Henry A. Kissinger is one of the major American officials and diplomats of the 20th c, when the U. S. A. became the unique global state. He was the assistant to president of the U. S. A. for national security affairs from 1969 till 1975 and state secretary from 1973 to 1977. In 1973 he won the Nobel Peace Prize. Dr. Kissinger was a scholar before and after his public career, therefore his influence on American and worldwide policy and diplomacy was felt already from the early 60s and is felt even today, when he is past 80.

H. Kissinger's book Diplomacy ¹ is an acknowledged pearl of his scholarship. Against the background of the world diplomacy, the author dwells on historical events from the 17th through 20th c, on the possible conclusions and future changes. It is an interesting and instructive book. Personally I like his style: the text is consequent, language is refined, and conclusions are careful. This provided for a wide distribution: both among amateurs of diplomacy (the same as diplomats, say, are taken to football or fishing),

стр. 59

and among those, who devoted their professional life to international relations now and then offering up their family life.

It is advisable to reread Dr. Kissinger's writings of 1993-94 about our present and near future because his Diplomacy mentions Ukraine only in passim-six or seven times. H. Kissinger's estimations of 1994 reflected the world political thought in relation to our state both at that time, and, the more so, today. Is not it interesting to look at their adequacy? When globalization is in full swing it is more expedient to look at Ukraine from the point of view of the world, than vice versa.

Whimsical order

H. Kissinger's book, as you may remember, begins with the chapter "The New World Order". The author determines this imaginary, dreamlike order as a normal international order based on democracy, free trade, and international law. And he philosophically remarks, that there has never been such system ² . On the following 800 pages he explains why; in the final chapter "Revision of the new world order" he cautiously assumes that it isn't worth looking for it. Though not an ideal one, the new order will sure exist; Kissinger thinks that its basic characteristics will be different enough from those formed during previous fifty years.

What is Kissinger's short-term forecast dwelt upon in the first chapter? Kissinger reminds that during the Cold War the traditional concept of force was substantially distorted. In the past the state with the military, political and economic might became a superpower. When the FSU was a military superpower, but economic midget. To the contrary, Japan was an economic giant, but never existed as military power. After Cold War, most probably, the symmetry will return. At the same time, he thinks, the military power of the U. S. A. will diminish gradually (sic!). As there is no obvious enemy, American public will require redistributing resources from defense to other priorities. Accordingly, other countries will wish to take greater responsibility for their security. These trends will be more palpable in economy.

The international system will be determined, on the one hand, by fragmentation, on the other hand by further globalization. The world order will remind of the European one in the 18th to 19th c. It will

стр. 60

include six main actors-the U. S. A., Europe, Japan, China, Russia and, obviously, India and a number of medium and smaller states. America will have to forget both about the 19th century isolationism, and about actual hegemony during the Cold War.

I suggest analyzing four positions which are marked by Kissinger. To make it clearer, let's make a list:

* the relative military power of the U. S. A. will diminish;

* other countries will undertake greater responsibility for their security;

* the downtrend of relative diminishment of the role of the U. S. A. will be especially evident in economy;

* the international system will be founded on the U. S. A., Europe, China, Japan, Russia, maybe, India.

The first thesis, no doubt, raises the most reservations. Firstly, the delicate talks in the NATO about the "relative technological lag of European countries behind the U. S. A. in the sphere of defense", which I myself heard in the mid-90s, within a decade turned into overt sneers and proceeded from the corridor talks to TV screens. All of them are trying to prove that Europe keeps on trailing along at the back.

But there are also statistical proofs concerning the U. S. military budget. Let us have a look at its dynamics:

Military budget of the U.S.A

* Rough estimate

Everything testifies to the fact that neither absolute nor relative military power of the U. S. A. does not diminish, and the U. S. government is likely ready to do quite a bit so that it does not diminish in the future.

The second prognosis is also doubtful. The countries which were under the wing of the U. S. A. in the Cold War do not want to get out. Despite the American arrogance in the NATO decision making and on the international scene as a whole, the French appeal to create the European military constituent was heard only by the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg. And the very constituent is weak. It is rather theoretical, than military. The rest, especially the "New Europe", is looking for umbrella. Beyond Europe such countries, as Ethiopia and Yemen, Philippines and Thailand, Colombia and Georgia, and even "terrorist" Sudan allowed American military to teach or train them. NATO has a bigger list of applicants now. The U. S. influence in NATO is also bigger. That is, the majority of countries are not eager to increase responsibility for their own security, with the exception of the Russian Federation, as stated later.

It is difficult to verify the third prognosis about the relative diminishment of the U. S. weight in the world economy. Possibly, the GDP data may confirm him. And China will, probably, have better showing than the U. S. A. by 2025, if there are no cataclysms (in China). However modern economy is information and finances in the first place, i. e. ability to use the former to maneuver the latter.

