powers. This ended Russian imperial enthusiasm for ventures in the Far East and redirected Russian attention toward the Balkans. When the Russians focused on the Balkans, though, their policies were driven by Russian motives and interests and were hindered by Russian weaknesses and limitations. Especially during the most noteworthy crises in the Balkans in the 1870s and again during the 1910s, Russia failed to provide much help to the Balkan Slavs.

The Crimean War was a major turning point for Russian foreign policy. Russia was badly defeated by Britain and France and diplomatically isolated. Even Austria, which had been a Russian ally, had lent its support to the victorious coalition. Defeat and abandonment left Russia distrustful of Western Europeans. In the Treaty of Paris that officially ended the Crimean War, Russia withdrew its forces from Moldavia and Wallachia (present-day Romania) and surrendered the mouth of the Danube River and part of Bessarabia. Russia also relinquished its diplomatic status as protector of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Most embarrassing, it gave up the right to establish forts or maintain a navy in the Black Sea, even on Russian territory.

In response to national humiliation and diplomatic isolation, it became popular among Russian thinkers to see Slavic civilization as highly advanced and Orthodox Christianity as the true faith. It followed, then, that Russia should reinvigorate its mission of protecting the Slavs and Orthodox Christians from the less advanced societies of Western Europe. In order to play this role and boost its prestige, it was essential for Russia to fill a leadership role among other Slavic peoples. While the Poles and sometimes the Czechs were excepted from the list of Slavic peoples subject to Russia's interest because they were not Orthodox Christians, there were many Slavic peoples in the Balkans who were of interest to the Russians. The Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgarians received Russian interest and attention. Even the Greeks and Romanians, Orthodox but not Slavic, also fell into the category of peoples the Russians sometimes sought to protect. Many proponents of an enlarged Russian role in the Balkans envisioned the Russians eventually leading a federation of its peoples, or the replacement of Ottoman suzerainty with Russian. Yet, the key, at least to Russian Pan-Slavists, was for Russia to be in charge.

Russian interest in the Balkans became crucial during the crisis of 1875-1878. The crisis began when Christian peasants living in Muslim- governed Bosnia-Herzegovina began rebelling. In the spring of 1876 the Bulgarians also began to rebel. The ill-fated uprisings were brutally put down by Ottoman forces. In June the Serbs went to war against the Ottomans. Although Russia was unprepared to enter the war at that time, there was ample popular support for the Serbs in Russia. A distinguished Russian general led the Serb forces, who received additional support from about five thousand Russian volunteers who served in the Serbian army. Financial support also came from individual Russians. Even poor Russian peasants rushed off to enlist, or donated kopeks to support the Serb forces. Despite this unofficial support from Russia, the Serbs were badly mauled by the Turks. The great powers of Europe tried and failed to resolve the situation, and in April 1877 the Russians formally declared war.

At first glance this might appear as a triumph of Pan-Slavic policy. After the Russians provided private economic, military, and moral support for the Balkan Serbs in their showdown with the Ottoman Turks, including Pyotr Tchaikovsky's composition of the Marche Slave (1876), Russia fought and defeated the Turks on the behalf of the Slavic people. The reality, however, was more disappointing. The Balkan nations had conflicting territorial aims. The preliminary peace agreement, the Treaty of San Stefano, never went into effect as the great powers of Europe convened the Congress of Berlin to redraw the boundaries. The revised peace, the Treaty of Berlin, left virtually all the Slavs displeased with Russia. The Serbs were unhappy that the Russians did so little to further Serbian territorial ambitions vis-à-vis Romania, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire, which retained control of a large swath of Balkan territory. Bulgarians were unhappy that Russia failed to convince the great powers to deliver the full terms of the San Stefano settlement, which would have united all Bulgarians in one large state. Instead, they were forced to accept a smaller Bulgaria that excluded many ethnic Bulgarians. Bosnia's Christians were left under nominal Ottoman rule and Austro-Hungarian administrative rule.

