The most common rejoinder is that Russia had no comprehension of the difficulties involved in preparing and mounting a cross-Channel invasion against an alert and competent defense. It has been suggested that the invasion could have been mounted in the summer of 1943 with good chances of success given the weakness of German forces and defenses compared to 1944. This hypothesis, however, depending heavily on statistical comparisons, has found little support beyond its originators. D-Day remains best understood as a one-time operation, absorbing such a high percentage of U.S. and British material and psychological resources that it could not be undertaken without near-absolute chances of success...' > The most common rejoinder is that Russia had no comprehension of the difficulties involved in preparing and mounting a cross-Channel invasion against an alert and competent defense. It has been suggested that the invasion could have been mounted in the summer of 1943 with good chances of success given the weakness of German forces and defenses compared to 1944. This hypothesis, however, depending heavily on statistical comparisons, has found little support beyond its originators. D-Day remains best understood as a one-time operation, absorbing such a high percentage of U.S. and British material and psychological resources that it could not be undertaken without near-absolute chances of success...' > The most common rejoinder is that Russia had no comprehension of the difficulties involved in preparing and mounting a cross-Channel invasion against an alert and competent defense. It has been suggested that the invasion could have been mounted in the summer of 1943 with good chances of success given the weakness of German forces and defenses compared to 1944. This hypothesis, however, depending heavily on statistical comparisons, has found little support beyond its originators. D-Day remains best understood as a one-time operation, absorbing such a high percentage of U.S. and British material and psychological resources that it could not be undertaken without near-absolute chances of success...'> The most common rejoinder is that Russia had no comprehension of the difficulties involved in preparing and mounting a cross-Channel invasion against an alert and competent defense. It has been suggested that the invasion could have been mounted in the summer of 1943 with good chances of success given the weakness of German forces and defenses compared to 1944. This hypothesis, however, depending heavily on statistical comparisons, has found little support beyond its originators. D-Day remains best understood as a one-time operation, absorbing such a high percentage of U.S. and British material and psychological resources that it could not be undertaken without near-absolute chances of success...' /> The most common rejoinder is that Russia had no comprehension of the difficulties involved in preparing and mounting a cross-Channel invasion against an alert and competent defense. It has been suggested that the invasion could have been mounted in the summer of 1943 with good chances of success given the weakness of German forces and defenses compared to 1944. This hypothesis, however, depending heavily on statistical comparisons, has found little support beyond its originators. D-Day remains best understood as a one-time operation, absorbing such a high percentage of U.S. and British material and psychological resources that it could not be undertaken without near-absolute chances of success...' />
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Allied Invasion of France (D-Day), 1944

Дата публикации: 20 сентября 2007
Публикатор: Научная библиотека Порталус
Рубрика: RUSSIA (TOPICS) - Soviet Russia (1917-53) →
Источник: (c) http://russia.by
Номер публикации: №1190295321


Allied Invasion of France (D-Day), 1944

Should the Second Front have been opened earlier than June 1944?

Viewpoint: Yes, the Second Front should have been opened earlier than June 1944 in order to satisfy the promise made by the Western allies to the Soviets and to promote trust among the Americans, British, and Soviets.

Viewpoint: No, although the Allies wanted to open a second front, the Americans were inexperienced and unprepared for a cross-Channel invasion, while the British favored attacks on the periphery of German occupied territory.
_________________________

As early as July 1941 a mortally threatened Soviet Union was calling for a "second front"--an Anglo-American invasion of Europe across the English Channel. The appeal was sufficiently compelling that Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt made successive attempts to present the invasions of North Africa in 1942 and Italy in 1943 as meeting Soviet criteria. Joseph Stalin was unimpressed, and since then Soviet and post-Soviet historiography has stated or implied that the Western allies delayed invading the European continent unnecessarily, if not hoping to weaken the U.S.S.R. then to spare the lives of their own men at the expense of Russia's.
The most common rejoinder is that Russia had no comprehension of the difficulties involved in preparing and mounting a cross-Channel invasion against an alert and competent defense. It has been suggested that the invasion could have been mounted in the summer of 1943 with good chances of success given the weakness of German forces and defenses compared to 1944. This hypothesis, however, depending heavily on statistical comparisons, has found little support beyond its originators. D-Day remains best understood as a one-time operation, absorbing such a high percentage of U.S. and British material and psychological resources that it could not be undertaken without near-absolute chances of success.