стр. 61

Americans are monopolizing this ability now. Meanwhile every serious economic decision in the world, China including, is made with the expressed or mute consent of the U. S. A... The influence of this superpower has but increased. The American human factor, which makes decisions, leads the way. We will dwell on it at the end of the article.

It is also difficult to comment the fourth prognosis about the amount of global actors. How many will be? Who is an actor? After a decade Europe failed to become a single political and economical actor. After the failure of the common euroconstitution at the end of 2003 they cast doubts on its viability. Looks like, the most pessimistic French warnings about Europe of Fifteen as the most effective mechanism are coming true. Optimists reassure that Europeans will get back to the project of constitution and put everything right. It is most likely, but will it lead to a political and economic unity? Will this 25-member Europe play according to the same score, like American states or Chinese provinces?

If there had been no outer world striving to split, tear up, and set Europe at variance, it would have been united by now. Instead, everybody tempts some part of it by advantages and "special relations".

Russia lies heavy on the "brotherly Slavic states"-Poland, Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia. Or Germany dependent on power supply. On France sympathizing with it. The Arab countries of North Africa are flirting with Spain and France, with Italy and Greece, and all together with Turkey. America does not forget to flatter Britain and scare Holland and Denmark. Japan and China go on pressing, as well as Canada, Brazil (in particular), Mercosur (on the whole) and all "Iberian-American" concert (as a whole). Even little Moldova presses Romania, medium Albania presses down on Italy, and Big Ukraine on everybody one after another (in rotation of presidency). Therefore the consolidation of Europe is an extremely contradictory phenomenon, slow, and unforeseeable. Despite the formal realization the process can essentially slow down.

The next global actor-China-seems to raise no doubts. With some reservations. It is still a very poor country. Despite enormous GDP hundreds of millions of Chinese have only the most necessary clothes, small apartment and minimum of things. The infrastructure is only now being developed, but the size of China and quality of construction works put off the very realization for decades or even centuries. The case with the clumsy atypical pneumonia management revealed psychological unreadiness of the regime and society for global challenges and showed deficit of resources even in such a special issue. Consequently, the degree of globalization of China is considerably below that in Europe.

It is difficult to perceive Japan as a global actor as well. Z. Brzezinsky, another known American politician and scholar of the second half of 20th c, Japan does not look like a global state; it is assigned the role of "Asiatic Canada". The matter concerns Japan going global via active participation in the solution of issues common to all mankind: ecology, international aid, humanitarian actions etc. Isn't it something different from the Kissinger's concept? He can count on one fact only (in the beginning of 2004): Japan agreed to

стр. 62

send 400 servicemen to Iraq. Nevertheless there are some contradictions: servicemen there will carry out humanitarian and infrastructural missions. This is more like Brzezinsky's forecast.

We will venture our own forecast. We will put together opinions of two American professors and get a territorial, raw material, military and human part of one "global" state, to which technological and financial part of another "global" state can be added in the nearest future. And there will be Chipan. Or Japna. As you like. I can answer all possible objections. As far as I know, Japanese nation gradually developed as a result of migration of people and ideas from Korea and China. We suppose that Korea (now Southern, and afterwards United) may be a "gasket" balancing possible reservations, strengthening interest and leveling objections in both Asiatic giants in relation to emerging North-Asiatic Union (like the EU). Taiwan in some form could join the three. On the one hand, such entity could be a nightmare for the U. S. A. and Russia; on the other hand, it might be a natural returning to the roots. Clearly, America and Russian Federation would not back the natural process. It is also clear, that a process will begin with greater consolidation of the EU and pressure of the U. S. A.

Is the Russian Federation a global actor today? Will it remain on the "Kissinger's list" in the nearest 20-25 years? The answer is yes, if only at least Brazil is inscribed on the list. Although it seems to us that the list will rather shrink and consist of the first three participants only realizing the terrible foresight of Orwell. In any case, the vast territory of the RF, its natural riches, remnants of military might, human intellect and national ambitions (it is a very important constituent!) will keep it among global states even a decade after Kissinger's forecasts. The brain drain undermining intellectual potential and authorization (anti-democratization) undermining national ambitions are two processes which can substantially change the situation. In addition, the U. S. A., unlike the EU, focus efforts on limitation of reviving Russian globalization, reduction of this phenomenon to Eurasian globalization implying existing borders instead of real transboundery impact. Some recent relative facts one can find in the article "Liberal empire" against the "superpower" ⁴ . More philosophical treatment can be found in A. Halchynsky's article ⁵ . Now, there is a problem: can a country be considered global without transboundery impact, especially when we mean Russia? Every global force may control the periphery (except for the U. S. A. which considers the rest of the world a periphery). By the way, quite often periphery welcomes such approach. In this connection we should underline the powerful strengthening of the Brazilian impact on other countries of South America; it being known that certain countries of the continent support this process as a defense from the harmful effect of North America under the leadership of the U. S. A... The neighbors of Russia either only conditionally support its influence (Kazakhstan, Byelorussia) or do not support at all. Let this question remain open.