This dissatisfaction complicated future Russian efforts in the Balkans. While some Bulgarians were highly Russophilic, others resented what they saw as frequent, unwarranted Russian interference in Bulgarian internal affairs. Mounting frustration led to the fall of Russia's handpicked ruler of Bulgaria, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, and to the dismissal of his Russian advisers. The country's next ruler, Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, had a pro-German and pro-Austrian orientation and in 1915 led Bulgaria into World War I on their side. The Serbs, meanwhile, grew so frustrated with Russia that they began seeking closer ties with the Austro- Hungarian Empire. Austria-Hungary, trying to prevent strife with the Serbs that later contributed to the outbreak of World War I, encouraged the Serbs' pro-Austrian tendencies, which endured until a coup d'état installed a rival, pro-Russian dynasty in 1903. Conflict between the Bulgarians and the Serbs was a frequent feature of Balkan diplomacy between 1878 and 1915, and the Russians frequently failed to mediate effectively despite their pretensions to influence in the Balkans.

The Russians again had difficulty during a major period of crisis in the Balkans in the early twentieth century. Despite its efforts to win the friendship of Serbia, Austria-Hungary continued to experience difficulties. The Serbs living outside the empire contributed significantly to the problem. Some wanted to see the creation of a greater Serbia in which all ethnic Serbs were united in one country. Others preferred to see a united kingdom of South Slavs, such as the Yugoslavia created after World War I. Both views were unofficially endorsed by the Serbian government after 1903. For their part, the Austrians could not abide any solution predicated upon the creation of ethnically or linguistically unified nation-states.

In attempting to deal with these pressures, Austria-Hungary in October 1908 formally annexed the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, without any meaningful response from Russia. This caused an uproar, even among Russians who thought their government should have done more to prevent the annexation. Yet, Russia had no international support and was forced to back down. Russia appeared ineffective again just four years later in the First Balkan War. A Serb-Bulgarian mutual assistance treaty signed in March 1912 paved the way for an attack on the Ottoman Empire by Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro. The Balkan nations defeated the Turks and made considerable territorial gains in the peace. Just as had been the case in 1878, however, the great powers of Europe again stepped in and imposed a different settlement, less favorable to the Balkan Slavs. Again the Russians were isolated and unwilling to fight, and the great powers were able to trim the gains the Balkan nations had been expecting from their war against the Ottoman Empire.

Conflict again came to the Balkans the very next year. Lingering Bulgarian-Serb tension and a desire finally to achieve the frontiers of the San Stefano peace led the Bulgarians to launch an unwise attack on Serbia. Not only were the Bulgarians defeated, but Greece, Romania, and the Ottoman Empire also joined the attack. The two victories in 1912 and 1913 left Serbia with about twice the size and population it had previously. The Bulgarians, meanwhile, were unhappy with the Serbs and still yearned to recapture the San Stefano boundaries. This would shape the involvement of both nations in World War I, which grew out of the crisis that followed the assassination of the Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914. Austrian leaders held the government of Serbia accountable, figuring that the assassination plot could not have been carried out without government knowledge.

The failure to find a diplomatic resolution to this crisis led to Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia. The Russian government realized that it had to fight in defense of Serbia if Russia were to maintain any prestige and influence in Europe. Bulgaria remained neutral at first, wooed by both the Allies and the Central Powers. The Central Powers were able to offer Bulgaria greater incentives, and in 1915 it looked to the government in Sofia like the Central Powers would win. Thus, the Bulgarians entered the war on the opposite side of the Russians and Serbs. Russian efforts to serve as the mentor and proctor of Balkan Slav nations were in tatters.

What is most noteworthy about Russian policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was how little the Russians were able to do for Balkan Slavs. With the Ottoman Empire in decay, with the Austro-Hungarian Empire finding it ever more difficult to maintain peace among the various peoples in its multiethnic empire, the Russians were unable to produce policies that would lead to steady gains for the Balkan Slavs or that would produce peace among their Slavic clients. Russian power was inadequate to protect the gains of Balkan nations in the war of 1877-1878, to prevent the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, to protect the Balkan nations' gains in the First Balkan War, or to prevent the Second Balkan War (1913). Despite Pan-Slavist rhetoric, Russian policies brought little benefit to the Balkan Slavs in their region's most noteworthy crises.

-- John Soares, Cincinnati, Ohio


Viewpoint: No. Russia helped the Balkan states facilitate the independence of the region's peoples before the 1917 revolution and protected them later.

In 1999 Russian paratroopers raced from Bosnia to Kosovo to secure the Slatina airport in Pristina mere hours before NATO deployment, thereby claiming a role in the future political development of the region. Serbs were not surprised the next day as the media broadcast American and Western officials, who only the night before had celebrated their success in undercutting the Russians from their historic sphere of interest, sputtering in disbelief as they realized that the Russians had unexpectedly outmaneuvered them and were now a presence with which the Westerners would have to contend. Russia, the historical guardian of the Balkans, had returned and was keeping a watchful eye over its ward.