Viewpoint: Yes, the Second Front should have been opened earlier than June 1944 in order to satisfy the promise made by the Western allies to the Soviets and to promote trust among the Americans, British, and Soviets.

Diplomatic relations among countries can be difficult under normal circumstances. Different cultures, philosophies, and goals provide challenges to negotiations, agreements, treaties, and alliances. Complex relationships frequently become strained and change in wartime, even between closely tied countries. The World War II Anglo- American alliance offers the best example of the intricacies of wartime foreign relations, especially when a third partner, the Soviet Union, entered the picture. One of the issues which perhaps taxed the Allied alliance the most was the establishment of a second front in Europe by the British and Americans in order to relieve pressure being placed on the Soviet Union by German forces. While the three Allied powers agreed about the necessity of a second front, each one had its own ideas regarding the scope, location, and timing of the campaign.

In general, each of the Allies supported a second front that met its political requirements and military capabilities. By a second front, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin and American president Franklin D. Roosevelt meant a major campaign in France that would force German führer Adolf Hitler to shift troops from the Russian front to combat the new threat. Although he acknowledged that Allied forces would ultimately have to cross the English Channel into France, British prime minister Winston Churchill suggested that a second front could be established anywhere, even North Africa or Italy. The goal was to engage Axis forces in battle in an area that the Germans would have to reinforce, hopefully with troops from the Russian front, and to prevent them from being used against the strained Soviet forces. Heated discussions about the second front increasingly created tension within the alliance, and the issue had ramifications for postwar relations between the Soviet Union and its Western allies.

The second-front issue was introduced early in the war. The Germans invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. By the end of the next month the Soviets made two major requests of the British and Americans, who were not yet official participants in the conflict. The Soviets asked the United States for aid and an American army to fight on the Russian front. The Soviets also requested the establishment of a second front, without which they would be unable to continue the fight against the Germans. Although both Churchill and Roosevelt denied the Soviet request temporarily, the idea had been planted and would recur in negotiations concerning strategy between the United States and Great Britain.

The British in 1941 rejected Stalin's request for a second front, for example an invasion of France, because they did not have the means to implement such an operation. The United States, although providing Great Britain with supplies, had not yet entered the war. Stalin blamed German successes in Russia and the Ukraine on Britain's failure to invade France. By December 1941 the British had designed a plan for a cross-Channel assault, but they realized that it could not be implemented before 1943. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor changed the situation, however, and the British would now have help with the invasion of France.

Shortly after America's entry into the war, Churchill and Roosevelt readdressed the issue of a second front during discussions at the Arcadia Conference in Washington (22 December 1941-11 January 1942). The Soviets wanted the Western allies to attack the Germans from the west as early as possible. While both leaders favored providing relief for the Russians, they recognized that a major cross-Channel assault was probably not feasible in 1942. It would be some time before the American could put an effective force in the field. The British and Americans did, however, pledge to launch an emergency cross-Channel assault in the summer of 1942 if the Russian forces appeared in danger of collapse and to begin plans for a joint invasion of northern France in April 1943. Fear that the Soviet Union would repeat events of World War I and negotiate a separate peace with Germany prompted agreement.

In March 1942, Roosevelt sent a plan for a joint invasion of France to Churchill. The prime minister initially agreed in principle with the cross-Channel invasion plan, but after reconsideration, he expressed his concerns about the possible irreplaceable losses that the British might suffer. Any cross-Channel assault in 1942 would have to be carried out predominantly by British forces. The United States was not yet in a position to contribute much to the operation. Consequently, Churchill renewed a push for an attack against German forces in North Africa, where the British had recently suffered setbacks, or in another location that was not a German stronghold. Roosevelt reiterated the need for a second front to relieve the pressure that the Germans were placing on the Russians. He suggested that a cross-Channel invasion could fulfill an obligation to the Russians even if it was not a military success. With Dunkirk (26 May-4 June 1940) fresh in their minds, the British were reluctant to commit to an amphibious assault that was doomed to failure. The failed assault on Dieppe, France, in August 1942 made the British even more hesitant about the proposed operation.