But seeing India as a global actor in 2004 obviously crystallized in comparison with the events a decade before. India achieved much success in economy,

стр. 63

technology and control of periphery. India is morally superior to Pakistan in their conflict in Kashmir, even if it gives away a part of its territory. India is globally present in the sphere of information, culture and finance. It is also very important that India is an English-speaking nation and its Diaspora becomes the real outpost of India in any society. As far as India is the biggest Moslem state in the world (over 300m!), one should not exclude that rapprochement of eternal competitors-India and Pakistan- will begin after the solution of Kashmir issue starting with the framework of South- Asiatic association of regional cooperation and proceeding to compete with the "North Asiatic" association of China and Japan. At first glance it looks like a fantasy, especially taking into account the privileged relations of China with Pakistan. However, common geography, economy and colonial history-as in the case of India and Pakistan-may appear more important than short-term political contradictions. It was the same with France and Germany, Romania and Hungary, Syria and Turkey, Sudan and Egypt, etc.

Achievement an object: stability through imperialism

Let's take now the Kissinger's recommendations about the future of the world. One can find them in the final chapter of his book. They sound rather conservative meaning that rapid and smooth expansion of the U. S. A. during the last 130 years on the continent, in the hemisphere and in the world succeeded due to a set of rules and approaches which should be applied in the coming future as well. Then America achieves much success. The form of such approach is partnership; the slogan is promotion of democracy; objective is preservation of EuroAtlantic nucleus and strengthening of its own presence due to creation of key points of resistance in different parts of the planet.

It is a brief of advices intended to clarify how to realize the said approach. American- Russian, American-European, American-Asiatic (Japan and China apart) relations are considered the most important. The Western hemisphere is mentioned as well, though not as a result, but as a gained objective. Kissinger explains his confidence in the fact that the U. S. A will be the gainer by its total control of the Western hemisphere ⁶ .

In future relations with Russia Kissinger advised to keep in mind, as a key element, its imperialistic nature telling that at the moment the prospects of democracy in Russia were uncertain. To his mind, it was uncertain if even the policy of democratic Russia could be instrumental for international stability. During its dramatic history Russia led her own way, different from that of the West. It had no autonomous church; had no Reformation, Age of Enlightenment, Epoch of Great Discoveries, modern market economy... Even true reformers can treat traditional Russian nationalism as a unifying force for achievement of their aims. And nationalism in Russia was always missionary and imperial.

Kissinger considered integration of Russia into the international system the key task of the emerging world order....If Russia was destined to become a serious partner in creation of a new world order, she had to be ready for the requirements of stability in the world relations, and advantages ⁷ . His estimation of the key role of the Russian issue (see below) looms

стр. 64

behind the statement. And there is also this fact that Russia is the biggest neighbor of Ukraine.

He is more languid in his reasoning about relationships with Europe. He calls for quicker integration of CEE into NATO and the EU (which is being done now). Here he mentioned the security tensions between the U. S. A. and Europe (he was fifty percent right about Old Europe; however, the position of New Europe shows that Americans have taken into account the warnings of "Diplomacy"). Here, finally, there is an appeal to bring Russia closer to NATO; we also find a casual remark that it can happen even if RF absorbs a former republic to keep it within the boundaries of the FSU. What are such offerings for? ⁸ For the sake of global domination.

How can one achieve domination? With the help of expanded NATO. At the time Kissinger wrote the book nobody could tell which emerging force or combination of forces will be the most powerful or dangerous: Russia, China, or fundamentalist Islam. The ability of America to handle these challenges would be increased by the reformed North Atlantic cooperation ⁹ .

Analyzing Asian future Kissinger proceeded from the necessity of existence of the stability triangle U. S. -Japan-China in Asia; though he noted that it wasn't in the best American traditions. The latter sustain independent determination of positions and policy. According to Kissinger, without Chine America could fail in Asia, because other Asian countries wouldn't back the plan. Even if they shared American approaches in soul, they would step aside; because, in the end, America was far from China which was present everywhere.

The upshot of the matter was that H. Kissinger noticed an interesting paradox: the U. S. A. with Europe had common values, but lacked common strategic priorities in the post-bipolar world. They differed with China, but had common strategic purpose to balance (control?-R. V.) the rest of Asia. In the Western hemisphere all coincided with American interests ¹⁰ .

