Principal Personages

Pavel Karlovich Rennenkampf, General (1854-1918), Russian Army commander

Aleksandr Vasilievich Samsonov, General (1859-1914), Russian Army commander

Nicholas, II (Nikolai Aleksandrovich, 1868-1918), Tsar of Russia, 1894-1917

Paul von Hindenburg, General (Paul Ludwig Hans Anton von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg) (1847-1934), German Army commander


Summary of Event

On June 28, 1914, Gavril Princip, a member of a Serbian terrorist organization, successfully assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary. The assassination took place in Sarajevo, the capital of Austrian-held and Serbian-populated Bosnia-Hercegovina. Subsequently, Austria-Hungary issued an ultimatum to the Balkan kingdom of Serbia, accusing her of responsibility for the assassination of the Archduke. Serbia, while acknowledging most of Austria-Hungary's demands, found itself at war with the Habsburg state following Austria-Hungary's declaration of hostilities on July 28, 1914. The history of diplomacy in Europe for decades prior to Sarajevo insured a much wider conflict than the showdown over Austria-Hungary's presence in the Balkans. By 1914, the major European powers were divided into two major alliances that had now become "armed camps." The Triple Alliance, formed by secret treaty in 1882, embraced Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy; the Triple Entente, finalized in 1907, included Great Britain, France, and Tsarist Russia. Russia had maintained a long-standing interest in the Balkans throughout the nineteenth century. As part of Russian-inspired Pan-Slavism--attempts to foster unity of Eastern Europe's various Slavic nationalities under "Mother Russia's" influence--Russia had repeatedly intervened in Balkan politics. Russia had centuries-old ties with Bulgarians and had developed strong diplomatic ties with the Serbs as well. By 1900, Serbia was the largest independent Balkan state. Hence the Serbs, "brother Slavs" and "brother Orthodox," commanded geopolitical importance for Russia as relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary steadily deteriorated after 1903. Russia's decision to support Serbia in the wake of Austria's declaration of war meant that a local Balkan conflict would escalate into a world conflagration. World War I, a conflict unprecedented in violence, size, and scope, had begun.

Russia entered World War I while attempting to rehabilitate her diplomatic and military reputation in keeping with her pretensions to great power status. In two prior military conflicts--the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)--Russia had suffered serious defeats. World War I presented Russia with numerous opportunities to advance territorially. The Ottoman Empire was clearly leaning toward the Triple Alliance, and indeed would formally join the German war effort by October, 1914. The Russians in this setting could hope to increase greatly their involvement in the Balkans with British and French support. In Central Europe, playing on Pan-Slavic sentiments, Russia would prove able to mobilize other Slavic groups such as the Czechs and Slovaks to fight against their Austro-Hungarian oppressors. In addition, Russia hoped for consolidation of control over Polish lands, some of which were still under German and Austrian control. All in all, the war seemed to promise much for Russia's attempt to recoup diplomatically and militarily.

The Tsar and his Council of Ministers, on July 28, 1914, ordered the first partial mobilization of the Russian Army. By July 30, Nicholas II announced a full-scale general mobilization of Russia's troops. The war effort clearly had widespread support in Russia. Among the political parties, only the Bolsheviks maintained a consistent antiwar position. The other parties from right to left enthusiastically endorsed the war in a special meeting of the Russian parliament, the Duma, on August 8, 1914. Support for war came from key non-Russian nationalities of the Russian Empire as well.

Enthusiasm, however, could not overcome serious difficulties as Russia prepared for its first campaign. Russia's key advantage, its potential manpower, was tempered by many factors. With Russia's huge population, the Russians entered the war with a standing army of more than 1,400,000 men with 3,000,000 in reserve. However, this massive army lacked proper equipment throughout the war. Russia had just begun to industrialize prior to the war, and its small-scale industrial base could not readily produce a mass of war matériel. Rail and other forms of transportation to the Prussian frontier were severely underdeveloped, hampering the movement of weapons and men westward; medical facilities were deficient; Russian military intelligence was weak; troops as well as officers were poorly trained. The Russian general staff could not measure up to any commanders of the other great powers. The personal hatred between Generals E K. Rennenkampf and A. V. Samsonov, leaders of the campaign into East Prussia, created yet another liability to afflict the East Prussian campaign.

In terms of overall planning, the Triple Entente asked far too much of the Russian Army in planning the invasion of East Prussia. Russia was expected to draw German forces away from France so that the French might be relieved of a massive German assault. To draw off sufficient German companies to the Eastern Front, Russia was required to launch a fateful invasion of East Prussia a mere sixteen days into the mobilization. This forced the Russians to commit 800,000 troops--more than half of the standing army--to the very first campaign of the war. On August 17, 1914, the Russian First Army, under General Rennenkampf, invaded East Prussia from the east. According to plan, on August 19, General Samsonov at the head of the Russian Second Army was to proceed from 'Warsaw northward into East Prussia. The two Russian armies would thus encircle the German forces in a giant pincers movement. At first, matters went Russia's way, with Rennenkampf winning in his first few encounters with German troops. At this point, however, the German high command became greatly concerned with Rennenkampf's successes and brought General Paul yon Hindenburg out of retirement to head the defense of East Prussia. With the entry of Hindenburg into the campaign, Russia's early successes were followed by massive defeats.

Hindenburg, in a calculated risk, decided to focus his first actions against Samsonov's trailing Second Army. Counting on Rennenkampf's hatred of Samsonov, Hindenburg reasoned that Rennenkampf would not come to the aid of Samsonov's forces--a calculation which proved frighteningly true for the Russians. While smaller in number, the Germans used their superior weaponry and staff to surround and massacre Samsonov's Second Army between August 23 and 30 in what came to be known as the Battle of Tannenberg. The bulk of Samsonov's forces were captured or killed, and Samsonov himself committed suicide upon this crushing defeat. As Hindenburg expected, Rennenkampf had failed to support the Second Army. With Samsonov's forces defeated, the Germans then concentrated full force against Rennenkampf's First Army, which was chased from East Prussia by mid-September, 1914. The Russian invasion of East Prussia ended in the total defeat of the Tsar's forces. Russian losses were estimated at 300,000 men and 650 guns. This terrible loss served as the first damper on support for the war in Russia. The East Prussian debacle, coupled with subsequent Russian losses, helped to convert mounting Russian domestic discontent into revolution by 1917.

FURTHER READINGS

Thoumin, Richard. The First World War. Ed. Martin Kieffer. Trans. by Martin Kieffer. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1964.

Charques, Richard. The Twilight of Imperial Russia. Phoenix House, 1958.

Florinsky, Michael T. The End of the Russian Empire. Yale University Press, 1931.
An account by one of the leading émigré historians


Harcave, Sidney. Russia: A History. J. B. Lippincott Company, 1968.
Text includes a good chapter on World War I and the East Prussian invasion


Pares, Bernard. The Fall of the Russian Monarchy: A Study of the Evidence. Alfred A. Knopf, 1939.
Classic account by a British historian of Rasputin, the war, and the end of tsardom


Seton-Watson, Hugh. The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914. Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1952.
Contains a chapter on the impact of the war on Russia


Von Laue, Theodore H. Why Lenin? Why Stalin? A Reappraisal of the Russian Revolution, 1900-1930. J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964.
Provides a good discussion of how the war weakened the Tsarist aristocracy