The debate continued at a second Washington conference in June. Although he verbally supported the American plan, Churchill continued to push for the invasion of North Africa in 1942 instead of a cross-Channel assault called Sledgehammer. Suggesting that Hitler's worst fear was that of fighting a two-front war, Roosevelt's advisers pushed for Sledgehammer. Even if the combined Allied forces were insufficient to launch an offensive in the near future, the buildup of American troops in Great Britain would have a psychological effect on the Germans, which would be almost as important as an actual military offensive. Not convinced that Sledgehammer was possible for 1942, Roosevelt agreed to the North African campaign, Torch, because he wanted an offensive before the end of the year.

The decision to implement Torch meant the postponement of a cross-Channel invasion, renamed Roundup, until 1943. Fearing Soviet opposition, Churchill went to Moscow. Stalin, who believed that he had received a promise for a second front in 1942, expressed sharp dissatisfaction with the Anglo-American decision. He accused his allies of not treating the second-front issue seriously and suggested that the Soviet Union would not tolerate a postponement of the offensive. By the end of Churchill's visit, however, Stalin accepted Torch with the understanding that the Allies would establish a second front in 1943.

Allied operations culminated in several victories in the fall of 1942: the Russians successfully counterattacked; American and British troops had German forces on the run in North Africa and Egypt. The victories created a paradox for the Allies. The next logical step was the cross-Channel invasion, but success in North Africa indicated the need for further offensives in the Mediterranean--first in Sicily, then in Italy--which would destroy the possibility of Roundup in April 1943. The British argued convincingly in favor of the latter course, claiming the Allies should take steps to force Italy out of the war. Because of German U-boat activity in the Atlantic, the buildup of the invasion force in Britain was proceeding slowly. The supply of troops, shipping, and other material from the United States dictated that only a small-scale offensive in one area would be possible in the spring of 1943. Even if Roundup could be launched in 1943, it could not begin in time to support the Russian summer campaign, and, because of its limited size, it would not result in the shift of German troops from the eastern front to France. Finally, the British argued that Allied forces should take advantage of the situation to maintain the momentum that they had already established. Meanwhile, Stalin pressed for details of the second-front offensive. Victories in the east enabled the Soviets to imply that they were "virtually fighting alone." Some Americans began to fear that if the United States did not become involved in Europe soon, the Soviet Union would claim sole responsibility for victory, not acknowledge American aid or the Mediterranean offensive, and dictate the postwar conditions. Although American military leaders, particularly General George C. Marshall, argued against continued operations in the Mediterranean and in favor of fulfilling the promise of a cross-Channel assault in 1943, the Americans finally agreed to implement the British plan in exchange for a definite date for a second front in Europe.

Because they chose to pursue the Mediterranean campaign, the Allies were forced to delay opening the Second Front until June 1944. Consequently, they failed to attack the Germans from the west as early as they possibly could, which raises several historical issues. The British and Americans failed to establish a second front in Europe as early as they could for many reasons. First, they approached the problem differently, which sparked debate and uncertainty regarding Allied strategy. The Americans believed that the proper course was to concentrate sufficient forces and then assault the enemy directly. The British strategy envisioned engaging the Germans in battle around the periphery of Fortress Europe. After draining away much of Germany's strength, the Allies would then launch the cross-Channel attack. Second, because they had been fighting the Germans for some time, the British "tended to focus on the difficulties of assault, and the tactical and logistical problems involved, while the Americans . . . found it easier to start with the large view of the strategic problem." Finally, the Americans failed to solve certain logistical problems, particularly those surrounding the availability of landing craft, to mount an earlier offensive.

It is highly likely that had a cross-Channel assault been mounted in 1942, it would have failed. The Americans would have been unable to commit a large force to the operation; therefore, the bulk of responsibility would have fallen to the British, who were committed in North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. To implement a Sledgehammer or Roundup in 1942, the British would have had to withdraw troops from another theater. Reverses suffered in Egypt and North Africa required an increase, not a decrease, in their commitment. As a result, an amphibious landing would have been small and vulnerable. Minimal German response would, in all likelihood, have culminated in another Dunkirk.