What about these conclusions a decade after their formulation?

The so called Europe, as it is seen today, is far less united and romantic, than at the time of "Diplomacy". The CE countries joined NATO and readily integrated into the EU, but, at the first glance, the stand of Europe did not improve. We have already mentioned the failure of the European constitution. Certainly, it was due to the partners' responsibly in relation to future obligations. That is, preparing to sign something, they prepare to fulfill it afterwards. Therefore, the European Union quarrel looks clearly superficial. It is intended for consensus only. Participants of negotiations expressed no objections against the very idea. Everyone wishes to have his finger in the pie. And if New Europe wants more than Brussels has sliced, which is only natural, and if the U. S. A. now back this position, it might be advisable go a bull. Cynical? Of course. In such sense politics was and will be cynical always. However, at closer examination we see that new European politicians gain a better slice not for themselves, but for the voters in the countries they represent. Consequently, it is no cynicism, but protection of national interests, or national producer,

стр. 65

i. e. his/her own people. And it goes without saying. It is the main goal of any government.

Certainly, overplaying their demands, the New Europeans will push Paris and Berlin to separate rapprochement. And Washington might well welcome such scenario. There could be nothing better. On the one hand, thirty members of NATO cannot even budge without the U. S. A., but can replace American soldiers (i. e. voters!) on a battlefield. On the other hand, there is high-tech and productive, but disconnected economy of thirty small countries, which could be curtailed by simple stockjobbing. And there is still a prize: Russia. It is big and rich in resources and pays miserable wages. But it is situated between Europeans and Americans. It plays both ways, but will always loose each way because of its technological and financial backwardness. And all this structure is controlled by Washington.

The same is about Asia, as seen from 1994. India was still at daggers drawn with Pakistan and it couldn't be ignored as a force. Kissinger thought that Japan and China, accentuating their controversies and nuclear ambitions of North Korea, could be managed as a trio, because these two countries alone could come to an agreement, while Americans would lack resources to deal with each separately. The European scenario (EU + Russia under NATO with the possible sacrifice of the post-soviet states) should be replayed in Asia as Japan + China under the U. S. A. with the possible sacrifice of Korea. .

It was Kissinger's scenario in 1994. There is a temptation to name it imperial.

At the same time there exists common sense, and it reminds us, that the critical mass of offenses and problems, having been hidden by the bipolar competitions for almost fifty years, has broken loose and began to crash institutions and international agreements, environment and human rights, economic agreements and security of peaceful citizens. 11/9 is a result of freeing of the artificially retained contradictions. It burst out in the point of maximum contradictions. It was Caucasus in the FSU. Globally this is Near East with enormous concentration of civilization, religious, political, social humiliation, which was not accounted for by the civilization of the early 3rd millennium. The Kissinger's forecast mentions it in one line only. We will analyze the oversight below. Now we will get back to the "imperial" scenario of the events of the 21st c laid out in "Diplomacy" 10 years ago.

The comparative analysis of the number and character of the threats to stability during this decade shows that the former increased and the latter diversified. The reasons are also obvious: following the heady news of triumph over Communism, public in the West demanded curtailing militarism and expanding human rights and liberties, while the repressive machine of the East broke and for the time being stopped to control immature societies. As far as the majority of people today cannot decide for themselves and as far as there is no reliable and strong partner the U. S. A. take it upon itself. They are not guided by "aggressive", "colonial", or "imperial" interests. They look after themselves. Their security and welfare. They are like the dwellers of an "elite" apartment house hiring a concierge. When hooligans attack them

стр. 66

on the street, they create police. After 11/9 such actions of the U. S. do not look unmotivated, and the Kissinger's suggestions, calling to respond to drastic threats, do not seem imperial.

It should be noted that Kissinger's scenario is not strictly followed today. Maybe, 10 years is a too small period for conclusions. The tendencies seen by Americans are not clearly shaped sometimes. Here are two simple contradictory facts from the early 2004. The WTO Arbitration came to the conclusion about illegality of the one-sided American protectionism measures at the market of metal and food products. Fines imposed on the U. S. A. reached milliards of dollars. It looks like the united Europe simply resists America. At the same time some countries of this union (for example Denmark, Spain, Italy) get right to take part in tenders for reconstruction of Iraq, and other (Germany, France) have no such right, or only partial permission. And winners feel free to exercise their right, and losers do not express indignation toward the former, do not call for solidarity etc. That is, the second fact testifies that Kissinger's recommendations are realistic Europe can be put under U. S. influence and not only in a military sphere. Although, the first fact may point to a border right in the middle of Atlantic. It is noteworthy, that in both cases we deal with large incomes (or the lost benefit); therefore moral reasons cannot explain such differences. What will outweigh? Will Kissinger's recommendations be carried out? If not, how big the gap will be between Europe and America and how it will influence its own security?

