P. V. GUSTERIN

Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

agency Keywords: recruitment, residency, secret information

Intelligence services exist in any sovereign State. In the USSR, they were created in the very first years of its existence. It was especially difficult then to find intelligence personnel to work in the countries of the East.

In part, the personnel issue was solved by attracting military specialists from among the former officers of the General Staff of the tsarist Army. But the training of new personnel, including for intelligence, has also begun. In the 1920s, the Eastern Faculty of the Frunze Military Academy was established. Subsequently, the Leningrad Institute of Living Oriental Languages (since 1928 - the Leningrad Oriental Institute, which functioned until 1938), the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies (MIV) (which functioned until 1954), the historical and philological faculties of Leningrad and Moscow Universities, as well as the Turkestan Oriental Institute (since 1924 - the Eastern Faculty of Central Asian Studies) joined this work. university, since 1960 - Tashkent University).

Here is how Evgeny Dumbadze, an employee of the Comintern in Constantinople, who fled to Paris in 1928 and was subsequently liquidated by the Soviet secret services, presumably in 1939, describes the situation with the training of Oriental specialists in the USSR: "Leningrad Oriental Institute<...> has the task of training workers for practical activities in the East and researchers for Oriental universities. < ... > In Moscow-the Nariman Narimanov Oriental Institute, the Communist Institute (more precisely, the University. - P. G.) of workers of the East named after Stalin. In Baku, Tashkent, Samarkand, Vladivostok and other cities, in addition to special oriental universities, there are also oriental faculties attached to universities. All these educational institutions are hotbeds from which specialists come to work in the East, both through the Comintern and the GPU (State Political Administration). The reception of students in them is subject to certain difficulties. So, ... persons who have at least 5 years of party experience are accepted ,or on the recommendation of the party committee. Regardless of this, for admission, you must have either an army service record or work experience in the Cheka (GPU).<...> Those who graduate from these educational institutions are then sent to the Comintern (eastern section)and the GPU (foreign department), < ... > then they are seconded as their employees abroad. " ¹

In 1922. Foreign Department (INO) GPU ², under the guise of diplomatic and trade missions, opened the first legal residency in Afghanistan and Turkey, and in 1923 such a residency was established in Persia (since 1935-Iran).

The authorized representative offices of the GPU in the regions were also involved in the organization of cross-border intelligence. Thus, the GPU's representative office in the Caucasus with its "headquarters" in Tiflis (renamed Tbilisi in 1936) He oversaw intelligence work in Western and Northern Persia and Asian Turkey. The Turkestan office, "stationed" in Tashkent, dealt with Northern Afghanistan, Eastern Persia, and Western China3.

By Order of the GPU No. 98 of June 2, 1922, the Eastern Department was created as part of the Secret Operations Directorate (SOW). Thus, the work on the "Eastern counter-revolution" was separated into an independent direction. VO combined the work of the GPU bodies in the Caucasus, Turkestan, Kyrgyzstan, the Tatar, Bashkir and Crimean Autonomous Soviet Republics, and the Bukhara and Khiva People's Soviet Republics in the part "... concerning specific counter-revolution and Eastern espionage". VO also worked on all materials received from agents from Afghanistan, Dzungaria, the Ili Region, India, Kashgaria, China, Korea, Mongolia, Persia, Tibet, Constantinople of Angora (Angora is an outdated name for Ankara) Turkey and Japan, and also set operational tasks for INO 4^. By December 1922, three branches of the HE were organized: 1-the Caucasus and the Middle East; 2-Central Asia and the Middle East; 3-the Far East ⁵.

In June 1922, the Regulations on the Zakordonny Branch (ZO) of the INO were approved. According to this document, ZO was"...an organizational center that concentrates all leadership and management of foreign work of an intelligence and counterintelligence nature."