Could the cross-Channel operation have been successfully implemented in 1943? Under the right conditions, yes, it could have. Marshall, the leading proponent of launching Roundup in 1943, was right about what course of action the Allies should follow, but failed to convince Roosevelt that the operation was possible. While both the Americans and the British agreed that it would be advantageous to force the Italians out of the war, they did not concur that the best way to accomplish that goal was to mount an offensive on the peninsula. The British prevailed in their strategy and in September 1943 Allied forces landed in Italy. Within a short time the Italians surrendered and the offensive should have been over. The Germans were not willing, however, to allow the Allies to control Italy. Consequently, the Germans increased their commitment in Italy, and the offensive did not progress as the Allies had expected. German resistance was much stiffer than that offered by the Italians. The advance to Rome proved slow and costly, and required another amphibious landing. The landing at Anzio did not proceed as planned and resulted in significant Allied casualties. In fact, Rome did not fall until early June 1944.

It is possible that the war would have ended sooner had Allied troops landed in northwestern France in 1943 instead of 1944. The defeat of German forces in France and Germany, not in Italy, would have resulted in the end of the European conflict. The Allied campaign in Italy had bogged down. The Germans had established several strong lines of defense. A further push up the peninsula would have been costly in terms of lives and material. An attempt to launch an offensive from Italy into southern Germany would have been both impossible and a logistical nightmare. Several historians, particularly Americans, have argued that the offensive in Italy was unnecessary, costly, and delayed the Normandy invasion, as well as the defeat of Germany.

Why should the Second Front have been launched earlier? First, it would have been the fulfillment of the promise made by the Americans and British to their Soviet ally. Both military leaders and historians have accused the British of advocating the Mediterranean offensives in order to prevent the Soviets from determining postwar conditions in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The Mediterranean campaign delayed the Normandy invasion until 1944, increased the strain on relations between the Western Allies and the Soviets, and helped to demonstrate to Stalin that the Allied leaders could not be trusted to keep their promises. This lack of trust became increasingly apparent in the postwar world and affected postwar agreements and relations. Second, the failure of the British and the Americans to agree upon a strategy, including plans and a date for the cross-Channel invasion, created friction and distrust between the two countries. Had a firm decision to launch the invasion been reached earlier, there would have been no reason for accusations of changing strategy, of lack of commitment, and of being afraid to engage the Germans in battle. Much bitterness on all sides could have been avoided had the Allies stuck to the original plan and not gotten sidetracked in the Mediterranean.

-- Mary Kathryn Barbier, Loyola University


Viewpoint: No, although the Allies wanted to open a second front, the Americans were inexperienced and unprepared for a cross-Channel invasion, while the British favored attacks on the periphery of German occupied territory.

The debate over Anglo-American strategy in World War II started shortly after the war. Nationalism, egos, and the advent of the Cold War greatly influenced the discussion. The issue of the Second Front is part of the larger historical debate on the effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, of American strategic thinking in the final years of the war when the Americans replaced the British as the leaders of the alliance. The historically accepted thesis is that it was not possible in 1942, nor in 1943, to conduct the cross-Channel attack.

At the Arcadia Conference (22 December 1941-11 January 1942), the British outlined a comprehensive strategy, as cited by Michael Howard in The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (1968):

(1) The realization of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost required the security of the main areas of war industry in the United States and United Kingdom.

(2) The maintenance of essential communications in defeating the German U-boat threat.

(3) Closing and tightening the ring around Germany by sustaining the Russian front, arming and supporting Turkey, building up strength in the Middle East, and gaining possession of the whole North African coast.

(4) Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.

(5) The continuous development of offensive against Germany.

(6) Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theater as will safeguard vital interests and to deny to Japan access to raw materials vital to her continuous war effort while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany.

Franklin D. Roosevelt and his advisers agreed that Germany was the most dangerous enemy and that the European theater would receive priority for resources rather than the campaign against the Japanese in the Pacific. The British strategy, accepted by the United States, argued that before the Allies could return to the continent and fight the main German army certain conditions had first to be met. The first condition was the buildup of forces--the mobilization of the vast industrial and manpower resources of the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom (U.K.). The second condition was the maintenance of sea lanes upon which the UK and Russia depended. The third condition was to contain Germany by keeping the Russians in the war, halting German advances in North Africa, and assisting other governments fighting Germany. The fourth condition was the erosion of German combat power through peripheral operations, strategic bombing, and blockade. These operations were designed to weaken the German army through attrition and dispersion. When all these conditions were met, the British believed the final phase of their strategy could then be carried out--the cross-Channel attack.