The fate of relations of EU and RF, and the fate of the grey area between them (Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldova, South Caucasus) is connected with the answers to these questions. If the United States take over the control of Europe, guarantee its unity in critical cases like that in Iraq, the policy of RF in relation to its neighbors becomes restrained, internal development gains perspective, relations with the Far- Eastern north Asiatic neighbors remain within the framework of economy. If the EU becomes stronger within a short time and acquires internal unity, then it will gain control package in the relationships with Russia, agreement about patronage of Moscow over the grey area will be concluded (unlike Washington Brussels has neither resources nor experience to do it). As a result Russia begins flirting with Japan, China and Koreas on its own and comes out to the Pacific coast as a local counterbalance to the U. S. A.

Such unexpected scenario is not a science fiction. In 1998 D. Landes wrote that Russia became a big prison and, except for a few months in 1917 and a few years after 1990, it remained a place of confinement (one should wait and see the outcome of present exercises with democracy) ¹¹ . This is the same Landes, which casts aside a myth about immanence of democracy for some, allegedly the "most European" peoples and gives an example of Hitlerite Germany born of the Weimar Republic.

A similar "variant fork" exists for the future relations of the U. S. A. with Asia. The U. S. backing of the rapid development of India (which actually takes place now) drags China's attention away to the south, and does not allow Peking to monitor the rapprochement with Japan; at the same

стр. 67

time, it forces Americans to exercise supervision over the Pacific Basin, which could be executed by China distracted from India. But if Washington stakes on Peking, in 25 years there will be bipolar competition not for Atlantic, but for the Pacific Basin.

About America

The Diplomacy dedicates many pages to the United States of America as the country that occupies special place in modern history. To highlight the problem, H. Kissinger gives future leaders many pieces of advice. There are two reasons to remind them on: to look if they are realized and to just to memorize them. Everybody can use a piece of advice about living in the 21st c, cannot he?

Why such advices? According to Kissinger, because the world situation has changed cardinally: the collapse of soviet communism meant the intellectual rehabilitation of the American ideals and, by twist of fate, made America to face the world which she tried to avoid during all its history ¹² . But whence this trouble? Does not it mean that, fighting against the Soviet Union and its clientele in the world during decades, Washington failed to work out a schedule of actions following the V-Day? As everybody knows, waging war with the Hitlerite Germany, Washington designed such project together with Britain and the USSR, and it led to the creation of the United Nations Organization. Yet in 1943, when the results of the WWII were not obvious, U. S. President F. Roosevelt told that "Four policemen", China included, will take care of the post-war world ¹³ . Meanwhile the 1991 victory took America by surprise. There is another definite proof: in summer 1990 President of the U. S. A. George Bush, Sr. arrived in Kyiv to declare support for the Soviet Union and warn against "destructive nationalism" which meant the renewal of independence of people of the FSU republics. Objective historians will probably remember this major failure of the superpower administration in the 20th c, which was like the failure of the FSU administration in 1941 that appeared unready for the attack of Germany. Both failures happened because a bunch of bureaucrats and pseudo-specialists provided false data for the executives based rather on beliefs instead of facts. Washington Sovietologists of the 80s and 90s appeared professionally helpless. By the way, their school was not dismantled; presently many those prophets go on supplying data for the Russian direction of analytical services of the U. S. A. or train specialists in Russian philology.

H. Kissinger was careful during the FSU disintegration and its transformation into 15 independent states and a number of dependent quasi-entities (like Prydnistrovya or Abkhazia). Admitting the possibility of the Russian variant ¹⁴ of the Monroe Doctrine, he advises America to apply it, with reservations, in the eastern part (Central Asia) because of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism.

This is a striking example of a retained advice of Kissinger given to Washington; he is not pushing it. There is no opponent to American expansion, but Kissinger advises to be careful. Why? He maintains that geopolitically America is an island far away from the great Eurasian mainland, whose resources" and population outbalance American possibilities ¹⁵ .

According to Kissinger, for the

стр. 68

third time in a row, within one century, America embarked on creating a new world order; therefore it should maintain balance between the idea of extermination of the evil and elimination of differences and instinct to build a closed society. Unfastidious interference with all ethnic disturbances and civil wars after the Cold War would rob crusading America of vitality... When in 1821 John Quincy Adams advised Americans against propensity to exterminate "far-away monsters", he could not even imagine the number and size of monsters in the post-bipolar world. At least they deserve to be controlled. However, the choice of criteria goes first.