At the head of the zakordonny intelligence apparatuses were residents of the INO. In accordance with the regulations on the resident, he was granted the right to recruit agents independently, without a request from the Center. To communicate with the Center, the resident used his own cipher. Once every three months, the resident reported to the Center on the use of foreign currency funds. Despite the huge volume of tasks assigned to foreign intelligence, only 70 employees served in ^the Foreign Intelligence Service in 1922.6

With the formation of the Soviet Union on December 30, 1922, LENT-

On November 2, 1923, the GPU was transformed into the United State Political Administration (OGPU) by a decree of the CEC Presidium. In accordance with the regulations on the OGPU, the INO was significantly expanded, and new, more complex tasks were assigned to it, taking into account the changed situation.

The 5th (Eastern) Sector of the Foreign Intelligence Service managed the activities of the stations in Afghanistan, Persia and Turkey (except Constantinople). At the same time, the Department worked on sending agents to Persia and Turkey from the territory of Transcaucasia, as well as to Afghanistan from the territory of Central Asia.

In 1922-1925, one of the main tasks of the INO continued to be the creation of a system of legal residencies that operated under the guise of Soviet diplomatic or trade missions. In the mid-1920s, there were about 20 residencies in Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey. There were not many employees in them: 3 - 4 intelligence officers worked in the main residencies, 1 - 2 in the peripheral ones.

In addition to general tasks, each of the residencies had its own specific tasks related to its location and capabilities. Thus, the Constantinople residency, which was supervised by the 4th (Southern European and Balkan countries) sector of the Foreign Intelligence Service with a residency in Vienna, conducted intelligence work in Bulgaria, Greece, Egypt, Palestine and Syria in 1923-1926. The Kabul station had a wide network of agents both on the border with India and in India itself. The residency in Tehran through the Kermanshah point operated in Iraq ⁷.

8^{" ... The threat of conflict with Britain was the reason for Moscow's insistent demands that the GPU penetrate and gain a foothold in Iraq. According to available information, the British were building two air bases in northern Iraq, from where their aircraft could easily reach Baku, bomb the oil fields and return back. Therefore, the intelligence service began to work actively among the Iraqi Kurds, hoping, if necessary, to raise an anti-English uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan and disable both the oil fields in Mosul and the airfields from which British planes could fly to bomb Baku."}

Until 1929, only the legal OGPU residency at the Consulate General in Constantinople, organized in 1926 by OGPU resident Yefim Goldenstein (1882-1938), operated in Turkey. "Until 1930, GPU residents in Turkey were ordered not to work against the Turkish government. This order was issued for two reasons. First, the Soviet government considered Turkey a friendly country. < ... > The second reason why the OGPU refrained from working against the Turks was the desire to create a base in Constantinople for work throughout the Middle East. Trilisser⁹believed that if you do not touch the Turks, but work on the territory of other countries, the Turks will look at this work through their fingers. Such a sacrifice should have been made in order to be able to work freely in Syria, Palestine, Egypt, etc. " ¹⁰

April 24, 1924 Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the USSR M. I. Kalinin signed the credentials of the diplomatic agent and Consul General of the USSR in the Kingdom of Hijaz K. A. Khakimov ¹¹.

On August 6, Khakimov and the staff of the Consulate General arrived in Jeddah and sent a telegram to Mecca addressed to the king about his arrival.¹² The Soviet representative, as a Muslim, was allowed to present his credentials to King Hussein of the Hejaz in Mecca, which he did on August 9, 1924. The USSR Agency in Jeddah became the first official representation of the Soviet Union in Arab countries.

M. M. Axelrod, an INO employee, arrived in Jeddah as Khakimov's secretary. Here he worked until 1927, performing the tasks of ENO ¹³ from 1925.

Moisey Markovich Axelrod graduated from the Faculty of Social Sciences of Moscow State University in 1923, and in 1924 - from the Arabic department of the Moscow Institute of International Relations, and he knew not only Arabic, but also Western languages. The Arab East aroused Axelrod's scientific interest. He was able to realize himself as a scientist, publishing in 1926-1930. about 30 Oriental scientific papers in the journals "International Life"and" New East". Formally, in 1929-1930. he was a fellow of the Scientific Association of Orientalists, and in 1929-1931 he taught at the Moscow State University, the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, and the Communist University of the Workers of the East (KUTV)^.14 Perhaps due to the fact that in 1928 Axelrod began working in foreign intelligence, he stopped publishing under his real name and signed Oriental articles with pseudonyms - "M. A." or "Rafiq Musa".