Returning to the continent was viewed by the British as part of a much larger grand strategy designed to substantially weaken the German army before the final phase went into effect. To the Americans the final phase was the strategy. Everything that went before it was simply preparation for the main event, the decisive campaign in western Europe against the main German army. The disagreement between the British and Americans was, thus, over the final phase of war.

The U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, in keeping with the American preference for a more direct approach to war, advanced a plan for an attack in Europe in 1942, Operation Sledgehammer, or in 1943, Operation Roundup. In May 1942 Roosevelt told Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov that he "`hoped" and "expected" Anglo-American forces to open a second front in Europe in 1942. America, however, lacked the wherewithal to conduct such an operation. Japanese successes in the Pacific caused the United States to divert forces and equipment to that region. American forces were still mobilizing and training. New technology such as Landing Ship Tanks (LST), Landing Craft Infantry (LCI), and other amphibious-assault vehicles had to be developed, produced, and deployed. American manpower and technology, as well as operational and tactical doctrines, were untested. Nevertheless, Marshall favored a strategy that took the Anglo-American armies into Europe at the earliest opportunity. He argued for the construction of a large army, and the concentration of forces, for a main effort in Europe. Marshall believed the American people had little tolerance for a long war and expected decisive results. He believed it was correspondingly necessary to focus the nation's efforts and resources on a decisive objective. Peripheral operations were indecisive and dispersed resources in campaigns that could not produce a final victory.

The British believed an invasion in 1942 impossible and one in 1943 improbable. They believed it was first necessary to weaken Germany substantially through peripheral operations. The British were psychologically damaged by the experience of World War I, the Somme (1 July-13 November 1916) and Passchendaele (the Third Battle of Ypres, July-November 1917), and the series of defeats suffered in 1940, culminating with the humiliating retreat at Dunkirk (26 May-2 June 1940). The British needed time and success in a minor theater before they were able to meet again the German Army in Europe. North Africa gave the British the time they needed to recover. The British practice of war emphasized limited, negotiated settlements and indirect attacks on the enemy domain. Churchill believed in the indirect approach to war and took actions to insure that British strategy reflected his thinking. Marshall entered into strategic negotiations with the British unprepared to advance his position, as the U.S. Army's position was not fully developed and the argument could not be made.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were divided as well. The U.S. Navy, under the leadership of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Earnest King, and the American people wanted to fight the Japanese who had "treacherously" attacked and destroyed the preeminent symbol of American power--its battleships at Pearl Harbor. Popular support and the urgency of the situation enabled King to advance operations in the Pacific, operations that pulled resources away from the European theater. The British refusal to conduct the cross-Channel attack caused Marshall to move closer to the position of King. Roosevelt, however, interceded to stop the erosion of the Anglo-American alliance. For political and strategic reasons, Roosevelt decided on the North African campaign proposed earlier by the British. Politically, Roosevelt felt it was necessary for the American people to have forces in battle in the European theater in 1942, and strategically he believed it was necessary to maintain the alliance. He therefore overrode Marshall and decided on the British strategic vision. In November 1942 Operation Torch took place. British and American forces were now committed to the British Mediterranean strategy.

The amphibious assault in North Africa highlighted deficiencies in American training and technology, and the battle at Kasserine Pass, Tunisia (14 February 1943) demonstrated that the Americans were not yet ready to fight quality German units--the U.S. soldiers panicked under fire. The poor showing of the U.S. Army in North Africa was not encouraging to the British. British military leaders were increasingly critical of American leadership, training practices, and manhood.

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Marshall again tried to refocus Anglo-American strategy. He argued for the cross-Channel attack. The British, however, under the leadership of Field-Marshall Lord Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, argued forcefully and persuasively for the invasions of Sicily, and subsequently, Italy. The agreed-upon strategic objectives for 1943, as recounted by Ed Cray in General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman (1990), were:

(1) Make the submarine menace a first charge on United Nations' resources;

(2) Concentrate on the defeat of Germany first;

(3) Undertake the conquest of Sicily;

(4) Continue to build troop strength and the number of landing craft in Great Britain;

(5) Launch a series of stepping-stone campaigns in the Solomons, the Marshalls, and at Truk in the Carolines;

(6) Invade Burma in December and open the Burma Road to China;

(7) Bomb Germany around the clock from bases in Great Britain; and

(8) Attempt to get Turkey to cast its lot with the Allies, and provide air bases to bomb the Rumanian oil fields.