One could think that criteria are not chosen and Washington is loosing its grasp on geopolitical balance between the U. S. A. and the rest of the world. American political scientist Carl Deutsch warned that there was something like Parkinson's Law in national security: feeling of danger for nation grew simultaneously with its power. The mightier the state is, the more its leaders, its elite and often its population increases its aspirations in the sphere of international relations. That is it feels a calling or feels obliged to introduce order in the world or at least to keep it right to its liking... Only the most powerful nations can develop a more or less plausible world image which can be managed in accordance with the tastes of population; its fears, efforts and spending increase accordingly ¹⁶ .

Is there actually such regularity and is it valid for the U. S. A. ? 30 years later another scholar wrote that objective threats for America did not increase, but American desire to control environment augmented. And the mightier it becomes, the greater influence it desire ¹⁷ . Practitioners confirm claims of scientists. In an interview the "Washington Post" the CIA deputy director for analytical questions remarked that Americans undertake steps which would be disclaimed as a precedent, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in further efforts to annihilate terrorist groups in the whole world ¹⁸ .

Certainly, somebody may object that nobody in America, Euroatlantic community and the world imagined how week an empire the FSU, did not realize that its heirs mostly would not be able to control their own territory and security. The latter can account for sometimes inadequate efforts of Euroatlantic and all those eager to fill the unexpected vacuum of security. They say they did not realize that the terrorist threat can be so mighty and penetrating. That is why antiterrorist methods of the 21st c are such all-embracing, hard, and unselective.

Both arguments do not stand up to criticism. Nothing can justify amateurish attitude (and it was a real reason). On the one hand, there were incorrect prognoses of sovietologists, on the other hand, execs were ready to believe them, as it was more comfortable, and in addition there was obvious unwillingness to listen to "men from the street", who lived in the post-communist space from Angola to Slovakia and Vietnam. Now, those counterterrorist actions are not so much all-embracing, as geographically dispersed, not so much hard, as cruel, and not so much unselective, as selective. They are politically selective, and it creates a feeling, that terrorism is not treated as a phenomenon, but as a hostile army headed by simplified Usama.

Here are only two examples to back it. The first one is dealing with the

стр. 69

Crusade Complex of which forewarned Kissinger 10 years ago. But President George Bush, Jr., however, called to crusade eastern enemies and it smelled of anti-Islamism rather than of counterterrorism. The second example concerns the same anti- American president and relates to Iraq. It is a question of the memoirs of the member of his Cabinet P. O'Neil, which remembers the president's gave orders to "find a method to oust that S. Hussein" before dossiers were obtained and suggestions made about actions in Iraq. In both examples desire (intention) instead of calculation is a priority, and the crusade is carried out without verification, whether there are enough resources and whether all those called answered. That is one more contradiction with Kissinger who called for moral consensus about devotion to democracy ¹⁹ .

Situation is complicated by the fact that the American economy of the 21st c is failing to meet the demands of its own leaders. Thence the dissatisfaction of taxpayers. It is considerably more difficult to tell those, who is for development, how to do it properly. As a result, the number of a priory respecters of America diminished, the number of conscientious supporters reduced, the number of followers and rivals crawled, and the number of haters and saboteurs skyrocketed. Those may be coincidences and blunders of administration. However, that may cost the world a pretty penny.

By the way, Kissinger forewarned that traditional American idealism must go together with serious estimation of modern realities in order to formulate practical aims of American interests. Foreign-policy interests of America in the past were inspired by the utopian pictures of eventual final stage of self-reproduction of internal global harmony (like the image of communism created in the FSU of the 50s and 60s of the 20th c?) ²⁰ . These words of Kissinger from 1994 may well be perceived in Washington in 2004 as a far-sighted appeal for retreat, unreadiness to fight an enemy "wherever he is". But is America able (not to say capable) to be both leader and lawmaker? Is not it more expedient to back initiatives of smaller actors which are more interested in security and stability? This way America will maintain consensus, which is objectively needed for humanity and which cannot be obtained under pressure.

Now for the Washington cadre. The question is as follows: do those, who prepare decisions, review the decisions of their predecessors? Or listen to advice of those, who settled dozens of negotiations and signed peace treaties? It is not a matter of succession in the State Department, because objective process of replacement of generation succession is obligatory here as well. Those are elders who resort to force in Washington. They know less than the 1994 staff and exert greater pressure. It is a matter of ideological succession and priorities, said H. Kissinger in 1994 ²¹ . The Presidential address to the nation of Jan. 21, 2004 is inspired by different ideas.

Everyone has a skeleton in a closet

Analyzing suggestions and foresights of Dr. Kissinger we should mention things he forgot or passed over in silence. There are three such topics. United Nations Organization. Terrorism. Near East. More

стр. 70

precisely: region between Europe, Russia, China India and Sahara, which in English is called Middle East and North Africa-MENA. After American coinage it is now called the Greater Middle East. Why are they held back?