None of this should have come as much of a surprise given the past history between Russia and Serbia as well as with other states on the Balkan Peninsula. Russia's status as traditional protector of the region was based on faith, common culture, and honor. Russia facilitated the liberation and independence of these states and came to their aid in later times through the use of political pressure or military intervention as well as guidance at pivotal points. Russia paid dearly for aiding and protecting these Balkan peoples and their fledgling states. It frequently acted contrary to its interests, often complicating relations with other states, and incurred incredible costs that hampered its own internal development and evolution.

The unique kinship felt by Russians toward their fellow Orthodox Slavs was reflected in the hyperbole of the Tsarist declarations throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and echoed by Russian elites. There was no doubt that the Russians supported those Orthodox Slavs who they fervently believed were suffering under the domination of the Muslim Ottoman and Catholic Austro-Hungarian Empires. This fraternal Slavic Orthodox sentiment would become interwoven with Russian national consciousness as well as with Russian foreign policy.

The seeds of this sentiment were sown by Catherine the Great in the eighteenth century. In 1774 Catherine's military success brought about the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, which gave Russia the right to defend all Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Russia thus became the dominant power in the Black Sea, the supreme champion of Eastern Christians, and the main opponent of the Ottoman Empire. Concerns about the welfare of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire would continue to be a driving force in Russian foreign relations, providing the justification for Russian declarations of war in 1788, 1806, 1828, 1853, and 1877.

Even other powers recognized the religious bonds, as well as Slavic cultural ties in certain cases, connecting Russia to the Serbs, Bulgarians, Romanians, and Greeks. Britain continued to prop up the ailing "Sick Man of Europe" in a variety of manners, such as insisting that the Turks pass reforms to ease the situation of their Balkan populations, in an attempt to oppose Russia's influence and appeal to those subjugated by the Ottomans in the region.

The most significant, tangible form of aid Russia offered to these people, and eventually to their states, arrived in the form of Russian troops. Even the perceived threat or mere hint of Russian military involvement was often enough to benefit the Balkan Orthodox Christians. Obviously, more concrete was actual Russian military intervention. This is not to say that Russia was always reliable in its support or that its soldiers were at the constant disposal of the Balkan peoples, nor that Russia was never guided by its own agenda or the need for self-preservation. During the Napoleonic wars, Russia abandoned Serbia to bear the wrath of the Turks after the failure of the first Serbian insurrection in 1804. Bogged down in an unsuccessful war against Napoleonic France followed by an uneasy peace and then a French invasion of Russia itself, it simply lacked the resources. Once France was defeated, however, Russia was free to focus on other matters, including the plight of its Orthodox brethren. Russia's successful campaign of 1828-1829 and the resulting Treaty of Adrianople forced the sultan to grant Serbia autonomy under Russian protection, affirm Greek independence, and acquiesce to Russian occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, the core entities of the future independent Romania.

The Crimean War (1853-1856) ended in a tremendous defeat for Russia, but with respect to the Balkans, the most severe blow was that the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji was undone and that Russia lost the legal right to meddle in Ottoman internal affairs. A collective international guarantee replaced Russia's protection of the Balkan Christians. Russia, however, was persistent. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, touched off by the suppression of anti-Ottoman riots in Serbia and Bulgaria, resulted in a Russian victory. Although the initial peace, the Treaty of San Stefano, was revised at the Congress of Berlin, the spoils from the war were noteworthy. Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania became independent states. Russia was recognized as dominant in Bulgaria, where it reorganized the government.

By the time World War I broke out in 1914, Russia's wars with the Ottoman Empire had yielded five new independent states: Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, and Bulgaria. The argument that Russia was guided chiefly by self-interest can easily be dismissed by a cursory examination of the colossal cost, whether in terms of human life, diplomacy, or economics, resulting from the many wars Russia waged leading up to World War I. The toll in human terms ran up to 40,000 in the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829, 450,000 in the Crimean War, 120,000 in 1877-1878, and several million in World War I. The financial damage was almost as staggering. For example, the Russian national debt increased nearly fivefold, from 108 million rubles in 1853 to 533 million in 1856. Rather than developing its own economy and industry and therefore addressing internal social issues, Russia devoted incredible resources, both human and financial, to these wars.