British strategy now called for eliminating Italy from the war, securing the Mediterranean for shipping, weakening Germany through an air offensive of bombers flying out of Italy, and winning the "Battle of the Atlantic." It was argued that the U-boat threat had to be defeated before the cross-Channel attack could take place. Brooke sounded the alarm, "a stranglehold on all offensive operations. . . . unless we could effectively combat the U-boat menace, we might not be able to win the war." Roosevelt again accepted the arguments of the British, and the campaign for Sicily was scheduled. Roosevelt also announced the doctrine of "unconditional surrender" to reassure the Russians of continued Anglo-American support. King won approval for offensive operations against the Japanese, and Marshall's fear of dispersing the nation's war effort was realized.

When the Casablanca Conference took place the campaign in North Africa was still in progress. The campaign did not end until May 1943, too late, it is argued, to redeploy forces for a cross-Channel attack in 1943. In July 1943 Anglo-American forces invaded Sicily, and in September, Italy. The Sicilian campaign ended any chance of invading Europe in 1943. Not until June 1944 would the cross-Channel attack take place.

-- Adrian R. Lewis, University of North Texas


Invasion of North Africa

White House news release.

Washington, November 7, 1942

In order to forestall an invasion of Africa by Germany and Italy, which, if successful, would constitute a direct threat to America across the comparatively narrow sea from Western Africa, a powerful American force equipped with adequate weapons of modern warfare and under American Command is today landing on the Mediterranean and Atlantic Coasts of the French Colonies in Africa.

The landing of this American Army is being assisted by the British Navy and air forces and it will, in the immediate future, be reinforced by a considerable number of divisions of the British Army.

This combined allied force, under American Command, in conjunction with the British campaign in Egypt is designed to prevent an occupation by the Axis armies of any part of Northern or Western Africa, and to deny to the aggressor nations a starting point from which to launch an attack against the Atlantic Coast of the Americas.

In addition, it provides an effective second front assistance to our heroic allies in Russia.

The French Government and the French people have been informed of the purpose of this expedition, and have been assured that the allies seek no territory and have no intention of interfering with friendly French Authorities in Africa.

The Government of France and the people of France and the French Possessions have been requested to cooperate with and assist the American expedition in its effort to repel the German and Italian international criminals, and by so doing to liberate France and the French Empire from the Axis yoke.

This expedition will develop into a major effort by the Allied Nations and there is every expectation that it will be successful in repelling the planned German and Italian invasion of Africa and prove the first historic step to the liberation and restoration of France.

Source: World War II Resources, Web Page.

FURTHER READINGS


References


Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957);

Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, volume 4 of The Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950);

Ed Cray, General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman (New York: Norton, 1990);

Carlo D'Este, Decision in Normandy (New York: Dutton, 1983);

Walter Scott Dunn Jr., Second Front Now--1943 (University: University of Alabama Press, 1979);

Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, volume 4, August 1942-September 1943 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970);

Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson; New York: Praeger, 1968);

Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994);

Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1975);

Maurice Matloff, "Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945," in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, in collaboration with Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986);

Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (Washington, D.C. : United States Government Printing Office, 1953);

Leo J. Meyer, "The Decision to Invade North Africa (Torch)," Command Decisions, edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960);

A. W. Purdue, The Second World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999);

David Reynolds, Warren F. Kimball, and A. O. Chubarian, Allies at War: the Soviet, American, and British Experience, 1939-1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994);

Keith Sainsbury, The Turning Point: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, and Chiang-Kai-Shek, 1943: The Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran Conferences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985);

Peter N. Stearns, World History: Patterns of Change and Continuity (New York: Harper & Row, 1987);

Mark A. Stoler, The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941-1943 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977);

United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1968);

United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1961);

Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York: Holt, 1958);

Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973);

Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994);

Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper, 1952).

Опубликовано на Порталусе 20 сентября 2007 года

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