Michiko Kakutani, one of the reviewers of Diplomacy, called the book the elegant study of the western diplomacy. This is an apt determination. It, possibly, explains why there is no treatment of the said topics.

They are mentioned here and there though. However, they are not paid proper attention to as fundamental issues.

Meanwhile M. Kakutani made note of weak sides of such one-sided approach. And we would like to know if Kissinger simply did not like to dwell at length on the UNO, MENA and terrorism because of his west-oriented conceptualization?

Washington has not developed a liking to the United Nations Organization. According to the world press, the administration of President G. Bush, Jr. does not consider itself bound by international laws and considers the UNO as a bureaucratic structure hampering decision making. It is a common estimation. But it can be used to other American administrations as well. H. Kissinger wrote the book at the times of Clinton administration which positioned himself as a supporter of consensus and friend of the UNO. It was Clinton's administration that designed plans and arguments of Iraqi war and G. Bush only ordered to complete the operation devised by his predecessor. During Clinton's times administration paved the way for denunciation of the ABM Treaty with the RF which was formally realized in the time of Bush administration. We heard a lot of accusations of Reagan of one-sidedness and disrespect of the world opinion! Time and again Carter was called a hypocrite (for selective observance of human rights)! Now, let's quit listing all post-war presidents and summarize: the UNO was created with the help and active participation of the U. S. A. in a concrete period and for concrete objectives. When it became clear, that the UN is ineffective under new conditions (Cold War) or burdensome (post-bipolar world), they stopped to fuss over it and began sorting things out. Namely, it had to be instrumental in New York formalizing decisions made in Washington. Let's face the truth! God be merciful, but if Moscow had won the Cold War, the UNO would have been done with once and forever.

So, the UNO is out of question. Is it worth speaking about? Sure, it is. To my mind, omitting the UNO topic H. Kissinger undervalues collective activism. Arranging countries on a piece of paper, he loses feeling of scale. The number of questions to be considered simultaneously rises exponentially. If all 281,421 million American citizens get down to work, they will not be able to manage it. But the volume of work may be axed, if we systematize amassed issues. It is named the international law. And the UNO is its source. The latest example: 1999 Global Compact about the rules of relations of business world and world social problems renewed by the Secretary General of UNO in 2004 ²² . The globalization multiplies quality and quantity problems. Without UNO and its rules there is no way to control instability in time of globalization.

One could raise the objection that the Diplomacy simply does not contain the

стр. 71

chapter "UNO", as well as a lot of other possible chapters. We wouldn't agree: it does not contain any feeling of place and necessity of UNO in the future. It is no chance, but intention.

Will the U. S. A. change its attitude toward UNO in the future? They'd rather do it, though emotions may prevail over sober analysis.

The MENA topic, possibly, was omitted because it was beyond Kissinger's means. Although, being the secretary of the state he tackled the matter in real earnest but ever since the Near East changed, though not always for the best. It is rather a knotty issue. Here we find a problem of technological backwardness of the region in a global society, problem of historic injustice in opposition of Israel and Arab world, problem of Islam as a world view and a way of life that cardinally distinguishes this region from the rest of the world. It is a unique concatenation of circumstances, Gordian knot of the 21st c, as much as a threat to cleave which led to 11/9.

Now for the terrorism. Kissinger underrated it. Like nobody in 1994 could see it in the light of 2001.

When Kissinger was writing his Diplomacy (not without his participation) the first serious political changes took place in the MENA region. The atmosphere of disorderly fight of all against all, decision of certain problems at the expense of other was replaced by purposeful efforts to establish priorities and appoint those responsible for a positive result. The very problem of terrorism is rather complicated. Experts and politicians disagree on account of it. The latter accentuate the so called "axis of evil", "countries-pariahs" and call for destruction of the "cells of terrorism". These politicians include leaders of the U. S. A. Israel, and quite often the RF. At the same time researchers and experts think that "in the case of modern terrorism we deal with the new phenomenon which does not match either the concept of the state or the concept of ethnic communities. We rather face informal networks-Diaspora, radical and fundamentalist or criminal coalitions-which play an important role today. Therefore presently local activists, representatives of minorities together with other communities, NGOs and international structures can carry out more destructive actions, including violence ²³ .