Russia not only compromised itself in terms of blood and treasure but also in ideology as well. A longtime supporter of autocratic government in Europe, Russia, which had vociferously condemned underground movements and national independence programs, stood by Serbia's side in 1914, despite the fact that a conspiracy accomplished an assassination of an heir to a European throne to further national independence. Again, Russia's sense of duty and responsibility toward its Balkan cousins would cost it greatly. Involvement in World War I set the stage for collapse of the Romanov monarchy and the Bolshevik Revolution, the outcome of which was a seven-decade sentence of communism.

Even decades of the Cold War could not completely eradicate the relationship between Russia and its Balkan siblings. En route to Sarajevo in the 1990s, Russian soldiers passing through were greeted by cheering Bosnian Serbs who had lined the streets. In reaction to the NATO bombing campaign in 1999, an unparalleled political consensus in Russia swelled against the NATO intervention as an unjust act of aggression and violation of sovereignty. The ancient concerns of honor, duty, and fraternity were restored. Russia reclaimed its position and responsibility as a great power and protector of the Balkan states. Vyacheslav Kostikov, Boris Yeltsin's spokesman, stated that Russia had "returned to the sources of its historical policy and role in the Balkans and defended the Serbs, who are close in faith, culture, and national spirit" (Laird 19).

-- Jelena Budjevac, Washington, D.C.


IMPERIAL MANIFESTO

August 2, 1914

By the Grace of God, We, Nicholas II, Emperor and Autocrat of all Russia, Tsar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., etc., proclaim to all Our loyal subjects:

Following her historical traditions, Russia, united in faith and blood with the Slav nations, has never regarded their fate with indifference. The unanimous fraternal sentiments of the Russian people for the Slavs have been aroused to special intensity in the past few days, when Austria-Hungary presented to Serbia demands which she foresaw would be unacceptable to a Sovereign State.

Having disregarded the conciliatory and peaceable reply of the Serbian Government, and having declined Russia's well-intentioned mediation, Austria hastened to launch an armed attack in a bombardment of unprotected Belgrade.

Compelled, by the force of circumstances thus created, to adopt the necessary measures of precaution, We commanded that the army and the navy be put on a war footing, but, at the same time, holding the blood and the treasure of Our subjects dear, We made every effort to obtain a peaceable issue of the negotiations that had been started.

In the midst of friendly communications, Austria's Ally, Germany, contrary to our trust in century-old relations of neighborliness, and paying no heed to Our assurances that the measures We had adopted implied no hostile aims whatever, insisted upon their immediate abandonment, and, meeting with a rejection of this demand, suddenly declared war on Russia.

We have now to intercede not only for a related country, unjustly attacked, but also to safeguard the honor, dignity, and integrity of Russia, and her position among the Great Powers. We firmly believe that all Our loyal subjects will rally self-sacrificingly and with one accord to the defense of the Russian soil.

At this hour of threatening danger, let domestic strife be forgotten. Let the union between the Tsar and His people be stronger than ever, and let Russia, rising like one man, repel the insolent assault of the enemy.

With a profound faith in the justice of Our cause, and trusting humbly in Almighty Providence, We invoke prayerfully the Divine blessing for Holy Russia and our valiant troops.

Given at Saint Petersburg, on the second day of August, in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, and the twentieth year of Our reign.

NICHOLAS

Source: Frank A. Golder, ed., Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917, translated by Emanuel Aronsberg (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), pp. 29-30.

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FURTHER READINGS


References


Nadia Alexandrova Arbatova, "European Security after the Kosovo Crisis: The Role of Russia," Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 1 (May 2001): 64-79.

E. J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Richard C. Hall, Bulgaria's Road to the First World War (Boulder, Colo.: Eastern European Monographs, 1996).

Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Balkans (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

Laurie Laird, "Shared History," Europe, 337 (June 1994): 19.

A. L. Macfie, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (London: Longman, 1989).

David MacKenzie, Serbs and Russians (Boulder, Colo.: Eastern European Monographs, 1996).

Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War (Harlow, U.K.: Pearson Longman, 2003).

David McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

Jelena Milojkovic-Djuric, Panslavism and National Identity in Russia and the Balkans (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

Philip E. Moseley, Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Easter Question in 1838 and 1839 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934).

Andrew Rossos, Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy 1908-1914 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1981).

B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937).

Astrid Tuminez, Russian Nationalism Since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).