In 1929, Mr. Khakimov was appointed a representative of the Export-import office of Gostorgs for trade with Turkey and the Middle East "Blizhvostgostorg" in Yemen. At the meeting of the Politburo of May 9, 1929 (Protocol No. 79), " the proposal of the NKID was adopted to approve the General Representative of the USSR (General Commissioner of the Middle East Trade Committee) in Yemen, T. V. Korotkov. Khakimov K. A. " ¹⁵, where he worked for about two and a half years, from June 1929 to December 1931. ¹⁶

"In Gejas and Yemen, the GPU did not conduct any work until the arrival of the Soviet ambassador Khakimov. In 1925, being connected with the GPU for work in Mashhad, Khakimov began to conduct information work in Gejas. Simultaneously with

They were accompanied to Gejas by Khakimov's secretary Moisey Axelrod ¹⁷ and a representative of the People's Commissariat of Trade Belkin (1893-1942). (The latter was a career intelligence officer. Under the cover of the NKID, he worked in Yemen, performed separate assignments in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Uruguay, Germany, Spain; died in 1942 in Iran while performing an official task. - P. G.) Axelrod and Belkin voluntarily, at their own risk and fear, began first in Gejas, and then in Yemen as agents. Seeing their zeal, the GPU appointed Axelrod, who soon moved from Gejas to Yemen, as its special representative.

18 ^{Axelrod..., who knew Arabic well, was able to contact prominent Imam Yahya's staff, but due to his lack of intelligence experience, he could not make sufficient use of these connections. From Yemen, Axelrod worked in Eritrea, a colony of Italy, and sometimes even sent agents to Egypt."}

And here is an episode that took place on the way to Yemen in 1928: "In Port Said, the increased vigilance of the steamship police against us, especially against T. S., caught my eye. Axelrod. Our passports were taken ashore (obviously for photography)... One of the police officers, with exaggerated confidentiality, informed T. To Axelrod that we are blacklisted in Egypt. " ¹⁹

Nevertheless, M. Axelrod's intelligence activities continued: "Moses Axelrod was supposed to go to Egypt (at the end of 1929-P. G.) in order to get directly acquainted with local party groups, in particular with the Wafda party (the largest political party in Egypt in 1918 - 1953, which led the national liberation movement in the country. It was mainly a party of the national bourgeoisie, but it also included representatives of the intelligentsia, landowners and small entrepreneurs. Its main goal was to achieve full independence of Egypt. However, being in power in 1924, 1928, 1930, 1936 - 1937, 1942 - 1944, 1950 - 1951 It did not achieve much success. - P. G.), the left wing of which we hoped to split off in order to work together with the Egyptian Communist Party.20^{< ... > Axelrod was supposed to pay attention to the Egyptian merchants, in particular to the local Armenians, who numbered up to 15 thousand people in Egypt, and try to contact India through them. < ... > Axelrod, who was going to Egypt, was supposed to be detained and temporarily used in Constantinople. Moscow reported that Turkey's foreign policy had recently turned to the west, and therefore it was necessary for me to start intelligence work against the Turkish government, for which, if necessary, I could send Axelrod to Angora. < ... > At the beginning of January 1930, I sent a report to Moscow with a proposal to move our center to Beirut. There, we would be closer to the countries where we were supposed to be working, and we would have the advantage over Constantinople that we were out of the scope of international intelligence directed against us and built a solid nest in Istanbul. Moscow, in response, offered to send Axelrod for a personal report. In mid-February, Axelrod... I went to Moscow."}