Therefore, the ostentatious unity of political leaders against terrorism in the style of battle actions on the basis of UNO resolutions or without them and school-like monitoring of "anti-terrorist performance" only confuse public creating an illusion of powerful planetary blow, when actually they deal with the budget of law enforcement authorities and increase of the rating of politicians ²⁴ . More convincing is the complex approach which views the origin of global terrorist network as a result of economic, political and social and cultural reasons. However, modern anti-terrorist strategies give preference to military and social measures. The members of counterterrorist coalition still go on fighting with the displays and consequences of terrorism instead of causes. The efficacy of such measures can be estimated by the level of disclosing of terrorist crimes, which is extraordinarily low (from 5 to 10%) ²⁵ .

It is exploration and not resolution or revolution that attracts me. Besides the word "networks" it subconsciously calls for the existence of the center for network control or at least generating structure.

стр. 72

Although V. Tyshkov, the author of the term, argues that there is neither center nor structure, but a response to objective and subjective changes/events, which is not always predictable, and is always unacceptable. On the other hand, even novice in politics can expect such response to not always necessary, but "always rightful" actions authored by Washington today.

By the way, it would be a mistake to treat the UN antiterrorism as bureaucratic exercises only. Piles of resolutions as contribution to politics do not abolish considerable theoretical and organizational input of Organization into the control of terrorism. For example, Report about the policy of the Working Group "UNO and Terrorism" ²⁶ with its 31 recommendations is a balanced and all-embracing document, which consistently examines the methods of dissuasion, denial and cooperation and stipulates for participation of UNO, states, NGOs, legal, economic and social actions, preventiveness, logicality, programming, etc. It's quite another matter that more often than not politicians reduce strategy to the level of headlines. They do not twist reality, but simplify it making it sound false. Let's imagine that having read the Diplomacy, a journalist will write: "H. Kissinger asserts that the American foreign policy is the best one". Actually H. Kissinger asserts not only this, which does him credit, and not always this. That is why he is considered among the best diplomats and scholars. The two-volume edition of memoirs of the leader of the former MFA of the FSU A. Gromyko is a horse of a different color.

The book is long; however its review should be shorter. This 911-pages work is the real encyclopedia of the newest (western) diplomacy with high-quality retrospective explanation of its sources. Therefore the foresights are convincing.

There are no foresights concerning Ukraine in the book. It is farsightedly implanted in-between European-Russian relations, even without proper condolences. Of course, you do not choose geography. It may be beneficial, though: some, as Egypt and Panama, dig a channel and become rich. Other, as SFRU, are turned into the Kosovo exemplary concentration camp and ruined. There are a lot of sharp words in the book about eastern neighbors of Ukraine mentioned above. They are also very promising.

H. Kissinger is more indulgent about western neighbors 1993, though not without remarks. And it is a good sign. The environment of Ukraine is not either ideal or all- powerful. It may be less able, probably less experienced and demonstratively less educated. But it learns its lessons. Its elite and electorate should dispose of the gain and strive for the better place in fundamental worldbooks. Dr. Henry Kissinger is rather impartial, despite his personal likings. That is why the Diplomacy deserves to be re-read in the future.

References

¹ "Diplomacy", Simon & Shuster, N. Y., 1994

² P. 18.

³ Data of the U. S. Department of Defense.

⁴ Е. Фесько, В. Ананьєв, "День", 14.01.04.

⁵ "Обережно!" - Росія. "Дзеркало тижня", 24-30.05.03.

⁶ P. 831-832.

стр. 73

⁷ P. 817-819.

⁸ There was an anecdote in the FSU: moronic leader L. Brezhniev saw the new rocket system and accidentally pressed the "start" button. As a result, they reported, Guinea vanished. "Damn it, " the General Secretary of the CPSU says (other variants mention another faraway country.) Kissin-ger's reflections remind of it.

⁹ P. 826.

¹⁰ P. 831.

¹¹ David S. Landes. "The wealth and poverty of Nations", New York, 1998, 650 p.

¹² P. 19.

¹³ P. 829.

¹⁴ P. 816.

¹⁵ P. 813.

¹⁶ Karl W. Deutsch, "The analysis of International Relations", Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice - Hall, 1986, p. 88.

¹⁵ Fareed Zakkaria, "From wealth to power. The unusual origin of America's world role", p. 185. Princeton University Press, 1998, 199p.

¹⁶ "Washington Post", 13/01/04

¹⁷ P. 834.

¹⁸ P. 836.

¹⁹ P. 812.

²⁰ UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's address to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, 23.01.04.

²¹ В. А. Тишков. "Социально-куль-турный аспект феномена терроризма// Социальные и психологические проб-лемы борьбы с международным терро-ризмом. - М. Наука, 2002 - с. 26, quoted after: Ю. Марченко. На тлі ціннісної кризи. "Політика і час", N 12, 2003, ст. 61-66

²² www.un.org.terrorism

²³ E. Machenko, op. cit., p. 65.

²⁴ Annex to A/57/273 S/2102/875