Contacts between the Soviet Union and the Egyptian side were carried out through the representative offices of both countries in Ankara, Berlin, London, Paris, Rome and Tehran, and, as the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L. M. Karakhan21 wrote to ^the plenipotentiary in France V. S. Dovgalevsky on September 1, 1928, "Paris seems to us the most convenient point for negotiations with the Egyptians"²². As for the capital of Italy, according to the same Karakhan, addressed to the plenipotentiary in Italy D. I. Kursky on February 19, 1929, "...Rome takes on for us the importance of a primary observation post along the line... eastern politics"²³. This is confirmed by the fact that in 1934 Axelrod was appointed resident of Soviet political intelligence in Rome.

Little is known about the short European period of M. M. Axelrod's work. In the history of our intelligence service, he has been preserved, first of all, as the initiator of its activities in the countries of the East. In 1940, his life, like that of many of his talented contemporaries - intelligence officers and diplomats, unjustly accused of crimes that they did not commit, tragically ended.

^{Dumbadze E.} 1 In the service of the Cheka and the Comintern. Paris, MSMXX, pp. 125-126.

² "Regulations on State Political Management" is published in: Dzerzhinskiy F. E. Gosudarstvennaya bezopasnost', Moscow, 2008, pp. 77-81; Chekisty: Istoriya v litsakh, Moscow, 2008, pp. 9-11.

^{Agabekov G. S.} 3 GPU: Notes of the chekist. Berlin, 1930, p. 27.

⁴ Chekists.., p. 40.

^{Kolpakidi A., Prokhorov D.} 5 Vneshnaya razvedka Rossii [Foreign Intelligence of Russia], Moscow, 2001, p. 18.

⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

⁷ Essays on the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence, vol. 2, Moscow, 2006, pp. 241-242.

^{Arabajyan Z. A.} 8 Iran: Opposition to Empires (1918-1941). Moscow, 1996, p. 129.

⁹ Trilisser (Moskvin) Michael (Meer) Abramovich (1883-1940) was an outstanding intelligence organizer. Since 1921 - in the central office of the Cheka. From May 1922 to October 1929-Head of the INO. Seven years at the head of Soviet foreign intelligence - www.nvo.ng.ru/spforces/2008 - 07-18/12_Trilisser.html.

^{Agabekov G. S.} 10 Decree. soch., pp. 214-215, 218-219.

¹¹ USSR and Arab countries. 1917-1960. Moscow, 1961, p. 60.

¹² AVPRF. f. 190, op. 2, p. 1, d. 2, l. 96.

^{Degtyarev K., Kolpakidi A.} 13 Vneshnaya razvedka SSSR [Foreign Intelligence of the USSR]. Moscow, 2009, p. 346.

¹⁴ People and destinies. St. Petersburg, 2003, p. 20.

¹⁵ RGASPI. f. 17, op. 163, d. 784, l. 62.

¹⁶ See: Peresypkin O. G. Vostochnye uzory [Eastern Patterns], Moscow, 2006, pp. 29-31.

¹⁷ See: Kilberg H. I. Memoirs of M. M. Axelrod. - In: Unknown pages of Russian Oriental Studies, Moscow, 1997; Smilyanskaya I. M. Moisey Markovich Akselrod (1898-1940) / / Peoples of Asia and Africa. 1989, N 5.

^{Agabekov G. S.} 18 Edict. soch., p. 212. For more information about K. A. Khakimov, see: Gusterin P. In memory of Karim Khakimov-diplomat and scientist / / Diplomatic Service. 2008, N 1.

¹⁹ About the second trip to Yemen. Report of G. Astakhov from 21.01.1929 / / AVPRF. F. 08, op. 12, p. 77, d. 99, l. 21.

^{Agabekov G. S.} 20 Decree. soch., pp. 237-244.

²¹ Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan's real name is Levon Mikhailovich Karakhanyan. See: People and Destinies.., p. 193.

²² DVP SSSR. T. XI, p. 498.

²³ AVPRF. f. 08, op. 12, p. 77, d. 99, l. 38.